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Due to the removal of the blkcipher and ablkcipher algorithm types,
crypto_skcipher::keysize is now redundant since it always equals
crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->max_keysize.
Remove it and update crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() accordingly.
Also rename crypto_skcipher_default_keysize() to
crypto_skcipher_max_keysize() to clarify that it specifically returns
the maximum key size, not some unspecified "default".
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Pull eCryptfs updates from Tyler Hicks:
- Fix error handling when ecryptfs_read_lower() encounters an error
- Fix read-only file creation when the eCryptfs mount is configured to
store metadata in xattrs
- Minor code cleanups
* tag 'ecryptfs-5.3-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
ecryptfs: Change return type of ecryptfs_process_flags
ecryptfs: Make ecryptfs_xattr_handler static
ecryptfs: remove unnessesary null check in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig
ecryptfs: use print_hex_dump_bytes for hexdump
eCryptfs: fix permission denied with ecryptfs_xattr mount option when create readonly file
ecryptfs: re-order a condition for static checkers
eCryptfs: fix a couple type promotion bugs
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This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
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Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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request_key and ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key never
return a NULL pointer, so no need do a null check.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Static checkers complain that we are using "s->i" as an offset before
we check whether it is within bounds. It doesn't matter much but we
can easily swap the order of the checks to make everyone happy.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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Trivial fix to spelling mistake in debug message text.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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The script “checkpatch.pl” pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written …
Thus fix the affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable.
* Delete the jump target "out" and the local variable "rc"
which became unnecessary with this refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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Omit extra messages for a memory allocation failure in these functions.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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Trival fix, some error messages are missing a \n, so add it.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are
not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic
because the payload of a revoked key is NULL. request_key() *does* skip
revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked
before we acquire the key semaphore.
Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return
-EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL. For completeness we check this
for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys
cannot be revoked currently.
Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to
fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it
seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer.
Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.19+]
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time
ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page
cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE.
This promise never materialized. And unlikely will.
We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to
PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether
PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case,
especially on the border between fs and mm.
Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much
breakage to be doable.
Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are
not.
The changes are pretty straight-forward:
- <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;
- PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN};
- page_cache_get() -> get_page();
- page_cache_release() -> put_page();
This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using
script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files.
I've called spatch for them manually.
The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to
PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later.
There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll
fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also
will be addressed with the separate patch.
virtual patch
@@
expression E;
@@
- E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
expression E;
@@
- E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+ E
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT
+ PAGE_SHIFT
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_SIZE
+ PAGE_SIZE
@@
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_MASK
+ PAGE_MASK
@@
expression E;
@@
- PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E)
+ PAGE_ALIGN(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_get(E)
+ get_page(E)
@@
expression E;
@@
- page_cache_release(E)
+ put_page(E)
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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eCryptfs: Fix null pointer dereference on kzalloc error path
The conversion to skcipher and shash added a couple of null pointer
dereference bugs on the kzalloc failure path. This patch fixes them.
Fixes: 3095e8e366b4 ("eCryptfs: Use skcipher and shash")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch replaces uses of ablkcipher and blkcipher with skcipher,
and the long obsolete hash interface with shash.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The patch 237fead61998: "[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and
fs/Kconfig" from Oct 4, 2006, leads to the following static checker
warning:
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:846 ecryptfs_new_file_context()
error: off-by-one overflow 'crypt_stat->cipher' size 32. rl = '0-32'
There is a mismatch between the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
and ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat.global_default_cipher_name causing the
copy of the cipher name to cause a off-by-one string copy error. This
fix ensures the space reserved for this string is the same size including
the trailing zero at the end throughout ecryptfs.
This fix avoids increasing the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
and also ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet_silly_stack.cipher_string and instead
reduces the of ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE to 31 and includes the + 1 for
the end of string terminator.
NOTE: An overflow is not possible in practice since the value copied
into global_default_cipher_name is validated by
ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string() at mount time. None of the allowed
cipher strings are long enough to cause the potential buffer overflow
fixed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[tyhicks: Added the NOTE about the overflow not being triggerable]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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The elements in the data array are already unsigned chars and do not
need to be casted.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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There's no reason to include syscalls.h in keystore.c. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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In 'decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key' function:
Initializes 'payload' pointer and releases it on exit.
Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.28+
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When the userspace messaging (for the less common case of userspace key
wrap/unwrap via ecryptfsd) is not needed, allow eCryptfs to build with
it removed. This saves on kernel code size and reduces potential attack
surface by removing the /dev/ecryptfs node.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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smatch analysis:
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1206 decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key() info:
redundant null check on msg calling kfree()
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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This is meant to remove a compiler warning. It should not make any
functional change.
payload_len should be initialized when it is passed to
write_tag_64_packet() as a pointer. If that call fails, this function
should return early, and payload_len won't be used.
Signed-off-by: Simon Que <sque@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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statfs() calls on eCryptfs files returned the wrong filesystem type and,
when using filename encryption, the wrong maximum filename length.
If mount-wide filename encryption is enabled, the cipher block size and
the lower filesystem's max filename length will determine the max
eCryptfs filename length. Pre-tested, known good lengths are used when
the lower filesystem's namelen is 255 and a cipher with 8 or 16 byte
block sizes is used. In other, less common cases, we fall back to a safe
rounded-down estimate when determining the eCryptfs namelen.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/885744
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many
magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This
patch defines those values and replaces the magic values.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set’:
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1991:28: warning: ‘payload_len’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1976:9: note: ‘payload_len’ was declared here
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Fixes a regression caused by b5695d04634fa4ccca7dcbc05bb4a66522f02e0b
Kernel keyring keys containing eCryptfs authentication tokens should not
be write locked when calling out to ecryptfsd to wrap and unwrap file
encryption keys. The eCryptfs kernel code can not hold the key's write
lock because ecryptfsd needs to request the key after receiving such a
request from the kernel.
Without this fix, all file opens and creates will timeout and fail when
using the eCryptfs PKI infrastructure. This is not an issue when using
passphrase-based mount keys, which is the most widely deployed eCryptfs
configuration.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Tested-by: Alexis Hafner1 <haf@zurich.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.39+]
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* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
tpm: Fix a typo
tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
...
Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c
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No idea why these were split in the first place...
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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The function ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig() has been modified in order
to search keys of both 'user' and 'encrypted' types.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The buffers allocated while encrypting and decrypting long filenames can
sometimes straddle two pages. In this situation, virt_to_scatterlist()
will return -ENOMEM, causing the operation to fail and the user will get
scary error messages in their logs:
kernel: ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet: Internal error whilst attempting
to convert filename memory to scatterlist; expected rc = 1; got rc =
[-12]. block_aligned_filename_size = [272]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_filename: Error attempting to generate tag 70
packet; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename: Error attempting to
encrypt filename; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_lookup: Error attempting to encrypt and encode
filename; rc = [-12]
The solution is to allow up to 2 scatterlist entries to be used.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
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A requested key is write locked in order to prevent modifications on the
authentication token while it is being used.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() call is moved before the
mutex_lock(s->tfm_mutex) instruction in order to avoid possible deadlocks
that may occur by holding the lock on the two semaphores 'key->sem' and
's->tfm_mutex' in reverse order.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the
update() method of the corresponding key. The new function
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from
the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to
encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
[tyhicks: Minor formatting changes]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The size of the 'keysig' array is incremented of one byte in order to make
room for the NULL character. The 'keysig' variable is used, in the function
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(), to find an authentication token with
the given signature and is printed a debug message if it cannot be
retrieved.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch removes the 'num_global_auth_toks' field of the
ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat structure, used to count the number of items in
the 'global_auth_tok_list' list. This variable is not needed because there
are no checks based upon it.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The pointer '(*auth_tok_key)' is set to NULL in case request_key()
fails, in order to prevent its use by functions calling
ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Commit cb55d21f6fa19d8c6c2680d90317ce88c1f57269 revealed a number of
missing 'z' length modifiers in calls to ecryptfs_printk() when
printing variables of type size_t. This patch fixes those compiler
warnings.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk
Make formats and arguments match.
Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
[tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to
force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has
been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and
'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and
the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only
files encrypted with the specified authentication token.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch replaces the check of the 'matching_auth_tok' pointer with
the exit status of ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig().
This avoids to use authentication tokens obtained through the function
ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig which are not valid.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch allows keys requested in the function
ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig()to be released when they are no
longer required. In particular keys are directly released in the same
function if the obtained authentication token is not valid.
Further, a new function parameter 'auth_tok_key' has been added to
ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() in order to provide callers the key
pointer to be passed to key_put().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[Tyler: Initialize auth_tok_key to NULL in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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In this code, 0 is returned on memory allocation failure, even though other
failures return -ENOMEM or other similar values.
A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as
follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression ret;
expression x,e1,e2,e3;
@@
ret = 0
... when != ret = e1
*x = \(kmalloc\|kcalloc\|kzalloc\)(...)
... when != ret = e2
if (x == NULL) { ... when != ret = e3
return ret;
}
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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When searching through the global authentication tokens for a given key
signature, verify that a matching key has not been revoked and has not
expired. This allows the `keyctl revoke` command to be properly used on
keys in use by eCryptfs.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with
something other than a password authentication token, such as a private
token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs
key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the
situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON().
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3
packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an
crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be
incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat().
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Eric Biggers
Linus Torvalds
David Howells
YueHaibing
Thomas Gleixner
Dan Carpenter
Colin Ian King
Markus Elfring
Kirill A. Shutemov
Herbert Xu
Tyler Hicks
Fabian Frederick
Steven Rostedt
Geyslan G. Bem
Kees Cook
Tim Gardner
Simon Que
Tyler Hicks
Jean Delvare
Roberto Sassu
Joe Perches
Julia Lawall
Tejun Heo