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A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd
indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts
that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than
CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and
acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target().
While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp
is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this
(potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request.
Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain
max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to
out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that
only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to
using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid.
[ idryomov: changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5e8d4d36bf23 ("libceph: add support for primary_temp mappings")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a4ed38d7a180 ("libceph: support for CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:
1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
the validated buffer boundary.
2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
bogus boundary.
3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
the decode window entirely.
Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
*p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n
ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe
*p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n
A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.
-EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim
changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() rejects any addrvec containing more than
one entry that matches the requested msgr type (LEGACY or MSGR2),
logging "another match of type N in addrvec" and returning -EINVAL.
Some admin tooling (e.g. pveceph mon create from Proxmox VE) generates
addrvecs with multiple same-type entries when public_network lists more
than one CIDR: it picks one local IP per subnet and emits both a v2 and
a v1 entry for each IP. Monmaps shaped this way cause:
libceph: mon0 (1)10.10.10.15:6789 session established
libceph: another match of type 1 in addrvec
libceph: problem decoding monmap, -22
No Ceph code uses the extra entries: since Nautilus, the userspace
messenger (AsyncMessenger) unconditionally picks the first address of
the requested type and ignores any subsequent matches.
Match that behavior: use the first matching entry and silently skip any
subsequent ones. This is a compatibility fix for existing deployments
and does not enable dual-stack or multi-subnet address selection.
[ idryomov: tweak ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() comment ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a5cbd5fc22d5 ("libceph, ceph: get and handle cluster maps with addrvecs")
Link: https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=7518
Signed-off-by: Kefu Chai <k.chai@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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When moving incoming skbs in the msk receive queue and the latter
is above limits, prune it as needed quite alike what TCP is doing
at the subflow level. The main difference relies in the stop condition:
since MPTCP does not perform collapsing, it's better off dropping the
bare minimum to fit the (newer) incoming packet.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-7-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Alike TCP, MPTCP handles in-sequence packets and partially overlapping
ones in a very similar way: we can use the same path to handle both,
avoiding some code duplication.
This will also make the next patch simpler.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-6-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently a wild producer could keep the backlog flushing operation
spinning for an unbound time.
Since the previous patch, the amount of data present in the backlog is
hard-limited. Move the backlog len update at the end of the flush loop to
prevent it spinning forever.
Also, no need to splice back the remaining skbs list into the backlog, as
such list is always empty after each backlog processing loop.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-5-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently the enforcement of the rcvbuf constraint is implemented
when moving the skbs into the msk receive or OoO queue, keeping the
incoming skbs in the subflow queue when over limits.
Under significant memory pressure the above can cause permanent data
transfer stalls, as the skb needed to make forward progress can be
stuck in a subflow queue.
Over memory limits, drop the incoming skb, relying on MPTCP-level
retransmissions.
Note that fallback socket must perform the limit before the skb reaches
the subflow-level queue, as dropping an in-sequence already acked skb
would break the stream.
This is not a complete fix for the stall issue, as the drop strategy
needs refinements that will come in the next patches.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-4-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently the MPTCP core enforces that when MPTCP-level retrans timer
fires, at most a single dfrag is retransmitted. In some corner-cases, it
may be necessary to retransmit multiple dfrags, and the MPTCP socket
will need to wait multiple retrans timeout to accomplish that.
Remove the mentioned constraint, allowing to transmit multiple dfrags
per retrans period, as long as the scheduler keeps selecting subflows
for retransmissions and pending data is available in the rtx queue.
The default scheduler will transmit a dfrag per available subflow.
Tested-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Tested-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-3-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This allow separating the stale logic invocation and the retrans
scheduler, and will simplify the next patch.
It's also a cleaner design as the retrans scheduler has currently
too many side effects. As a possible downside, the retrans work will
now traverse the subflows list additional times; that does not matter
much, as this is slowpath.
While at it, pick more accurate names for the involved helpers and
explicitly note that the per subflow stale data is under msk socket
lock protection.
The scheduler and the stale logic may observe different subflow
statues, as no subflow lock is acquired. This is intentional and not
harmful, worst case leading to slower retransmissions.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-2-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This is a cleanup in order to make the next patch simpler.
No functional change intended.
Tested-by: Gang Yan <yangang@kylinos.cn>
Tested-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geliang Tang <geliang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807-net-next-mptcp-oooq-pruning-v3-1-dbc1eb853cc3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net
The following patchset contains Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net. Still
large batch for this late -rc cycle but at least half of these fixes
in this batch have been cooking for several weeks before:
1) Fix race between ipset list:set GC and swap, use write_lock instead
of rcu read lock section when accessing the index to ensure
interference with ip_set_swap(), from Xiang Mei.
2) Release template conntrack in bridge conntrack when packet is
neither IPv4 nor IPv6 before setting skb as untracked.
From Zhiling Zou.
3) A series of 3 patches for IPVS to address sashiko reports:
Schedulers read destination overload state while connection
accounting and destination configuration can update it concurrently.
The first patch adds a single total connection counter. The second
patch uses it to identify threshold crossings precisely, and updates
OVERLOAD at the crossings and on a threshold edit under dst_lock.
The third patch moves configuration-controlled AVAILABLE to a
separate cflags word, so it cannot clobber OVERLOAD through an
unrelated read-modify-write update.
4) Log invalid packets in TCP and SCTP connection tracking to address
a deadlock when nfnetlink_log is used as logging backend and the
nfnetlink_log conntrack glue support is used. From Zihan Xi.
5) Wait for rcu grace period before releasing pernet state in
nfnetlink_log, otherwise packets can end up access already released
memory, triggering UaF. From Florian Westphal.
6) IPVS needs to reset IP information in control buffer in skbuff when
encapsulating IP packets in ICMP, from Kyle Zeng.
7) IPVS needs to validate ihl field of inner headers in when handling
ICMP response, from Julian Anastasov.
8) Remove a WARN_ON_ONCE reachable from the nf_tables hardware offload
when triggering ENOMEM on GFP_KERNEL allocation,
from Alexey Velichayshiy.
9) Publish reply tuple into the flowtable hashtable first, otherwise
GC might walk over a released tuple when insertion of the original
tuple fail. From Jeremy Jean.
10) Elide counter increment when replacing an ipset element,
from Florian Westphal.
11) Remove unneeded ipset accounting resets on destruction/flush,
from Florian Westphal.
* tag 'nf-26-08-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
netfilter: ipset: let destroy callbacks adjust ext mem size
netfilter: ipset: fix list type element drift bug
netfilter: flowtable: publish GC-visible tuple last
netfilter: nf_tables_offload: suppress WARN_ON_ONCE for ENOMEM in abort path
ipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access
ipvs: clear IPv4 options after rebasing tunnel ICMP errors
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: wait for rcu grace period before freeing pernet state
netfilter: nf_conntrack: defer invalid log until after unlock
ipvs: separate destination availability state
ipvs: properly update the overload flag on dest edit
ipvs: add totalconns for dest
netfilter: bridge: release template ct on non-IP path
netfilter: ipset: fix refcount race between list:set GC and swap
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810190621.894119-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode
through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the
passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a
tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a
slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class().
The issue can be reproduced with the following commands:
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: hfsc
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 hfsc sc rate 1000kbit
tc filter add dev lo parent 1:1 protocol ip prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:2 hfsc sc rate 2000kbit
Fix this by skipping hash tables via the TC_U32_KEY(handle) check.
Fixes: 07d79fc7d94e ("net_sched: add reverse binding for tc class")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1786089038-36366-1-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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tcf_action_exec() handles TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN by first checking
rcu_access_pointer(a->goto_chain) and then calling
tcf_action_goto_chain_exec(), which does a second, independent
rcu_dereference_bh(a->goto_chain) read and immediately dereferences
chain->filter_chain. A concurrent tcf_action_set_ctrlact() (e.g. the gact
replace path) can clear a->goto_chain between the two reads, so the second
read returns NULL and tcf_action_goto_chain_exec() dereferences NULL.
Fix the race by doing a single rcu_dereference_bh() read of a->goto_chain
in tcf_action_exec(), checking it once for NULL, and passing the resulting
chain pointer into tcf_action_goto_chain_exec(). This turns the split
check/use into a single check/use on one value.
Fixes: ee3bbfe806cd ("net/sched: let actions use RCU to access 'goto_chain'")
Reported-by: vega@nebusec.ai
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260809090928.868186-1-jhs@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add a new generic devlink device parameter (max_sfs) to control if and
how many light-weight NIC subfunctions can be created. Subfunctions are
a light-weight network functions backed by an underlying PCI function.
Their lifecycle can already be managed by devlink, but currently users
cannot enable them in the device. They can be enabled/disabled only via
external vendor tools. This parameter allows subfunctions to be enabled
(>0) or disabled (0) via devlink. A subsequent patch will add support
for max_sfs to the mlx5 driver.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806073037.3001886-2-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot reported a WARNING in __dev_queue_xmit() triggered via tpacket_snd():
skb_assert_len
WARNING: at include/linux/skbuff.h:2753 skb_assert_len
WARNING: at __dev_queue_xmit+0x21bc/0x4970 net/core/dev.c:4781
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3448 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x243/0x310 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2907 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x28d6/0x4eb0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3134
When sending 0-byte packets via TPACKET ring buffer on devices with no
hard header (e.g. dev->hard_header_len == 0), tpacket_fill_skb()
populates an skb with skb->len == 0 and returns 0. tpacket_snd() then
forwards this empty skb to packet_xmit(), causing __dev_queue_xmit() to
hit skb_assert_len(skb).
Similar checks exist in packet_snd() via commit dc633700f00f
("net/af_packet: check len when min_header_len equals to 0") and in
packet_sendmsg_spkt() via commit 6a341729fb31 ("af_packet: Don't send
zero-byte data in packet_sendmsg_spkt().").
Return -EINVAL in tpacket_fill_skb() when skb->len is zero to reject
zero-length packets in tpacket_snd().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+30b93b6845b19cc38581@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a79e807.01d0871a.3a0d52.00ac.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810150447.1220864-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When a connection is closed, nci_core_conn_close_rsp_packet() frees
conn_info but not conn_info->dest_params, which is a separate devm
allocation. Each connect/close cycle leaks one dest_params until the
NFC device is removed. Free dest_params along with conn_info.
Fixes: 9b8d1a4cf2aa ("nfc: nci: Add an additional parameter to identify a connection id")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721023518.1697625-1-lilinmao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
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nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v1() and nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v2() parse
the CORE_INIT_RSP packet without validating that the skb contains
enough data. A malformed response (e.g. injected via virtual_ncidev)
can declare a large num_supported_rf_interfaces while providing
insufficient data, causing reads of uninitialized slab memory. This
is later used in nci_init_complete_req(), triggering a KMSAN
uninit-value warning.
Add skb length checks before accessing packet fields:
- Validate the skb has at least 1 byte for the status field.
- Validate the skb can hold the fixed-size header before parsing.
- In v2, bounds-check each variable-length rf_interface entry and its
extension parameters within the parsing loop.
- In v1, verify the skb is large enough for both the variable-length
rf_interfaces array and the trailing rsp_2 structure.
Reported-by: syzbot+46ca2592193f2fb3debc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=46ca2592193f2fb3debc
Fixes: bcd684aace34 ("net/nfc/nci: Support NCI 2.x initial sequence")
Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527052625.3309581-1-yun.zhou@windriver.com
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
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Commit 27256cdb290e ("nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and
add length checks") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),
and commit d8bd2dedbde5 ("nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in
TLV parsers") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and
nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same
pattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header
(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checking that
the two header bytes or the declared length stay within the buffer. It
returns a pointer to a service name of up to 255 bytes that may point
past the end of the skb; it is subsequently consumed by memcmp() in
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). In addition tlv_array_len was computed as
"skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE" in size_t, so a CONNECT/CC frame shorter
than the LLCP header underflows to a huge length and the walk runs far
past the buffer.
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() is reachable from nfc_llcp_recv_connect() and
nfc_llcp_recv_cc(), i.e. from received CONNECT and CC PDUs. A nearby
NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation
happens automatically after NFC-DEP, and the nfc_llcp_rx_skb()
dispatcher applies no minimum-length guard.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer(skb), and
validate each declared length before use, matching the approach already
used for nfc_llcp_recv_snl(). Starting the walk at
&skb->data[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE] against the tail pointer also removes the
size_t underflow for short frames.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709131229.44477-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
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Every LLCP PDU begins with a two-byte header (DSAP/SSAP + PTYPE), but the
receive path never checked that a frame is at least LLCP_HEADER_SIZE bytes
before parsing it.
nfc_llcp_rx_skb() reads the header via nfc_llcp_ptype()/nfc_llcp_dsap()/
nfc_llcp_ssap(), which dereference pdu->data[0] and pdu->data[1], and a
CONNECT or CC PDU then computes
tlv_array_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
as a size_t and hands it to the TLV walk. When the frame is shorter than
the header the subtraction wraps to a huge value and the walk runs far
past the buffer, an out-of-bounds read.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link
activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Guard the common receive choke point __nfc_llcp_recv(), shared by both the
target (nfc_llcp_data_received()) and initiator (nfc_llcp_recv()) paths, so
a short skb is dropped before the rx_work worker parses it. Use
pskb_may_pull() rather than a skb->len test so the two header bytes are
guaranteed to sit in the skb linear area even for a non-linear skb,
matching how the sibling NCI and HCI receive paths validate their headers.
Reproduced with a KFENCE out-of-bounds read via /dev/virtual_nci on
linux-next.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714164631.75068-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
digital_wq_cmd_complete() dumps the response data whenever cmd->resp is
not an error pointer. However, a driver can legitimately complete a
command with no response skb at all.
digital_tg_send_psl_res() is the only caller that passes timeout=0,
meaning no response is expected once the command has been transmitted.
On that path trf7970a completes the command with
trf->rx_skb = ERR_PTR(0);
which evaluates to NULL. IS_ERR(NULL) is false, so the NULL response
passes the !IS_ERR() check and cmd->resp->data and cmd->resp->len are
dereferenced whenever the debug print site is enabled. The driver
guards its own dump with "trf->rx_skb && !IS_ERR(trf->rx_skb)"; the
digital layer is missing the NULL half of that test.
Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() so that NULL responses are skipped as well. The
callback on that path, digital_tg_send_psl_res_complete(), never
dereferences resp and dev_kfree_skb() accepts NULL, so only the debug
dump needs fixing.
Fixes: 59ee2361c924 ("NFC Digital: Implement driver commands mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710061254.80975-1-lilinmao@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each
parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /
nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF
technology-specific parameters are only extracted when
rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a
zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and
both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol();
- activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol().
nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch
condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into
ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30
nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0
process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0
worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0
kthread+0x376/0x500
Local variable ntf.i created at:
nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30
Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as
zero when no technology-specific parameters are present.
Fixes: 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support")
Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260623172109.1105965-2-horms@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626090301.2139500-1-sam@bynar.io
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array
ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets
without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling
nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals
NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.
ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC
that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters
NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an
auto-activated target (RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF) drives n_targets past the
limit. The append then writes a struct nfc_target past the end of the
array (a slab out-of-bounds write), and nfc_targets_found() goes on to
walk the array with the inflated count:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
Write of size 2 at addr ffff0000c7299a18 by task kworker/u8:0/12
Workqueue: nfc0_nci_rx_wq nci_rx_work [nci]
Call trace:
nci_add_new_protocol+0x94/0x2ac [nci]
nci_ntf_packet+0xddc/0x11a0 [nci]
nci_rx_work+0x15c/0x1e0 [nci]
process_one_work+0x2dc/0x500
worker_thread+0x240/0x460
kthread+0x1c0/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1024 bytes to the right of
allocated 1560-byte region [ffff0000c7299000, ffff0000c7299618)
Guard nci_target_auto_activated() with the same check used by
nci_add_new_target().
Fixes: 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622145243.3167276-1-sam@bynar.io
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of
kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.
The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent
protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter
validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter
extractors were not updated at that time.
Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty
region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining
count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually
available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len,
which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.
Fixes: e8c0dacd9836 ("NFC: Update names and structs to NCI spec 1.0 d18")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6d52d8b0-v3-1-e26221f8826d@proton.me
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() contain
three related bugs in their TLV parsing loops:
1. 'offset' is declared u8 but tlv_array_len is u16. When TLV data
advances offset past 255 it silently wraps to zero, causing
infinite loops or double-processing of buffer data.
2. Before reading tlv[0] (type) and tlv[1] (length) there is no
check that offset+2 <= tlv_array_len. A truncated TLV causes
an OOB read of one byte past the buffer end.
3. After reading the length field, the value bytes are accessed
without checking offset+2+length <= tlv_array_len. A crafted
length=0xFF on a short buffer causes up to 255 bytes of OOB
read past the buffer end.
Both functions are reachable without authentication via
nfc_llcp_set_remote_gb() which feeds remote LLCP general bytes
directly into nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() with no additional
validation.
Fix all three issues by widening offset from u8 to u16 and adding
bounds checks for both the TLV header and value field before each
access.
Fixes: 3df40eb3a2ea ("nfc: constify several pointers to u8, char and sk_buff")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622131802.239035-1-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nfc_llcp_recv_snl() walked the SNL TLV list using a u16 offset/length
pair derived from skb->len, without bounding reads to the actual skb
data. Three problems followed:
- For a short frame (skb->len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE), tlv_len underflowed.
- The per-TLV header (type, length) was read without checking that two
bytes remained.
- A declared TLV length could run past the end of the buffer, and an
SDREQ with length == 0 made "service_name_len = length - 1" underflow
(size_t), driving an out-of-bounds read in the following strncmp() /
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). The SDRES case likewise read tlv[2]/tlv[3]
without a length check.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link
activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer() over the
linear skb data, and validate each TLV declared length before use. Add
explicit length checks for SDREQ (>= 1) and SDRES (exactly 2).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: 19cfe5843e86 ("NFC: Initial SNL support")
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609202543.42282-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
digital_in_recv_sensf_res() memcpy()s resp->len bytes from a remote
NFC-F device response into the NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE-byte target.sensf_res
field without an upper-bound check. A nearby malicious NFC-F device can
send an oversized SENSF_RES response to overflow the stack-local struct
nfc_target.
Clamp resp->len to NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE before the copy.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: 8c0695e4998d ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-F technology support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603141355.68156-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nci_close_device() and nci_rx_work can both call
nci_data_exchange_complete() concurrently. After commit 4527025d440ce8
("nfc: nci: fix circular locking dependency in nci_close_device") moved
flush_workqueue(ndev->rx_wq) after mutex_unlock(&ndev->req_lock),
rx_work is no longer serialized with the explicit completion call in the
close path. Both callers read the non-NULL callback pointer and invoke
rawsock_data_exchange_complete(), which calls sock_put() -- but only one
sock_hold() was taken, so the second sock_put() underflows the refcount
and frees the socket while it is still in use.
Replace the bare clear_bit(NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE) with
test_and_clear_bit() so that only the first caller proceeds to invoke
the callback.
Fixes: 4527025d440c ("nfc: nci: fix circular locking dependency in nci_close_device")
Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526103121.47957-1-kipreyyy@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nfc_llcp_getsockopt() read llcp_sock->local before lock_sock(sk) and
then dereferenced the cached pointer inside the locked region.
llcp_sock_bind() assigns and clears llcp_sock->local under the same
socket lock, dropping the last reference on its error path. A
getsockopt() racing an in-flight bind() can observe the pointer, block
on lock_sock(), and then dereference a freed nfc_llcp_local once bind()
has unwound.
Move the llcp_sock->local read and the NULL check inside the
lock_sock(sk) region so bind() cannot mutate or free the pointer between
the load and the use.
Fixes: 26fd76cab2e6 ("NFC: llcp: Implement socket options")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521-fix_llc-v2-2-ab44cc09179c@debian.org
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
nfc_llcp_getsockopt() casts optval to (u32 __user *) for put_user(), so
the kernel always stores 4 bytes regardless of the caller-supplied
optlen. The existing min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32)) only clamps the length
reported back to userspace; it does not constrain the store. A call with
optlen < 4 therefore writes past the user buffer, violating the
getsockopt(2) contract for all five supported optnames.
Reject any call with optlen < sizeof(u32) up front. 'len' is int, so a
plain size comparison would promote a negative optlen to size_t and slip
past the check; an explicit 'len < 0' test is added first to catch
negative values before the size compare.
Fixes: 26fd76cab2e6 ("NFC: llcp: Implement socket options")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521-fix_llc-v2-1-ab44cc09179c@debian.org
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
|
|
tipc_node_link_down() caches the link pointer before taking n->lock:
struct tipc_link *l = le->link; /* unlocked */
if (!l)
return;
tipc_node_write_lock(n);
if (!tipc_link_is_establishing(l)) { /* deref l */
...
tipc_link_reset(l); /* write into l */
if (delete) {
kfree(l);
le->link = NULL;
The delete=true caller frees that very object under n->lock, so the lock
does not protect the cached pointer against it:
- CPU A, delete=false: tipc_rcv() on TIPC_LINK_DOWN_EVT, or the link
supervision timer via tipc_node_timeout(), reads l unlocked and then
dereferences it under n->lock;
- CPU B, delete=true: netlink TIPC_NL_BEARER_DISABLE -> bearer_disable()
-> tipc_node_delete_links() -> tipc_node_link_down(n, bearer_id, true)
-> kfree(l).
The link is freed with plain kfree(), not kfree_rcu(), and for UDP bearers
disable_media() only schedules the asynchronous cleanup_bearer() work, so
its synchronize_net() runs after the links are already gone. An in-flight
CPU A that has read l therefore dereferences freed memory once B frees it:
a use-after-free read in tipc_link_is_establishing(), and a use-after-free
write via tipc_link_reset() on the establishing branch.
The following trace was captured on 7.2.0-rc5-00284-gaf39eb111ce6:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_link_is_establishing (net/tipc/link.c:285)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802e2aa068 by task swapper/2/0
tipc_link_is_establishing (net/tipc/link.c:285)
tipc_node_link_down (net/tipc/node.c:1076)
tipc_node_timeout (net/tipc/node.c:843)
Allocated by task 9549:
tipc_link_create (net/tipc/link.c:490)
tipc_node_check_dest (net/tipc/node.c:1279)
tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:252)
tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:389)
Freed by task 9549:
tipc_node_link_down (net/tipc/node.c:1084)
tipc_node_delete_links (net/tipc/node.c:1320)
bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:414)
__tipc_nl_bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:992)
Move the le->link read inside tipc_node_write_lock(), so it is serialised
against the kfree() in the delete path. A racing teardown now either has
not run yet, and we see a valid link, or has already run, and we see NULL.
Fixes: 73f646cec354 ("tipc: delay ESTABLISH state event when link is established")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Assisted-by: tencentos-corvus-ai:kimi-k3
Signed-off-by: Jun Yang <junvyyang@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810102147.48191-1-juny24602@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in
ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in
sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read
async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a
record that did not authenticate breaks the connection.
tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in
for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it
skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to
reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A
splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that
recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read.
Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers
do.
Fixes: f314bfee81b1 ("tls: rx: return the already-copied data on crypto error")
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806-tls-splice-crypto-fix-v1-1-a2624005a286@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
In packet_parse_headers(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame,
skb_set_network_header() is called to advance network_header past the
VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. skb_probe_transport_header() is
then called with skb->protocol still set to the outer VLAN EtherType
(e.g. ETH_P_8021Q), while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset())
already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header.
In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff
points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it
reads a struct vlan_hdr at nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(), but that
offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header). The bytes
are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage encapsulated
EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector returns false,
so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls skb_set_transport_header(),
leaving transport_header at its uninitialized sentinel value (~0U).
Move skb_probe_transport_header() to before skb_set_network_header(). At
the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still
points to the VLAN header, so nhoff correctly points to the VLAN header.
The flow dissector can then parse the VLAN header, extract the inner
EtherType, and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing
transport_header to be set correctly.
Fixes: dfed913e8b55 ("net/af_packet: add VLAN support for AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW GSO")
Assisted-by: WChat:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807063405.688780-2-wei.fang@oss.nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
fib_nhc_update_mtu() walks the nexthop exception table under RTNL, but
RTNL does not serialize this walk with PMTU exception updates. The walk
uses rcu_dereference_protected() with a constant true condition without
holding fnhe_lock.
The following interleaving can therefore occur:
CPU 0 CPU 1
fib_nhc_update_mtu() update_or_create_fnhe()
load fnhe spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock)
fnhe_remove_oldest()
unlink fnhe
kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu)
<quiescent state>
access fnhe after grace period
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_nhc_update_mtu+0x3df/0x410
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888107d49000 by task poc/90
Call Trace:
fib_nhc_update_mtu+0x3df/0x410
fib_sync_mtu+0x7a/0xd0
fib_netdev_event+0x229/0x3f0
netif_set_mtu_ext+0x33a/0x570
dev_set_mtu+0x88/0x120
The same walk updates fnhe_pmtu and fnhe_mtu_locked. These fields form a
pair and other writers serialize them with fnhe_lock. RCU alone prevents
reclamation, but would still allow concurrent writers to leave a mixed
pair.
Walk the table under RCU and acquire fnhe_lock only while updating each
exception. RCU keeps the current entry alive while the short critical
section serializes its paired PMTU fields. This avoids holding the global
lock while scanning all 2048 buckets for every nexthop.
Fixes: af7d6cce5369 ("net: ipv4: update fnhe_pmtu when first hop's MTU changes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807181710.1178747-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() can fail when building the association secret
under memory pressure, but its void return silently leaves the HMAC digest
zeroed. On the receive path, sctp_sf_authenticate() compares this zeroed
digest against the peer-supplied one using crypto_memneq(), potentially
accepting an all-zero HMAC from the peer if the allocation failed. On the
send path, sctp_packet_pack() transmits a packet with a zeroed HMAC that
the peer would reject.
Improve error handling by making sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() return int:
- sctp_sf_authenticate() returns SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM instead of accepting
a zero HMAC.
- sctp_packet_pack() drops the packet on failure instead of transmitting
a zeroed HMAC.
Update the declaration in auth.h accordingly.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807064314.500742-1-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Make sure we check if nla_put_u32(id) was successful after creating
objects. This is theoretical today, the skbs are large enough to
always fit the ID.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <joe@dama.to>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260809000609.327659-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
tcf_ct_handle_fragments() runs its header sanity checks before handing
anything to the defragmentation engine:
if (family == NFPROTO_IPV4)
err = tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment(skb, &frag);
else
err = tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment(skb, &frag);
if (err || !frag)
return err;
tcf_ct_ipv4_is_fragment() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM;
tcf_ct_ipv6_is_fragment() adds -EPROTO when ipv6_find_hdr() fails. None of
them frees or queues the skb, so on that path the caller still owns it.
tcf_ct_act() however funnels every non-zero return into the
ownership-transfer exit:
err = tcf_ct_handle_fragments(net, skb, family, p->zone, &defrag);
if (err)
goto out_frag;
...
out_frag:
if (err != -EINPROGRESS)
tcf_action_inc_drop_qstats(&c->common);
return TC_ACT_CONSUMED;
TC_ACT_CONSUMED means the action took ownership of the skb, so no caller
frees it - sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for that verdict. The
skb is therefore orphaned: one sk_buff plus its data buffer is leaked per
malformed packet, unbounded. Note the drop counter is already incremented
for these errors, so the statistics claim a drop that never happens.
Three different ownership states reach out_frag: today - the skb may be
queued by the defrag engine (-EINPROGRESS), already freed by
nf_ct_handle_fragments(), or still owned by us. Tell the caller which of
those it is, and free the packet ourselves in the last case, which
restores the TC_ACT_SHOT behaviour that predated the Fixes: commit.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6 with a 54-byte frame carrying a 40-byte IPv6
header with nexthdr = 0 (hop-by-hop) and nothing after it, on a
clsact ingress chain with "action ct". kmemleak reports one leaked
232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per
packet; with this patch it reports none.
Fixes: 3f14b377d01d ("net/sched: act_ct: fix skb leak and crash on ooo frags")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Hyunjung Ko <hj351016@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806101235.809370-1-hj351016@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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upayload->data includes an extra NUL terminator even though it is never
used as a C string. In-tree users access only the first
upayload->datalen bytes.
Remove the redundant NUL terminator and allocate one byte less for
upayload->data in dns_resolver_preparse().
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806200454.245444-3-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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On cross-region connections we observed delayed ACKs suddenly turning
into immediate ACKs plus a TCP_MAX_QUICKACKS burst, as if the
connection had just received its first data segment.
Commit 95b9a87c6a6b ("tcp: record last received ipv6 flowlabel")
squeezed icsk_ack.ato into 8 bits, sized for TCP_DELACK_MAX. But both
writers still bound ato by icsk_rto, which can be well above 255
jiffies, so the bitfield assignment silently wraps mod 256: repeated
delack timer misses double ato up to icsk_rto, storing 320 as 64 and
256 as 0, and ato == 0 is the "first data packet" sentinel in
tcp_event_data_recv().
Clamp both writers to TCP_DELACK_MAX, which the static_assert already
guarantees to fit and tcp_send_delayed_ack() effectively caps ato at
anyway.
Fixes: 95b9a87c6a6b ("tcp: record last received ipv6 flowlabel")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807014437.36687-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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tcf_action_check_ctrlact() range checks the primary control action:
if (!opcode)
ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0;
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX is TC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it
cannot be set that way. But act_gact and act_police each carry a second,
independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that
helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only reject
TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned
verbatim from the action.
In particular user space can store TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is
TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value
range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the
skb, so nobody frees it: sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and
tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is
one leaked sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter,
unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated
packets.
Both are trivially deterministic. act_gact clamps tcfg_pval to >= 1, so
with pval = 1 gact_determ() returns the fallback for every packet.
act_police has no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0 and
tcf_police_mtu_check() always passes.
TC_ACT_CONSUMED was added by commit 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor
reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written:
commit 9469f375ab09 ("net/sched: act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on
fallback control action") and
commit c08f5ed5d625 ("net/sched: act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on
fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new
verdict appeared.
Factor the existing range test out of tcf_action_check_ctrlact() as
tcf_action_valid() and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot call
tcf_action_check_ctrlact() directly because that also allocates a
goto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do.
Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte
skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With
this patch both configurations are rejected with -EINVAL and kmemleak
reports none.
Fixes: 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Signed-off-by: Hyunjung Ko <hj351016@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806101252.809593-1-hj351016@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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netdev_queue_get_dma_dev() uses "compat" locking assert which wants
either the rtnl_lock or netdev instance lock. This is not right,
the callers are taking the instance lock unconditionally. All entry
points for queue config are purely instance locked.
In other words the callers use netdev_get_by_index_lock(), not
netdev_get_by_index_lock_ops_compat(). All the state we will
access is effectively instance lock protected (it's const for
devices which are not ops-locked).
Update the assert to avoid false positive warnings.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b6c5f9454ef34 ("io_uring/zcrx: call netdev_queue_get_dma_dev() under instance lock")
Reported-by: syzbot+a78926bdac2adb52dc0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806225627.3998672-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If the NF_CT_EXPECT_DEAD expectation flag is set on, bail out on
insertion. Moreover, add also DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() since this should
not ever happen. This is hardening commit b8b09dc2bf35 ("netfilter:
nf_conntrack_expect: use conntrack GC to reap expectations").
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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The existing check might extend the timeout if the ESTABLISHED timeout
has been tuned to be lower than UNACK via sysctl. Reported by sashiko.
Fixes: bf80e6802273 ("netfilter: conntrack: tcp: use UNACK timeout for non-closing RST packets")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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For bitmap this change makes no difference, because destructors are
called synchronously.
List type however calls them via call_rcu() so accounting decrement can
happen after list_set_flush() set ext_size to 0.
'set->elements = 0' can be removed for the same reason in the list type
case, it calls 'set->elements--' for each element.
Fixes: 9e41f26a505c ("netfilter: ipset: Count non-static extension memory for userspace")
Suggested-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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If list_set_uadd() calls list_set_replace() to swap an expired entry,
the element count remains the same, therefore the increment must be elided.
Fixes: 702b71e7c666 ("netfilter: ipset: Add element count to all set types header")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260806101947.2802-1-fw%40strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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nf_flow_table_iterate() only treats original-direction tuple nodes as
owning entries. Publishing the original node first lets GC observe and
free a flow while flow_offload_add() is still inserting the reply node.
Publish the reply node first and the original node last so GC never
sees a partially installed flow.
KASAN can trigger slab-use-after-free read and write reports in the
flowtable/rhashtable path (rht_deferred_worker, jhash, flow_offload_del,
flow_offload_lookup, etc.).
Fixes: ac2a66665e23 ("netfilter: add generic flow table infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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In nft_flow_rule_offload_abort(), WARN_ON_ONCE(err) is triggered on every
error during rollback, including -ENOMEM. Memory allocation failures are
expected under low-memory conditions and do not indicate a kernel bug.
Trace for example:
nft_flow_offload_chain() // FLOW_BLOCK_BIND
nft_flow_block_chain()
nft_chain_offload_cmd()
nft_block_offload_cmd()
->ndo_setup_tc()
nsim_setup_tc()
flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
flow_block_cb_alloc() // fails to -ENOMEM
The warning was reproduced on the 5.10 stable kernel under memory pressure
via fault injection, but the underlying bug exists in mainline as well,
as demonstrated by the ENOMEM trace above. The following splat was
triggered during nf_tables transaction processing:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8567 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.260-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591
Call Trace:
nf_tables_commit+0x3bd/0x4bd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8604
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xb1e/0x1f20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:509
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:579 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3b3/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:597
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x6cd/0xa00 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x906/0xe10 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190 net/socket.c:663
____sys_sendmsg+0x705/0x870 net/socket.c:2379
___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2433
__sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2462
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Change the condition to WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -ENOMEM) so that
warnings are only emitted for unexpected errors. This aligns with the
common kernel practice of not warning on -ENOMEM.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 63b48c73ff56 ("netfilter: nf_tables_offload: undo updates if transaction fails")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Velichayshiy <a.velichayshiy@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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While the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,
we must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after
reading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds
access.
One such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where
local process can change the ihl field and after
skb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a
problem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.
Add check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260730183506.87473-1-ja%40ssi.bg
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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ip_vs_in_icmp() rebases an skb from the outer ICMP packet to the
quoted original request before passing it to icmp_send(). However,
IPCB(skb)->opt still describes the outer IPv4 header.
A timestamp option in the outer header can therefore leave an offset
that points into the quoted transport header after the rebase.
__ip_options_echo() treats a byte at that stale location as the option
length and copies it into the fixed-size option storage on the
__icmp_send() stack, causing a stack out-of-bounds write.
Clear the stale option metadata after resetting the network header.
Keep the remaining control block fields, including the ingress
interface used by the ICMP response path.
Fixes: f2edb9f7706d ("ipvs: implement passive PMTUD for IPIP packets")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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sashiko reports: "nfnl_log_net_exit() calls nf_log_unset(), which
clears the logger pointer without an RCU grace period. Immediately after,
ops_free_list() frees the per-net state while concurrent packets might
still be executing nf_log_packet() under rcu_read_lock()."
Clear the pointer via .pre_exit to make sure rcu readers have completed
before pernet storage is free'd. The change in nf_log_syslog.c is only
done for consistency: it doesn't use pernet data.
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260731151806.849724-1-pablo%40netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Raphael Zimmer
Pavitra Jha
Kefu Chai
Paolo Abeni
Jakub Kicinski
Zhang Changzhong
Jamal Hadi Salim
Nikolay Aleksandrov
Eric Dumazet
Linmao Li
Yun Zhou
Doruk Tan Ozturk
Samuel Page
Bryam Vargas
Muhammad Bilal
Zhenghang Xiao
Breno Leitao
Jun Yang
Chuck Lever
Wei Fang
Chengfeng Ye
Qing Luo
Hyunjung Ko
Thorsten Blum
Jiayuan Chen
Pablo Neira Ayuso
Florian Westphal
Jérémy Jean
Alexey Velichayshiy
Julian Anastasov
Kyle Zeng