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When data is sent with MSG_OOB, SIGURG is sent to a process if the
receiver socket has set its owner to the process by ioctl(FIOSETOWN)
or fcntl(F_SETOWN).
This patch adds SIGURG check after every send(MSG_OOB) call.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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When SO_OOBINLINE is enabled on a socket, MSG_OOB can be recv()ed
without MSG_OOB flag, and ioctl(SIOCATMARK) will behaves differently.
This patch adds some test cases for SO_OOBINLINE.
Note the new test cases found two bugs in TCP.
1) After reading OOB data with non-inline mode, we can re-read
the data by setting SO_OOBINLINE.
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.inline_oob_ahead_break ...
# msg_oob.c:146:inline_oob_ahead_break:AF_UNIX :world
# msg_oob.c:147:inline_oob_ahead_break:TCP :oworld
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.inline_oob_ahead_break
ok 14 msg_oob.no_peek.inline_oob_ahead_break
2) The head OOB data is dropped if SO_OOBINLINE is disabled
if a new OOB data is queued.
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.inline_ex_oob_drop ...
# msg_oob.c:171:inline_ex_oob_drop:AF_UNIX :x
# msg_oob.c:172:inline_ex_oob_drop:TCP :y
# msg_oob.c:146:inline_ex_oob_drop:AF_UNIX :y
# msg_oob.c:147:inline_ex_oob_drop:TCP :Resource temporarily unavailable
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.inline_ex_oob_drop
ok 17 msg_oob.no_peek.inline_ex_oob_drop
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Currently, recv() is stopped at a consumed OOB skb even if a new
OOB skb is queued and we can ignore the old OOB skb.
>>> from socket import *
>>> c1, c2 = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
>>> c1.send(b'hellowor', MSG_OOB)
8
>>> c2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # consume OOB data stays at middle of recvq.
b'r'
>>> c1.send(b'ld', MSG_OOB)
2
>>> c2.recv(10) # recv() stops at the old consumed OOB
b'hellowo' # should be 'hellowol'
manage_oob() should not stop recv() at the old consumed OOB skb if
there is a new OOB data queued.
Note that TCP behaviour is apparently wrong in this test case because
we can recv() the same OOB data twice.
Without fix:
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break ...
# msg_oob.c:138:ex_oob_ahead_break:AF_UNIX :hellowo
# msg_oob.c:139:ex_oob_ahead_break:Expected:hellowol
# msg_oob.c:141:ex_oob_ahead_break:Expected ret[0] (7) == expected_len (8)
# ex_oob_ahead_break: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break
not ok 11 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break
With fix:
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break ...
# msg_oob.c:146:ex_oob_ahead_break:AF_UNIX :hellowol
# msg_oob.c:147:ex_oob_ahead_break:TCP :helloworl
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break
ok 11 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_ahead_break
Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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While testing, I found some weird behaviour on the TCP side as well.
For example, TCP drops the preceding OOB data when queueing a new
OOB data if the old OOB data is at the head of recvq.
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop ...
# msg_oob.c:146:ex_oob_drop:AF_UNIX :x
# msg_oob.c:147:ex_oob_drop:TCP :Resource temporarily unavailable
# msg_oob.c:146:ex_oob_drop:AF_UNIX :y
# msg_oob.c:147:ex_oob_drop:TCP :Invalid argument
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop
ok 9 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop_2 ...
# msg_oob.c:146:ex_oob_drop_2:AF_UNIX :x
# msg_oob.c:147:ex_oob_drop_2:TCP :Resource temporarily unavailable
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop_2
ok 10 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_drop_2
This patch allows AF_UNIX's MSG_OOB implementation to produce different
results from TCP when operations are guarded with tcp_incompliant{}.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Let's say a socket send()s "hello" with MSG_OOB and "world" without flags,
>>> from socket import *
>>> c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX)
>>> c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB)
5
>>> c1.send(b'world')
5
and its peer recv()s "hell" and "o".
>>> c2.recv(10)
b'hell'
>>> c2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)
b'o'
Now the consumed OOB skb stays at the head of recvq to return a correct
value for ioctl(SIOCATMARK), which is broken now and fixed by a later
patch.
Then, if peer issues recv() with MSG_DONTWAIT, manage_oob() returns NULL,
so recv() ends up with -EAGAIN.
>>> c2.setblocking(False) # This causes -EAGAIN even with available data
>>> c2.recv(5)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
BlockingIOError: [Errno 11] Resource temporarily unavailable
However, next recv() will return the following available data, "world".
>>> c2.recv(5)
b'world'
When the consumed OOB skb is at the head of the queue, we need to fetch
the next skb to fix the weird behaviour.
Note that the issue does not happen without MSG_DONTWAIT because we can
retry after manage_oob().
This patch also adds a test case that covers the issue.
Without fix:
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break ...
# msg_oob.c:134:ex_oob_break:AF_UNIX :Resource temporarily unavailable
# msg_oob.c:135:ex_oob_break:Expected:ld
# msg_oob.c:137:ex_oob_break:Expected ret[0] (-1) == expected_len (2)
# ex_oob_break: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break
not ok 8 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break
With fix:
# RUN msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break ...
# OK msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break
ok 8 msg_oob.no_peek.ex_oob_break
Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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After consuming OOB data, recv() reading the preceding data must break at
the OOB skb regardless of MSG_PEEK.
Currently, MSG_PEEK does not stop recv() for AF_UNIX, and the behaviour is
not compliant with TCP.
>>> from socket import *
>>> c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX)
>>> c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB)
5
>>> c1.send(b'world')
5
>>> c2.recv(1, MSG_OOB)
b'o'
>>> c2.recv(9, MSG_PEEK) # This should return b'hell'
b'hellworld' # even with enough buffer.
Let's fix it by returning NULL for consumed skb and unlinking it only if
MSG_PEEK is not specified.
This patch also adds test cases that add recv(MSG_PEEK) before each recv().
Without fix:
# RUN msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break ...
# msg_oob.c:134:oob_ahead_break:AF_UNIX :hellworld
# msg_oob.c:135:oob_ahead_break:Expected:hell
# msg_oob.c:137:oob_ahead_break:Expected ret[0] (9) == expected_len (4)
# oob_ahead_break: Test terminated by assertion
# FAIL msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break
not ok 13 msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break
With fix:
# RUN msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break ...
# OK msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break
ok 13 msg_oob.peek.oob_ahead_break
Fixes: 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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AF_UNIX's MSG_OOB functionality lacked thorough testing, and we found
some bizarre behaviour.
The new selftest validates every MSG_OOB operation against TCP as a
reference implementation.
This patch adds only a few tests with basic send() and recv() that
do not fail.
The following patches will add more test cases for SO_OOBINLINE, SIGURG,
EPOLLPRI, and SIOCATMARK.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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test_unix_oob.c does not fully cover AF_UNIX's MSG_OOB functionality,
thus there are discrepancies between TCP behaviour.
Also, the test uses fork() to create message producer, and it's not
easy to understand and add more test cases.
Let's remove test_unix_oob.c and rewrite a new test.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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In the TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_reset) NULL dereference occurred from
qdisc->dev_queue->dev <NULL> ->name
This situation simulated from bunch of veths and Bluetooth disconnection
and reconnection.
During qdisc initialization, qdisc was being set to noop_queue.
In veth_init_queue, the initial tx_num was reduced back to one,
causing the qdisc reset to be called with noop, which led to the kernel
panic.
I've attached the GitHub gist link that C converted syz-execprogram
source code and 3 log of reproduced vmcore-dmesg.
https://gist.github.com/yskelg/cc64562873ce249cdd0d5a358b77d740
Yeoreum and I use two fuzzing tool simultaneously.
One process with syz-executor : https://github.com/google/syzkaller
$ ./syz-execprog -executor=./syz-executor -repeat=1 -sandbox=setuid \
-enable=none -collide=false log1
The other process with perf fuzzer:
https://github.com/deater/perf_event_tests/tree/master/fuzzer
$ perf_event_tests/fuzzer/perf_fuzzer
I think this will happen on the kernel version.
Linux kernel version +v6.7.10, +v6.8, +v6.9 and it could happen in v6.10.
This occurred from 51270d573a8d. I think this patch is absolutely
necessary. Previously, It was showing not intended string value of name.
I've reproduced 3 time from my fedora 40 Debug Kernel with any other module
or patched.
version: 6.10.0-0.rc2.20240608gitdc772f8237f9.29.fc41.aarch64+debug
[ 5287.164555] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.164929] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.164950] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.164983] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.165008] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.165450] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.165472] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5287.165502] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode
…
[ 5297.598240] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered blocking state
[ 5297.598262] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered forwarding state
[ 5297.598296] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state
[ 5297.598313] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered forwarding state
[ 5297.616090] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device bond0
[ 5297.620405] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state
[ 5297.620730] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered disabled state
[ 5297.627247] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device team0
[ 5297.629636] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state
…
[ 5298.002798] bridge_slave_0: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.002869] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state
[ 5298.309444] bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_0): Releasing backup interface
[ 5298.315206] bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface
[ 5298.320207] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves
[ 5298.354296] hsr_slave_0: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.360750] hsr_slave_1: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.374889] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.374931] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.374988] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode
[ 5298.375024] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode
[ 5299.109741] team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_1 removed
[ 5299.185870] team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_0 removed
…
[ 5300.155443] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x0c03 length: 249 > 1
[ 5300.155724] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x1003 length: 249 > 9
[ 5300.155988] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x1001 length: 249 > 9
….
[ 5301.075531] team0: Port device team_slave_1 added
[ 5301.085515] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state
[ 5301.085531] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state
[ 5301.085588] bridge_slave_0: entered allmulticast mode
[ 5301.085800] bridge_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.095617] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state
[ 5301.095633] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state
…
[ 5301.149734] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link
[ 5301.173234] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link
[ 5301.180517] bond0: (slave bond_slave_1): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link
[ 5301.193481] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.204425] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.210172] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present!
[ 5301.210185] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory
[ 5301.224061] bond0: (slave bond_slave_1): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link
[ 5301.246901] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link
[ 5301.255934] team0: Port device team_slave_0 added
[ 5301.256480] team0: Port device team_slave_1 added
[ 5301.256948] team0: Port device team_slave_0 added
…
[ 5301.435928] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.446029] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.455872] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present!
[ 5301.455884] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory
[ 5301.502664] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.513675] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.526155] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present!
[ 5301.526164] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory
[ 5301.563662] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.576129] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode
[ 5301.580259] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present!
[ 5301.580270] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory
[ 5301.590269] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device bond0
[ 5301.595872] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000130-0x0000000000000137]
[ 5301.595877] Mem abort info:
[ 5301.595881] ESR = 0x0000000096000006
[ 5301.595885] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 5301.595889] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 5301.595893] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 5301.595896] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
[ 5301.595900] Data abort info:
[ 5301.595903] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 5301.595907] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 5301.595911] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 5301.595915] [dfff800000000026] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 5301.595971] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP
…
[ 5301.596076] CPU: 2 PID: 102769 Comm:
syz-executor.3 Kdump: loaded Tainted:
G W ------- --- 6.10.0-0.rc2.20240608gitdc772f8237f9.29.fc41.aarch64+debug #1
[ 5301.596080] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA,
BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.BA64.2305221830 05/22/2023
[ 5301.596082] pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 5301.596085] pc : strnlen+0x40/0x88
[ 5301.596114] lr : trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x2b0
[ 5301.596124] sp : ffff8000beef6b40
[ 5301.596126] x29: ffff8000beef6b40 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: 0000000000000001
[ 5301.596131] x26: 6de1800082c62bd0 x25: 1ffff000110aa9e0 x24: ffff800088554f00
[ 5301.596136] x23: ffff800088554ec0 x22: 0000000000000130 x21: 0000000000000140
[ 5301.596140] x20: dfff800000000000 x19: ffff8000beef6c60 x18: ffff7000115106d8
[ 5301.596143] x17: ffff800121bad000 x16: ffff800080020000 x15: 0000000000000006
[ 5301.596147] x14: 0000000000000002 x13: ffff0001f3ed8d14 x12: ffff700017ddeda5
[ 5301.596151] x11: 1ffff00017ddeda4 x10: ffff700017ddeda4 x9 : ffff800082cc5eec
[ 5301.596155] x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 00000000f1f1f1f1 x6 : 00000000f2f2f200
[ 5301.596158] x5 : 00000000f3f3f3f3 x4 : ffff700017dded80 x3 : 00000000f204f1f1
[ 5301.596162] x2 : 0000000000000026 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000130
[ 5301.596166] Call trace:
[ 5301.596175] strnlen+0x40/0x88
[ 5301.596179] trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x2b0
[ 5301.596182] perf_trace_qdisc_reset+0xb0/0x538
[ 5301.596184] __traceiter_qdisc_reset+0x68/0xc0
[ 5301.596188] qdisc_reset+0x43c/0x5e8
[ 5301.596190] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x288/0x770
[ 5301.596194] veth_init_queues+0xfc/0x130 [veth]
[ 5301.596198] veth_newlink+0x45c/0x850 [veth]
[ 5301.596202] rtnl_newlink_create+0x2c8/0x798
[ 5301.596205] __rtnl_newlink+0x92c/0xb60
[ 5301.596208] rtnl_newlink+0xd8/0x130
[ 5301.596211] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2e0/0x890
[ 5301.596214] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1c4/0x380
[ 5301.596225] rtnetlink_rcv+0x20/0x38
[ 5301.596227] netlink_unicast+0x3c8/0x640
[ 5301.596231] netlink_sendmsg+0x658/0xa60
[ 5301.596234] __sock_sendmsg+0xd0/0x180
[ 5301.596243] __sys_sendto+0x1c0/0x280
[ 5301.596246] __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc8/0x150
[ 5301.596249] invoke_syscall+0xdc/0x268
[ 5301.596256] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x16c/0x240
[ 5301.596259] do_el0_svc+0x48/0x68
[ 5301.596261] el0_svc+0x50/0x188
[ 5301.596265] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[ 5301.596268] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
[ 5301.596272] Code: eb15001f 54000120 d343fc02 12000801 (38f46842)
[ 5301.596285] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 5301.597053] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 5301.597057] Bye!
After applying our patch, I didn't find any kernel panic errors.
We've found a simple reproducer
# echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/qdisc/qdisc_reset/enable
# ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
Error: Unknown device type.
However, without our patch applied, I tested upstream 6.10.0-rc3 kernel
using the qdisc_reset event and the ip command on my qemu virtual machine.
This 2 commands makes always kernel panic.
Linux version: 6.10.0-rc3
[ 0.000000] Linux version 6.10.0-rc3-00164-g44ef20baed8e-dirty
(paran@fedora) (gcc (GCC) 14.1.1 20240522 (Red Hat 14.1.1-4), GNU ld
version 2.41-34.fc40) #20 SMP PREEMPT Sat Jun 15 16:51:25 KST 2024
Kernel panic message:
[ 615.236484] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 615.237250] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 615.237679] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 615.238097] Modules linked in: veth crct10dif_ce virtio_gpu
virtio_dma_buf drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper zynqmp_fpga xilinx_can
xilinx_spi xilinx_selectmap xilinx_core xilinx_pr_decoupler versal_fpga
uvcvideo uvc videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videodev
videobuf2_common mc usbnet deflate zstd ubifs ubi rcar_canfd rcar_can
omap_mailbox ntb_msi_test ntb_hw_epf lattice_sysconfig_spi
lattice_sysconfig ice40_spi gpio_xilinx dwmac_altr_socfpga mdio_regmap
stmmac_platform stmmac pcs_xpcs dfl_fme_region dfl_fme_mgr dfl_fme_br
dfl_afu dfl fpga_region fpga_bridge can can_dev br_netfilter bridge stp
llc atl1c ath11k_pci mhi ath11k_ahb ath11k qmi_helpers ath10k_sdio
ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 drm fuse backlight ipv6
Jun 22 02:36:5[3 6k152.62-4sm98k4-0k]v kCePUr:n e1l :P IUDn:a b4le6
8t oC ohmma: nidpl eN oketr nteali nptaedg i6n.g1 0re.0q-urecs3t- 0at0
1v6i4r-tgu4a4le fa2d0dbraeeds0se-dir tyd f#f2f08
615.252376] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 615.253220] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS
BTYPE=--)
[ 615.254433] pc : strnlen+0x6c/0xe0
[ 615.255096] lr : trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x94/0x3d0
[ 615.256088] sp : ffff800080b269a0
[ 615.256615] x29: ffff800080b269a0 x28: ffffc070f3f98500 x27:
0000000000000001
[ 615.257831] x26: 0000000000000010 x25: ffffc070f3f98540 x24:
ffffc070f619cf60
[ 615.259020] x23: 0000000000000128 x22: 0000000000000138 x21:
dfff800000000000
[ 615.260241] x20: ffffc070f631ad00 x19: 0000000000000128 x18:
ffffc070f448b800
[ 615.261454] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15:
ffffc070f4ba2a90
[ 615.262635] x14: ffff700010164d73 x13: 1ffff80e1e8d5eb3 x12:
1ffff00010164d72
[ 615.263877] x11: ffff700010164d72 x10: dfff800000000000 x9 :
ffffc070e85d6184
[ 615.265047] x8 : ffffc070e4402070 x7 : 000000000000f1f1 x6 :
000000001504a6d3
[ 615.266336] x5 : ffff28ca21122140 x4 : ffffc070f5043ea8 x3 :
0000000000000000
[ 615.267528] x2 : 0000000000000025 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 :
0000000000000000
[ 615.268747] Call trace:
[ 615.269180] strnlen+0x6c/0xe0
[ 615.269767] trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x94/0x3d0
[ 615.270716] trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset+0xe8/0x4e8
[ 615.271667] __traceiter_qdisc_reset+0xa0/0x140
[ 615.272499] qdisc_reset+0x554/0x848
[ 615.273134] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x360/0x9a8
[ 615.274050] veth_init_queues+0x110/0x220 [veth]
[ 615.275110] veth_newlink+0x538/0xa50 [veth]
[ 615.276172] __rtnl_newlink+0x11e4/0x1bc8
[ 615.276944] rtnl_newlink+0xac/0x120
[ 615.277657] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4e4/0x1370
[ 615.278409] netlink_rcv_skb+0x25c/0x4f0
[ 615.279122] rtnetlink_rcv+0x48/0x70
[ 615.279769] netlink_unicast+0x5a8/0x7b8
[ 615.280462] netlink_sendmsg+0xa70/0x1190
Yeoreum and I don't know if the patch we wrote will fix the underlying
cause, but we think that priority is to prevent kernel panic happening.
So, we're sending this patch.
Fixes: 51270d573a8d ("tracing/net_sched: Fix tracepoints that save qdisc_dev() as a string")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240229143432.273b4871@gandalf.local.home/t/
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Yunseong Kim <yskelg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yunseong Kim <yskelg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240624173320.24945-4-yskelg@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Add the following Telit FN912 compositions:
0x3000: rmnet + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (diag)
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=03 Port=07 Cnt=01 Dev#= 8 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.01 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=3000 Rev=05.15
S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion
S: Product=FN912
S: SerialNumber=92c4c4d8
C: #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
0x3001: rmnet + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + DPL (data packet logging) + adb
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=03 Port=07 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.01 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=3001 Rev=05.15
S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion
S: Product=FN912
S: SerialNumber=92c4c4d8
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240625102236.69539-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Testing determined that the recent commit 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear
tp->retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()") has a race, and does
not always ensure retrans_stamp is 0 after a TFO payload retransmit.
If transmit completion for the SYN+data skb happens after the client
TCP stack receives the SYNACK (which sometimes happens), then
retrans_stamp can erroneously remain non-zero for the lifetime of the
connection, causing a premature ETIMEDOUT later.
Testing and tracing showed that the buggy scenario is the following
somewhat tricky sequence:
+ Client attempts a TFO handshake. tcp_send_syn_data() sends SYN + TFO
cookie + data in a single packet in the syn_data skb. It hands the
syn_data skb to tcp_transmit_skb(), which makes a clone. Crucially,
it then reuses the same original (non-clone) syn_data skb,
transforming it by advancing the seq by one byte and removing the
FIN bit, and enques the resulting payload-only skb in the
sk->tcp_rtx_queue.
+ Client sets retrans_stamp to the start time of the three-way
handshake.
+ Cookie mismatches or server has TFO disabled, and server only ACKs
SYN.
+ tcp_ack() sees SYN is acked, tcp_clean_rtx_queue() clears
retrans_stamp.
+ Since the client SYN was acked but not the payload, the TFO failure
code path in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() tries to retransmit the
payload skb. However, in some cases the transmit completion for the
clone of the syn_data (which had SYN + TFO cookie + data) hasn't
happened. In those cases, skb_still_in_host_queue() returns true
for the retransmitted TFO payload, because the clone of the syn_data
skb has not had its tx completetion.
+ Because skb_still_in_host_queue() finds skb_fclone_busy() is true,
it sets the TSQ_THROTTLED bit and the retransmit does not happen in
the tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() call chain.
+ The tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() code next implicitly assumes the
retransmit process is finished, and sets retrans_stamp to 0 to clear
it, but this is later overwritten (see below).
+ Later, upon tx completion, tcp_tsq_write() calls
tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(), which puts the retransmit in flight and
sets retrans_stamp to a non-zero value.
+ The client receives an ACK for the retransmitted TFO payload data.
+ Since we're in CA_Open and there are no dupacks/SACKs/DSACKs/ECN to
make tcp_ack_is_dubious() true and make us call
tcp_fastretrans_alert() and reach a code path that clears
retrans_stamp, retrans_stamp stays nonzero.
+ Later, if there is a TLP, RTO, RTO sequence, then the connection
will suffer an early ETIMEDOUT due to the erroneously ancient
retrans_stamp.
The fix: this commit refactors the code to have
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() retransmit by reusing the relevant parts of
tcp_simple_retransmit() that enter CA_Loss (without changing cwnd) and
call tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). We have tcp_simple_retransmit() and
tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack() share code in this way because in both cases
we get a packet indicating non-congestion loss (MTU reduction or TFO
failure) and thus in both cases we want to retransmit as many packets
as cwnd allows, without reducing cwnd. And given that retransmits will
set retrans_stamp to a non-zero value (and may do so in a later
calling context due to TSQ), we also want to enter CA_Loss so that we
track when all retransmitted packets are ACked and clear retrans_stamp
when that happens (to ensure later recurring RTOs are using the
correct retrans_stamp and don't declare ETIMEDOUT prematurely).
Fixes: 9e046bb111f1 ("tcp: clear tp->retrans_stamp in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Fixes: a7abf3cd76e1 ("tcp: consider using standard rtx logic in tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack()")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240624144323.2371403-1-ncardwell.sw@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
If we're not in a NAPI softirq context, we need to be careful
about how we call napi_consume_skb(), specifically we need to
call it with budget==0 to signal to it that we're not in a
safe context.
This was found while running some configuration stress testing
of traffic and a change queue config loop running, and this
curious note popped out:
[ 4371.402645] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: ethtool/20545
[ 4371.402897] caller is napi_skb_cache_put+0x16/0x80
[ 4371.403120] CPU: 25 PID: 20545 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-rc3-netnext+ #8
[ 4371.403302] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 01/23/2021
[ 4371.403460] Call Trace:
[ 4371.403613] <TASK>
[ 4371.403758] dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x70
[ 4371.403904] check_preemption_disabled+0xc1/0xe0
[ 4371.404051] napi_skb_cache_put+0x16/0x80
[ 4371.404199] ionic_tx_clean+0x18a/0x240 [ionic]
[ 4371.404354] ionic_tx_cq_service+0xc4/0x200 [ionic]
[ 4371.404505] ionic_tx_flush+0x15/0x70 [ionic]
[ 4371.404653] ? ionic_lif_qcq_deinit.isra.23+0x5b/0x70 [ionic]
[ 4371.404805] ionic_txrx_deinit+0x71/0x190 [ionic]
[ 4371.404956] ionic_reconfigure_queues+0x5f5/0xff0 [ionic]
[ 4371.405111] ionic_set_ringparam+0x2e8/0x3e0 [ionic]
[ 4371.405265] ethnl_set_rings+0x1f1/0x300
[ 4371.405418] ethnl_default_set_doit+0xbb/0x160
[ 4371.405571] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xff/0x130
[...]
I found that ionic_tx_clean() calls napi_consume_skb() which calls
napi_skb_cache_put(), but before that last call is the note
/* Zero budget indicate non-NAPI context called us, like netpoll */
and
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_softirq());
Those are pretty big hints that we're doing it wrong. We can pass a
context hint down through the calls to let ionic_tx_clean() know what
we're doing so it can call napi_consume_skb() correctly.
Fixes: 386e69865311 ("ionic: Make use napi_consume_skb")
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240624175015.4520-1-shannon.nelson@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
The switch global port interrupt mask, REG_SW_PORT_INT_MASK__4, is
defined as 0x001C in ksz9477_reg.h. The designers used 32-bit value in
anticipation for increase of port count in future product but currently
the maximum port count is 7 and the effective value is 0x7F in register
0x001F. Each port has its own interrupt mask and is defined as 0x#01F.
It uses only 4 bits for different interrupts.
The developer who implemented the current interrupt mechanism in the
switch driver noticed there are similarities between the mechanism to
mask port interrupts in global interrupt and individual interrupts in
each port and so used the same code to handle these interrupts. He
updated the code to use the new macro REG_SW_PORT_INT_MASK__1 which is
defined as 0x1F in ksz_common.h but he forgot to update the 32-bit write
to 8-bit as now the mask registers are 0x1F and 0x#01F.
In addition all KSZ switches other than the KSZ9897/KSZ9893 and LAN937X
families use only 8-bit access and so this common code will eventually
be changed to accommodate them.
Fixes: e1add7dd6183 ("net: dsa: microchip: use common irq routines for girq and pirq")
Signed-off-by: Tristram Ha <tristram.ha@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1719009262-2948-1-git-send-email-Tristram.Ha@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
When bonding is configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode, if two identical
SYN packets are received at the same time and processed on different CPUs,
it can potentially create the same sk (sock) but two different reqsk
(request_sock) in tcp_conn_request().
These two different reqsk will respond with two SYNACK packets, and since
the generation of the seq (ISN) incorporates a timestamp, the final two
SYNACK packets will have different seq values.
The consequence is that when the Client receives and replies with an ACK
to the earlier SYNACK packet, we will reset(RST) it.
========================================================================
This behavior is consistently reproducible in my local setup,
which comprises:
| NETA1 ------ NETB1 |
PC_A --- bond --- | | --- bond --- PC_B
| NETA2 ------ NETB2 |
- PC_A is the Server and has two network cards, NETA1 and NETA2. I have
bonded these two cards using BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode and configured
them to be handled by different CPU.
- PC_B is the Client, also equipped with two network cards, NETB1 and
NETB2, which are also bonded and configured in BOND_MODE_BROADCAST mode.
If the client attempts a TCP connection to the server, it might encounter
a failure. Capturing packets from the server side reveals:
10.10.10.10.45182 > localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
10.10.10.10.45182 > localhost: Flags [S], seq 320236027,
localhost > 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855116,
localhost > 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [S.], seq 2967855123, <==
10.10.10.10.45182 > localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
10.10.10.10.45182 > localhost: Flags [.], ack 4294967290,
localhost > 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117, <==
localhost > 10.10.10.10.45182: Flags [R], seq 2967855117,
Two SYNACKs with different seq numbers are sent by localhost,
resulting in an anomaly.
========================================================================
The attempted solution is as follows:
Add a return value to inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add() to confirm if the
ehash insertion is successful (Up to now, the reason for unsuccessful
insertion is that a reqsk for the same connection has already been
inserted). If the insertion fails, release the reqsk.
Due to the refcnt, Kuniyuki suggests also adding a return value check
for the DCCP module; if ehash insertion fails, indicating a successful
insertion of the same connection, simply release the reqsk as well.
Simultaneously, In the reqsk_queue_hash_req(), the start of the
req->rsk_timer is adjusted to be after successful insertion.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: luoxuanqiang <luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621013929.1386815-1-luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Below is a summary of how the driver stores a reference to an skb during
transmit:
tx_buff[free_map[consumer_index]]->skb = new_skb;
free_map[consumer_index] = IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP;
consumer_index ++;
Where variable data looks like this:
free_map == [4, IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP, IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP, 0, 3]
consumer_index^
tx_buff == [skb=null, skb=<ptr>, skb=<ptr>, skb=null, skb=null]
The driver has checks to ensure that free_map[consumer_index] pointed to
a valid index but there was no check to ensure that this index pointed
to an unused/null skb address. So, if, by some chance, our free_map and
tx_buff lists become out of sync then we were previously risking an
skb memory leak. This could then cause tcp congestion control to stop
sending packets, eventually leading to ETIMEDOUT.
Therefore, add a conditional to ensure that the skb address is null. If
not then warn the user (because this is still a bug that should be
patched) and free the old pointer to prevent memleak/tcp problems.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
syzkaller reports a warning in __xdp_reg_mem_model().
The warning occurs only if __mem_id_init_hash_table() returns an error. It
returns the error in two cases:
1. memory allocation fails;
2. rhashtable_init() fails when some fields of rhashtable_params
struct are not initialized properly.
The second case cannot happen since there is a static const rhashtable_params
struct with valid fields. So, warning is only triggered when there is a
problem with memory allocation.
Thus, there is no sense in using WARN() to handle this error and it can be
safely removed.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5065 at net/core/xdp.c:299 __xdp_reg_mem_model+0x2d9/0x650 net/core/xdp.c:299
CPU: 0 PID: 5065 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-05271-gf99c5f563c17 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
RIP: 0010:__xdp_reg_mem_model+0x2d9/0x650 net/core/xdp.c:299
Call Trace:
xdp_reg_mem_model+0x22/0x40 net/core/xdp.c:344
xdp_test_run_setup net/bpf/test_run.c:188 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x365/0x1e90 net/bpf/test_run.c:377
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x813/0x11b0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1267
bpf_prog_test_run+0x33a/0x3b0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4240
__sys_bpf+0x48d/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5649
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with syzkaller.
Fixes: 8d5d88527587 ("xdp: rhashtable with allocator ID to pointer mapping")
Signed-off-by: Daniil Dulov <d.dulov@aladdin.ru>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240617162708.492159-1-d.dulov@aladdin.ru
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240624080747.36858-1-d.dulov@aladdin.ru
|
|
Add few tests with may_goto and negative offset.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619235355.85031-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
|
|
Zac's syzbot crafted a bpf prog that exposed two bugs in may_goto.
The 1st bug is the way may_goto is patched. When offset is negative
it should be patched differently.
The 2nd bug is in the verifier:
when current state may_goto_depth is equal to visited state may_goto_depth
it means there is an actual infinite loop. It's not correct to prune
exploration of the program at this point.
Note, that this check doesn't limit the program to only one may_goto insn,
since 2nd and any further may_goto will increment may_goto_depth only
in the queued state pushed for future exploration. The current state
will have may_goto_depth == 0 regardless of number of may_goto insns
and the verifier has to explore the program until bpf_exit.
Fixes: 011832b97b31 ("bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction")
Reported-by: Zac Ecob <zacecob@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQL-15aNp04-cyHRn47Yv61NXfYyhopyZtUyxNojUZUXpA@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619235355.85031-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
|
|
Add test coverage for reservations beyond the ring buffer size in order
to validate that bpf_ringbuf_reserve() rejects the request with NULL, all
other ring buffer tests keep passing as well:
# ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t ringbuf
[...]
./test_progs -t ringbuf
[ 1.165434] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 1.165825] bpf_testmod: module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel
[ 1.284001] tsc: Refined TSC clocksource calibration: 3407.982 MHz
[ 1.286871] clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x311fc34e357, max_idle_ns: 440795379773 ns
[ 1.289555] clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc
#274/1 ringbuf/ringbuf:OK
#274/2 ringbuf/ringbuf_n:OK
#274/3 ringbuf/ringbuf_map_key:OK
#274/4 ringbuf/ringbuf_write:OK
#274 ringbuf:OK
#275 ringbuf_multi:OK
[...]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
[ Test fixups for getting BPF CI back to work ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240621140828.18238-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
|
|
Avoid spurious link status logs that may ultimately be wrong; for example,
if the link is set to down with the cable plugged, then the cable is
unplugged and after this the link is set to up, the last new log that is
appearing is incorrectly telling that the link is up.
In order to avoid errors, show link status logs after link_reset
processing, and in order to avoid spurious as much as possible, only show
the link loss when some link status change is detected.
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2ca90c276e1 ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fix unintended sign extension and klockwork issues. These are not real
issue but for sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Ratheesh Kannoth <rkannoth@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Suman Ghosh <sumang@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
TC queues needs to be correctly updated when the number of queues on
a VSI is reconfigured, so netdev's queue and TC settings will be
dynamically adjusted and could accurately represent the underlying
hardware state after changes to the VSI queue counts.
Fixes: 0754d65bd4be ("ice: Add infrastructure for mqprio support via ndo_setup_tc")
Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Sokolowski <jan.sokolowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Karen Ostrowska <karen.ostrowska@intel.com>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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IEEE1588(ptp) is optional feature for network. Remove it from required
list to fix below CHECK_DTBS warning.
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a-qds.dtb: ethernet@f0000: 'ptp-timer' is a required property
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The errata DS80000754 recommends monitoring potential faults in
half-duplex mode for the KSZ9477 family.
half-duplex is not very common so I just added a critical message
when the fault conditions are detected. The switch can be expected
to be unable to communicate anymore in these states and a software
reset of the switch would be required which I did not implement.
Fixes: b987e98e50ab ("dsa: add DSA switch driver for Microchip KSZ9477")
Signed-off-by: Enguerrand de Ribaucourt <enguerrand.de-ribaucourt@savoirfairelinux.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Errata DS80000758 states that carrier sense back pressure mode can cause
link down issues in 100BASE-TX half duplex mode. The datasheet also
recommends to always use the collision based back pressure mode.
Fixes: b987e98e50ab ("dsa: add DSA switch driver for Microchip KSZ9477")
Signed-off-by: Enguerrand de Ribaucourt <enguerrand.de-ribaucourt@savoirfairelinux.com>
Reviewed-by: Woojung Huh <Woojung.huh@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Arun Ramadoss <arun.ramadoss@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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PHY_ID_KSZ9477 was supported but not added to the device table passed to
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE.
Fixes: fc3973a1fa09 ("phy: micrel: add Microchip KSZ 9477 Switch PHY support")
Signed-off-by: Enguerrand de Ribaucourt <enguerrand.de-ribaucourt@savoirfairelinux.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Not all PSE attributes are used for the pse-set netlink command.
Select only the ones used by ethtool.
Fixes: f8586411e40e ("netlink: specs: Expand the pse netlink command with PoE interface")
Signed-off-by: Kory Maincent <kory.maincent@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There are 2 types of outstanding tx skb's:
Type 1: Packets that are sitting in the drivers ind_buff that are
waiting to be batch sent to the NIC. During a device reset, these are
freed with a call to ibmvnic_tx_scrq_clean_buffer()
Type 2: Packets that have been sent to the NIC and are awaiting a TX
completion IRQ. These are free'd during a reset with a call to
clean_tx_pools()
During any reset which requires us to free the tx irq, ensure that the
Type 2 skb references are freed. Since the irq is released, it is
impossible for the NIC to inform of any completions.
Furthermore, later in the reset process is a call to init_tx_pools()
which marks every entry in the tx pool as free (ie not outstanding).
So if the driver is to make a call to init_tx_pools(), it must first
be sure that the tx pool is empty of skb references.
This issue was discovered by observing the following in the logs during
EEH testing:
TX free map points to untracked skb (tso_pool 0 idx=4)
TX free map points to untracked skb (tso_pool 0 idx=5)
TX free map points to untracked skb (tso_pool 1 idx=36)
Fixes: 65d6470d139a ("ibmvnic: clean pending indirect buffs during reset")
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Ensure the inner IP header is part of the skb's linear data before
setting old_iph. Otherwise, on a non-linear skb, old_iph could point
outside of the packet data.
Unlike classical VXLAN, which always encapsulates Ethernet packets,
VXLAN-GPE can transport IP packets directly. In that case, we need to
look at skb->protocol to figure out if an Ethernet header is present.
Fixes: d342894c5d2f ("vxlan: virtual extensible lan")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2aa75f6fa62ac9dbe4f16ad5ba75dd04a51d4b99.1718804000.git.gnault@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter.
Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg>
Reported-by: Muhammad Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Co-developed-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg>
Co-developed-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240621140828.18238-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
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Add few tests with may_goto and jumps to the 1st insn.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619011859.79334-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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When the following program is processed by the verifier:
L1: may_goto L2
goto L1
L2: w0 = 0
exit
the may_goto insn is first converted to:
L1: r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
if r11 == 0x0 goto L2
r11 -= 1
*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r11
goto L1
L2: w0 = 0
exit
then later as the last step the verifier inserts:
*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = BPF_MAX_LOOPS
as the first insn of the program to initialize loop count.
When the first insn happens to be a branch target of some jmp the
bpf_patch_insn_data() logic will produce:
L1: *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = BPF_MAX_LOOPS
r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
if r11 == 0x0 goto L2
r11 -= 1
*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r11
goto L1
L2: w0 = 0
exit
because instruction patching adjusts all jmps and calls, but for this
particular corner case it's incorrect and the L1 label should be one
instruction down, like:
*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = BPF_MAX_LOOPS
L1: r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
if r11 == 0x0 goto L2
r11 -= 1
*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r11
goto L1
L2: w0 = 0
exit
and that's what this patch is fixing.
After bpf_patch_insn_data() call adjust_jmp_off() to adjust all jmps
that point to newly insert BPF_ST insn to point to insn after.
Note that bpf_patch_insn_data() cannot easily be changed to accommodate
this logic, since jumps that point before or after a sequence of patched
instructions have to be adjusted with the full length of the patch.
Conceptually it's somewhat similar to "insert" of instructions between other
instructions with weird semantics. Like "insert" before 1st insn would require
adjustment of CALL insns to point to newly inserted 1st insn, but not an
adjustment JMP insns that point to 1st, yet still adjusting JMP insns that
cross over 1st insn (point to insn before or insn after), hence use simple
adjust_jmp_off() logic to fix this corner case. Ideally bpf_patch_insn_data()
would have an auxiliary info to say where 'the start of newly inserted patch
is', but it would be too complex for backport.
Fixes: 011832b97b31 ("bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction")
Reported-by: Zac Ecob <zacecob@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQJ_WWx8w4b=6Gc2EpzAjgv+6A0ridnMz2TvS2egj4r3Gw@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240619011859.79334-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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The following two shared buffer operations make use of the Shared Buffer
Status Register (SBSR):
# devlink sb occupancy snapshot pci/0000:01:00.0
# devlink sb occupancy clearmax pci/0000:01:00.0
The register has two masks of 256 bits to denote on which ingress /
egress ports the register should operate on. Spectrum-4 has more than
256 ports, so the register was extended by cited commit with a new
'port_page' field.
However, when filling the register's payload, the driver specifies the
ports as absolute numbers and not relative to the first port of the port
page, resulting in memory corruptions [1].
Fix by specifying the ports relative to the first port of the port page.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_snapshot+0xb6d/0xbc0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881068cb00f by task devlink/1566
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
print_report+0xce/0x670
kasan_report+0xd7/0x110
mlxsw_sp_sb_occ_snapshot+0xb6d/0xbc0
mlxsw_devlink_sb_occ_snapshot+0x75/0xb0
devlink_nl_sb_occ_snapshot_doit+0x1f9/0x2a0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x20c/0x300
genl_rcv_msg+0x567/0x800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x450
genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x547/0x830
netlink_sendmsg+0x8d4/0xdb0
__sys_sendto+0x49b/0x510
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[...]
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
copy_verifier_state+0xbc2/0xfb0
do_check_common+0x2c51/0xc7e0
bpf_check+0x5107/0x9960
bpf_prog_load+0xf0e/0x2690
__sys_bpf+0x1a61/0x49d0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170
__kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30
kfree+0xca/0x2b0
free_verifier_state+0xce/0x270
do_check_common+0x4828/0xc7e0
bpf_check+0x5107/0x9960
bpf_prog_load+0xf0e/0x2690
__sys_bpf+0x1a61/0x49d0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7d/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fixes: f8538aec88b4 ("mlxsw: Add support for more than 256 ports in SBSR register")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Cited commit added support for a new reset flow ("all reset") which is
deeper than the existing reset flow ("software reset") and allows the
device's PCI firmware to be upgraded.
In the new flow the driver first tells the firmware that "all reset" is
required by issuing a new reset command (i.e., MRSR.command=6) and then
triggers the reset by having the PCI core issue a secondary bus reset
(SBR).
However, due to a race condition in the device's firmware the device is
not always able to recover from this reset, resulting in initialization
failures [1].
New firmware versions include a fix for the bug and advertise it using a
new capability bit in the Management Capabilities Mask (MCAM) register.
Avoid initialization failures by reading the new capability bit and
triggering the new reset flow only if the bit is set. If the bit is not
set, trigger a normal PCI hot reset by skipping the call to the
Management Reset and Shutdown Register (MRSR).
Normal PCI hot reset is weaker than "all reset", but it results in a
fully operational driver and allows users to flash a new firmware, if
they want to.
[1]
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 1023ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 2047ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 4095ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 8191ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 16383ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 32767ms after bus reset; waiting
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: not ready 65535ms after bus reset; giving up
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: PCI function reset failed with -25
mlxsw_spectrum4 0000:01:00.0: cannot register bus device
mlxsw_spectrum4: probe of 0000:01:00.0 failed with error -25
Fixes: f257c73e5356 ("mlxsw: pci: Add support for new reset flow")
Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk <maksymy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Maksym Yaremchuk <maksymy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Kuniyuki Iwashima
Yunseong Kim
Daniele Palmas
Neal Cardwell
Shannon Nelson
Tristram Ha
luoxuanqiang
Nick Child
Daniil Dulov
Alexei Starovoitov
Daniel Borkmann
Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez
Ratheesh Kannoth
Jan Sokolowski
Frank Li
Enguerrand de Ribaucourt
Kory Maincent
Guillaume Nault
Ido Schimmel