| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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When using ioctl to get address of interface, we can't
get it anymore. For example, the command is show as below.
# ifconfig eth0
In the patch ("03aef17bb79b3"), the devinet_ioctl does not
return a suitable value, even though we can find it in
the kernel. Then fix it now.
Fixes: 03aef17bb79b3 ("devinet_ioctl(): take copyin/copyout to caller")
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot reported a lockdep splat in gen_new_estimator() /
est_fetch_counters() when attempting to lock est->stats_lock.
Since est_fetch_counters() is called from BH context from timer
interrupt, we need to block BH as well when calling it from process
context.
Most qdiscs use per cpu counters and are immune to the problem,
but net/sched/act_api.c and net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c are using
a spinlock to protect their data. They both call gen_new_estimator()
while object is created and not yet alive, so this bug could
not trigger a deadlock, only a lockdep splat.
Fixes: 1c0d32fde5bd ("net_sched: gen_estimator: complete rewrite of rate estimators")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Handle HRESP error by doing a SW reset of RX and TX and
re-initializing the descriptors, RX and TX queue pointers.
Signed-off-by: Harini Katakam <harinik@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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On TTC table creation, the indirection TIRs should be used instead of
the inner indirection TIRs.
Fixes: 1ae1df3a1193 ("net/mlx5e: Refactor RSS related objects and code")
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <galp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Shalom Lagziel <shaloml@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Heiner reported a lockdep splat [1]
This is caused by attempting GFP_KERNEL allocation while RCU lock is
held and BH blocked.
We believe that addrconf_verify_rtnl() could run for a long period,
so instead of using GFP_ATOMIC here as Ido suggested, we should break
the critical section and restart it after the allocation.
[1]
[86220.125562] =============================
[86220.125586] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[86220.125612] 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7 Not tainted
[86220.125641] -----------------------------
[86220.125666] kernel/sched/core.c:6026 Illegal context switch in RCU-bh read-side critical section!
[86220.125711]
other info that might help us debug this:
[86220.125755]
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[86220.125792] 4 locks held by kworker/0:2/1003:
[86220.125817] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680
[86220.125895] #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680
[86220.125959] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000b06d9510>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
[86220.126017] #3: (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: [<00000000aef52299>] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x1e/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.126111]
stack backtrace:
[86220.126142] CPU: 0 PID: 1003 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7
[86220.126185] Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-CI321NANO/ZBOX-CI321NANO, BIOS B246P105 06/01/2015
[86220.126250] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_verify_work [ipv6]
[86220.126288] Call Trace:
[86220.126312] dump_stack+0x70/0x9e
[86220.126337] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xce/0xf0
[86220.126365] ___might_sleep+0x1d3/0x240
[86220.126390] __might_sleep+0x45/0x80
[86220.126416] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x53/0x250
[86220.126458] ? ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6]
[86220.126498] ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6]
[86220.126538] ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6]
[86220.126580] ? ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6]
[86220.126623] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.126664] ? addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.126708] addrconf_verify_work+0xe/0x20 [ipv6]
[86220.126738] process_one_work+0x258/0x680
[86220.126765] worker_thread+0x35/0x3f0
[86220.126790] kthread+0x124/0x140
[86220.126813] ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680
[86220.126839] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
[86220.126869] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40
[86220.126893] ? call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x12a/0x160
[86220.126926] ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60
[86220.126999] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:420
[86220.127041] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1003, name: kworker/0:2
[86220.127082] 4 locks held by kworker/0:2/1003:
[86220.127107] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680
[86220.127179] #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da8e9b73>] process_one_work+0x1de/0x680
[86220.127242] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000b06d9510>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
[86220.127300] #3: (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: [<00000000aef52299>] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x1e/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.127414] CPU: 0 PID: 1003 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180110+ #7
[86220.127463] Hardware name: ZOTAC ZBOX-CI321NANO/ZBOX-CI321NANO, BIOS B246P105 06/01/2015
[86220.127528] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_verify_work [ipv6]
[86220.127568] Call Trace:
[86220.127591] dump_stack+0x70/0x9e
[86220.127616] ___might_sleep+0x14d/0x240
[86220.127644] __might_sleep+0x45/0x80
[86220.127672] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x53/0x250
[86220.127717] ? ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6]
[86220.127762] ipv6_add_addr+0xfe/0x6e0 [ipv6]
[86220.127807] ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6]
[86220.127854] ? ipv6_create_tempaddr+0x24d/0x430 [ipv6]
[86220.127903] addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.127950] ? addrconf_verify_rtnl+0x339/0x510 [ipv6]
[86220.127998] addrconf_verify_work+0xe/0x20 [ipv6]
[86220.128032] process_one_work+0x258/0x680
[86220.128063] worker_thread+0x35/0x3f0
[86220.128091] kthread+0x124/0x140
[86220.128117] ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680
[86220.128146] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
[86220.128180] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40
[86220.128207] ? call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x12a/0x160
[86220.128243] ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60
Fixes: f3d9832e56c4 ("ipv6: addrconf: cleanup locking in ipv6_add_addr")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In current route cache aging logic, if a route has both RTF_EXPIRE and
RTF_GATEWAY set, the route will only be removed if the neighbor cache
has no NTF_ROUTER flag. Otherwise, even if the route has expired, it
won't get deleted.
Fix this logic to always check if the route has expired first and then
do the gateway neighbor cache check if previous check decide to not
remove the exception entry.
Fixes: 1859bac04fb6 ("ipv6: remove from fib tree aged out RTF_CACHE dst")
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When compared to ixgbe and other previous Intel drivers the i40e and i40evf
drivers actually reserve 2 additional descriptors in maybe_stop_tx for
cache line alignment. We need to update DESC_NEEDED to reflect this as
otherwise we are more likely to return TX_BUSY which will cause issues with
things like xmit_more.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make sure to cancel any pending work that might update driver coalesce
settings when taking down an interface.
Fixes: 6a8788f25625 ("bnxt_en: add support for software dynamic interrupt moderation")
Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@broadcom.com>
Cc: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Unsolicited IPv6 neighbor advertisements should be sent after DAD
completes. Update ndisc_send_unsol_na to skip tentative, non-optimistic
addresses and have those sent by addrconf_dad_completed after DAD.
Fixes: 4a6e3c5def13c ("net: ipv6: send unsolicited NA on admin up")
Reported-by: Vivek Venkatraman <vivek@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When the frame check sequence (FCS) is split across the last two frames
of a fragmented packet, part of the FCS gets counted twice, once when
subtracting the FCS, and again when subtracting the previously received
data.
For example, if 1602 bytes are received, and the first fragment contains
the first 1600 bytes (including the first two bytes of the FCS), and the
second fragment contains the last two bytes of the FCS:
'skb->len == 1600' from the first fragment
size = lstatus & BD_LENGTH_MASK; # 1602
size -= ETH_FCS_LEN; # 1598
size -= skb->len; # -2
Since the size is unsigned, it wraps around and causes a BUG later in
the packet handling, as shown below:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2068!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
...
NIP [c021ec60] skb_pull+0x24/0x44
LR [c01e2fbc] gfar_clean_rx_ring+0x498/0x690
Call Trace:
[df7edeb0] [c01e2c1c] gfar_clean_rx_ring+0xf8/0x690 (unreliable)
[df7edf20] [c01e33a8] gfar_poll_rx_sq+0x3c/0x9c
[df7edf40] [c023352c] net_rx_action+0x21c/0x274
[df7edf90] [c0329000] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x240
[df7edff0] [c000c108] call_do_irq+0x24/0x3c
[c0597e90] [c00041dc] do_IRQ+0x64/0xc4
[c0597eb0] [c000d920] ret_from_except+0x0/0x18
--- interrupt: 501 at arch_cpu_idle+0x24/0x5c
Change the size to a signed integer and then trim off any part of the
FCS that was received prior to the last fragment.
Fixes: 6c389fc931bc ("gianfar: fix size of scatter-gathered frames")
Signed-off-by: Andy Spencer <aspencer@spacex.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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pfifo_fast used to drop based on qdisc_dev(qdisc)->tx_queue_len,
so we have to resize skb array when we change tx_queue_len.
Other qdiscs which read tx_queue_len are fine because they
all save it to sch->limit or somewhere else in qdisc during init.
They don't have to implement this, it is nicer if they do so
that users don't have to re-configure qdisc after changing
tx_queue_len.
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Introduce a new qdisc ops ->change_tx_queue_len() so that
each qdisc could decide how to implement this if it wants.
Previously we simply read dev->tx_queue_len, after pfifo_fast
switches to skb array, we need this API to resize the skb array
when we change dev->tx_queue_len.
To avoid handling race conditions with TX BH, we need to
deactivate all TX queues before change the value and bring them
back after we are done, this also makes implementation easier.
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch promotes the local change_tx_queue_len() to a core
helper function, dev_change_tx_queue_len(), so that rtnetlink
and net-sysfs could share the code. This also prepares for the
following patch.
Note, the -EFAULT in the original code doesn't make sense,
we should propagate the errno from notifiers.
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We don't stop device before reset owner, this means we could try to
serve any virtqueue kick before reset dev->worker. This will result a
warn since the work was pending at llist during owner resetting. Fix
this by stopping device during owner reset.
Reported-by: syzbot+eb17c6162478cc50632c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The goal is to let the user follow an interface that moves to another
netns.
CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The user should be able to follow any interface that moves to another
netns. There is no reason to hide physical interfaces.
CC: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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It was found that ethtool provides unexisting module name while
it queries the specified network device for associated driver
information. Then user tries to unload that module by provided
module name and fails.
This happens because ethtool reads value of DRV_NAME macro,
while module name is defined at the driver's Makefile.
This patch is to correct Cavium CN88xx Thunder NIC driver names
(DRV_NAME macro) 'thunder-nicvf' to 'nicvf' and 'thunder-nic'
to 'nicpf', sync bgx and xcv driver names accordingly to their
module names.
Signed-off-by: Vadim Lomovtsev <Vadim.Lomovtsev@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Offset 128 overlaps the last word of the redzone.
Use 132 which is always beyond that.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This is to make ptr_ring test build again.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We don't rely on lockless guarantees, but it
seems cleaner than inverting __ptr_ring_peek.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In theory compiler could tear queue loads or stores in two. It does not
seem to be happening in practice but it seems easier to convert the
cases where this would be a problem to READ/WRITE_ONCE than worry about
it.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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__skb_array_empty should use __ptr_ring_empty since that's the only
legal lockless function.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit bcecb4bbf88aa03171c30652bca761cf27755a6b.
If we try to allocate an extra entry as the above commit did, and when
the requested size is UINT_MAX, addition overflows causing zero size to
be passed to kmalloc().
kmalloc then returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR with a subsequent crash.
Reported-by: syzbot+87678bcf753b44c39b67@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Similar to bcecb4bbf88a ("net: ptr_ring: otherwise safe empty checks can
overrun array bounds") a lockless use of __ptr_ring_full might
cause an out of bounds access.
We can fix this, but it's easier to just disallow lockless
__ptr_ring_full for now.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Lockless access to __ptr_ring_full is only legal if ring is
never resized, otherwise it might cause use-after free errors.
Simply drop the lockless test, we'll drop the packet
a bit later when produce fails.
Fixes: 362899b8 ("macvtap: switch to use skb array")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Lockless __ptr_ring_empty requires that consumer head is read and
written at once, atomically. Annotate accordingly to make sure compiler
does it correctly. Switch locked callers to __ptr_ring_peek which does
not support the lockless operation.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The only function safe to call without locks
is __ptr_ring_empty. Move documentation about
lockless use there to make sure people do not
try to use __ptr_ring_peek outside locks.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The comment near __ptr_ring_peek says:
* If ring is never resized, and if the pointer is merely
* tested, there's no need to take the lock - see e.g. __ptr_ring_empty.
but this was in fact never possible since consumer_head would sometimes
point outside the ring. Refactor the code so that it's always
pointing within a ring.
Fixes: c5ad119fb6c09 ("net: sched: pfifo_fast use skb_array")
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If a sk_v6_rcv_saddr is !IPV6_ADDR_ANY and !IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED, it
implicitly implies it is an ipv6only socket. However, in inet6_bind(),
this addr_type checking and setting sk->sk_ipv6only to 1 are only done
after sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum) has been completed successfully.
This inconsistency between sk_v6_rcv_saddr and sk_ipv6only confuses
the 'get_port()'.
In particular, when binding SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets,
udp_reuseport_add_sock(sk,...) is called. udp_reuseport_add_sock()
checks "ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk)" before adding sk to
sk2->sk_reuseport_cb. In this case, ipv6_only_sock(sk2) could be
1 while ipv6_only_sock(sk) is still 0 here. The end result is,
reuseport_alloc(sk) is called instead of adding sk to the existing
sk2->sk_reuseport_cb.
It can be reproduced by binding two SO_REUSEPORT UDP sockets on an
IPv6 address (!ANY and !MAPPED). Only one of the socket will
receive packet.
The fix is to set the implicit sk_ipv6only before calling get_port().
The original sk_ipv6only has to be saved such that it can be restored
in case get_port() failed. The situation is similar to the
inet_reset_saddr(sk) after get_port() has failed.
Thanks to Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> who created an easy
reproduction which leads to a fix.
Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- Backwards Compatibility:
If userspace wants to determine whether RTM_DELLINK supports the
IFLA_IF_NETNSID property they should first send an RTM_GETLINK request
with IFLA_IF_NETNSID on lo. If either EACCESS is returned or the reply
does not include IFLA_IF_NETNSID userspace should assume that
IFLA_IF_NETNSID is not supported on this kernel.
If the reply does contain an IFLA_IF_NETNSID property userspace
can send an RTM_DELLINK with a IFLA_IF_NETNSID property. If they receive
EOPNOTSUPP then the kernel does not support the IFLA_IF_NETNSID property
with RTM_DELLINK. Userpace should then fallback to other means.
- Security:
Callers must have CAP_NET_ADMIN in the owning user namespace of the
target network namespace.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- Backwards Compatibility:
If userspace wants to determine whether RTM_SETLINK supports the
IFLA_IF_NETNSID property they should first send an RTM_GETLINK request
with IFLA_IF_NETNSID on lo. If either EACCESS is returned or the reply
does not include IFLA_IF_NETNSID userspace should assume that
IFLA_IF_NETNSID is not supported on this kernel.
If the reply does contain an IFLA_IF_NETNSID property userspace
can send an RTM_SETLINK with a IFLA_IF_NETNSID property. If they receive
EOPNOTSUPP then the kernel does not support the IFLA_IF_NETNSID property
with RTM_SETLINK. Userpace should then fallback to other means.
To retain backwards compatibility the kernel will first check whether a
IFLA_NET_NS_PID or IFLA_NET_NS_FD property has been passed. If either
one is found it will be used to identify the target network namespace.
This implies that users who do not care whether their running kernel
supports IFLA_IF_NETNSID with RTM_SETLINK can pass both
IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} and IFLA_IF_NETNSID referring to the same network
namespace.
- Security:
Callers must have CAP_NET_ADMIN in the owning user namespace of the
target network namespace.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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RTM_{NEW,SET}LINK already allow operations on other network namespaces
by identifying the target network namespace through IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID}
properties. This is done by looking for the corresponding properties in
do_setlink(). Extend do_setlink() to also look for the IFLA_IF_NETNSID
property. This introduces no functional changes since all callers of
do_setlink() currently block IFLA_IF_NETNSID by reporting an error before
they reach do_setlink().
This introduces the helpers:
static struct net *rtnl_link_get_net_by_nlattr(struct net *src_net, struct
nlattr *tb[])
static struct net *rtnl_link_get_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net *src_net,
struct nlattr *tb[], int cap)
to simplify permission checks and target network namespace retrieval for
RTM_* requests that already support IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} but get extended
to IFLA_IF_NETNSID. To perserve backwards compatibility the helpers look
for IFLA_NET_NS_{FD,PID} properties first before checking for
IFLA_IF_NETNSID.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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efx_default_channel_want_txqs() is only used in efx.c, while
efx_ptp_want_txqs() and efx_ptp_channel_type (a struct) are only used
in ptp.c. In all cases these symbols should be static.
Fixes: 2935e3c38228 ("sfc: on 8000 series use TX queues for TX timestamps")
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
[ecree@solarflare.com: rewrote commit message]
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The "return 0" instruction follows other return instruction
and it makes it impossible to execute, hence remove it.
Fixes: 00fc0c51e35b ("rocker: Change world_ops API and implementation to be switchdev independant")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The new test will spawn four threads, doing map update, delete, lookup
and get_next_key in parallel. It is able to reproduce the issue in the
previous commit found by syzbot and Eric Dumazet.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Commit b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command
for LPM_TRIE map") introduces a bug likes below:
if (!rcu_dereference(trie->root))
return -ENOENT;
if (!key || key->prefixlen > trie->max_prefixlen) {
root = &trie->root;
goto find_leftmost;
}
......
find_leftmost:
for (node = rcu_dereference(*root); node;) {
In the code after label find_leftmost, it is assumed
that *root should not be NULL, but it is not true as
it is possbile trie->root is changed to NULL by an
asynchronous delete operation.
The issue is reported by syzbot and Eric Dumazet with the
below error log:
......
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 8033 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:trie_get_next_key+0x3c2/0xf10 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:682
......
This patch fixed the issue by use local rcu_dereferenced
pointer instead of *(&trie->root) later on.
Fixes: b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command or LPM_TRIE map")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Update selftests to relfect recent changes and add various new
test cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from arm32 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Shubham Bansal <illusionist.neo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The verifier in both cBPF and eBPF reject div/mod by 0 imm,
so this can never load. Remove emitting such test and reject
it from being JITed instead (the latter is actually also not
needed, but given practice in sparc64, ppc64 today, so
doesn't hurt to add it here either).
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from mips64 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from sparc64 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from ppc64 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from s390x JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from arm64 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Since we've changed div/mod exception handling for src_reg in
eBPF verifier itself, remove the leftovers from x86_64 JIT.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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One of the ugly leftovers from the early eBPF days is that div/mod
operations based on registers have a hard-coded src_reg == 0 test
in the interpreter as well as in JIT code generators that would
return from the BPF program with exit code 0. This was basically
adopted from cBPF interpreter for historical reasons.
There are multiple reasons why this is very suboptimal and prone
to bugs. To name one: the return code mapping for such abnormal
program exit of 0 does not always match with a suitable program
type's exit code mapping. For example, '0' in tc means action 'ok'
where the packet gets passed further up the stack, which is just
undesirable for such cases (e.g. when implementing policy) and
also does not match with other program types.
While trying to work out an exception handling scheme, I also
noticed that programs crafted like the following will currently
pass the verifier:
0: (bf) r6 = r1
1: (85) call pc+8
caller:
R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_-1
callee:
frame1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_1
10: (b4) (u32) r2 = (u32) 0
11: (b4) (u32) r3 = (u32) 1
12: (3c) (u32) r3 /= (u32) r2
13: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76)
14: (95) exit
returning from callee:
frame1: R0_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)
R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv0
R3_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R10=fp0,call_1
to caller at 2:
R0_w=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
R10=fp0,call_-1
from 14 to 2: R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0,imm=0)
R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0,call_-1
2: (bf) r1 = r6
3: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80)
4: (bf) r2 = r0
5: (07) r2 += 8
6: (2d) if r2 > r1 goto pc+1
R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8,imm=0) R1=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
R2=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8,imm=0) R6=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0)
R10=fp0,call_-1
7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r0 +0)
8: (b7) r0 = 1
9: (95) exit
from 6 to 8: safe
processed 16 insns (limit 131072), stack depth 0+0
Basically what happens is that in the subprog we make use of a
div/mod by 0 exception and in the 'normal' subprog's exit path
we just return skb->data back to the main prog. This has the
implication that the verifier thinks we always get a pkt pointer
in R0 while we still have the implicit 'return 0' from the div
as an alternative unconditional return path earlier. Thus, R0
then contains 0, meaning back in the parent prog we get the
address range of [0x0, skb->data_end] as read and writeable.
Similar can be crafted with other pointer register types.
Since i) BPF_ABS/IND is not allowed in programs that contain
BPF to BPF calls (and generally it's also disadvised to use in
native eBPF context), ii) unknown opcodes don't return zero
anymore, iii) we don't return an exception code in dead branches,
the only last missing case affected and to fix is the div/mod
handling.
What we would really need is some infrastructure to propagate
exceptions all the way to the original prog unwinding the
current stack and returning that code to the caller of the
BPF program. In user space such exception handling for similar
runtimes is typically implemented with setjmp(3) and longjmp(3)
as one possibility which is not available in the kernel,
though (kgdb used to implement it in kernel long time ago). I
implemented a PoC exception handling mechanism into the BPF
interpreter with porting setjmp()/longjmp() into x86_64 and
adding a new internal BPF_ABRT opcode that can use a program
specific exception code for all exception cases we have (e.g.
div/mod by 0, unknown opcodes, etc). While this seems to work
in the constrained BPF environment (meaning, here, we don't
need to deal with state e.g. from memory allocations that we
would need to undo before going into exception state), it still
has various drawbacks: i) we would need to implement the
setjmp()/longjmp() for every arch supported in the kernel and
for x86_64, arm64, sparc64 JITs currently supporting calls,
ii) it has unconditional additional cost on main program
entry to store CPU register state in initial setjmp() call,
and we would need some way to pass the jmp_buf down into
___bpf_prog_run() for main prog and all subprogs, but also
storing on stack is not really nice (other option would be
per-cpu storage for this, but it also has the drawback that
we need to disable preemption for every BPF program types).
All in all this approach would add a lot of complexity.
Another poor-man's solution would be to have some sort of
additional shared register or scratch buffer to hold state
for exceptions, and test that after every call return to
chain returns and pass R0 all the way down to BPF prog caller.
This is also problematic in various ways: i) an additional
register doesn't map well into JITs, and some other scratch
space could only be on per-cpu storage, which, again has the
side-effect that this only works when we disable preemption,
or somewhere in the input context which is not available
everywhere either, and ii) this adds significant runtime
overhead by putting conditionals after each and every call,
as well as implementation complexity.
Yet another option is to teach verifier that div/mod can
return an integer, which however is also complex to implement
as verifier would need to walk such fake 'mov r0,<code>; exit;'
sequeuence and there would still be no guarantee for having
propagation of this further down to the BPF caller as proper
exception code. For parent prog, it is also is not distinguishable
from a normal return of a constant scalar value.
The approach taken here is a completely different one with
little complexity and no additional overhead involved in
that we make use of the fact that a div/mod by 0 is undefined
behavior. Instead of bailing out, we adapt the same behavior
as on some major archs like ARMv8 [0] into eBPF as well:
X div 0 results in 0, and X mod 0 results in X. aarch64 and
aarch32 ISA do not generate any traps or otherwise aborts
of program execution for unsigned divides. I verified this
also with a test program compiled by gcc and clang, and the
behavior matches with the spec. Going forward we adapt the
eBPF verifier to emit such rewrites once div/mod by register
was seen. cBPF is not touched and will keep existing 'return 0'
semantics. Given the options, it seems the most suitable from
all of them, also since major archs have similar schemes in
place. Given this is all in the realm of undefined behavior,
we still have the option to adapt if deemed necessary and
this way we would also have the option of more flexibility
from LLVM code generation side (which is then fully visible
to verifier). Thus, this patch i) fixes the panic seen in
above program and ii) doesn't bypass the verifier observations.
[0] ARM Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8 [ARM DDI 0487B.b]
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0487b.b/DDI0487B_b_armv8_arm.pdf
1) aarch64 instruction set: section C3.4.7 and C6.2.279 (UDIV)
"A division by zero results in a zero being written to
the destination register, without any indication that
the division by zero occurred."
2) aarch32 instruction set: section F1.4.8 and F5.1.263 (UDIV)
"For the SDIV and UDIV instructions, division by zero
always returns a zero result."
Fixes: f4d7e40a5b71 ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Recent findings by syzcaller fixed in 7891a87efc71 ("bpf: arsh is
not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it") triggered a warning
in the interpreter due to unknown opcode not being rejected by
the verifier. The 'return 0' for an unknown opcode is really not
optimal, since with BPF to BPF calls, this would go untracked by
the verifier.
Do two things here to improve the situation: i) perform basic insn
sanity check early on in the verification phase and reject every
non-uapi insn right there. The bpf_opcode_in_insntable() table
reuses the same mapping as the jumptable in ___bpf_prog_run() sans
the non-public mappings. And ii) in ___bpf_prog_run() we do need
to BUG in the case where the verifier would ever create an unknown
opcode due to some rewrites.
Note that JITs do not have such issues since they would punt to
interpreter in these situations. Moreover, the BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
would also help to avoid such unknown opcodes in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Given we recently had c131187db2d3 ("bpf: fix branch pruning
logic") and 95a762e2c8c9 ("bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in
check_alu_op()") in particular where before verifier skipped
verification of the wrongly assumed dead branch, we should not
just replace the dead code parts with nops (mov r0,r0). If there
is a bug such as fixed in 95a762e2c8c9 in future again, where
runtime could execute those insns, then one of the potential
issues with the current setting would be that given the nops
would be at the end of the program, we could execute out of
bounds at some point.
The best in such case would be to just exit the BPF program
altogether and return an exception code. However, given this
would require two instructions, and such a dead code gap could
just be a single insn long, we would need to place 'r0 = X; ret'
snippet at the very end after the user program or at the start
before the program (where we'd skip that region on prog entry),
and then place unconditional ja's into the dead code gap.
While more complex but possible, there's still another block
in the road that currently prevents from this, namely BPF to
BPF calls. The issue here is that such exception could be
returned from a callee, but the caller would not know that
it's an exception that needs to be propagated further down.
Alternative that has little complexity is to just use a ja-1
code for now which will trap the execution here instead of
silently doing bad things if we ever get there due to bugs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Very minor optimization; saves 1 byte per program in x86_64
JIT in cBPF prologue.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Tonghao Zhang
Eric Dumazet
Harini Katakam
Gal Pressman
Wei Wang
Alexander Duyck
Andy Gospodarek
David Ahern
Andy Spencer
Cong Wang
Jason Wang
Nicolas Dichtel
Vadim Lomovtsev
Michael S. Tsirkin
Martin KaFai Lau
Christian Brauner
kbuild test robot
Leon Romanovsky
Yonghong Song
Daniel Borkmann