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The kernel's initcall infrastructure lacks the ability to express
dependencies between initcalls, whereas the modules infrastructure
automatically handles dependencies via symbol loading. Ensure the
PSP SEV driver is initialized before proceeding in sev_hardware_setup()
if KVM is built-in as the dependency isn't handled by the initcall
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-ID: <f78ddb64087df27e7bcb1ae0ab53f55aa0804fab.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM is dependent on the PSP SEV driver and PSP SEV driver needs to be
loaded before KVM module. In case of module loading any dependent
modules are automatically loaded but in case of built-in modules there
is no inherent mechanism available to specify dependencies between
modules and ensure that any dependent modules are loaded implicitly.
Add a new external API interface for PSP module initialization which
allows PSP SEV driver to be loaded explicitly if KVM is built-in.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-ID: <15279ca0cad56a07cf12834ec544310f85ff5edc.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If userspace creates vcpus, then a vgic, we end-up in a situation
where irqchip_in_kernel() will return true, but no private interrupt
has been allocated for these vcpus. This situation will continue
until userspace initialises the vgic, at which point we fix the
early vcpus. Should a vcpu run or be initialised in the interval,
bad things may happen.
An obvious solution is to move this fix-up phase to the point where
the vgic is created. This ensures that from that point onwards,
all vcpus have their private interrupts, as new vcpus will directly
allocate them.
With that, we have the invariant that when irqchip_in_kernel() is
true, all vcpus have their private interrupts.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250212182558.2865232-3-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We currently spit out a warning if making a timer interrupt pending
fails. But not only this is loud and easy to trigger from userspace,
we also fail to do anything useful with that information.
Dropping the warning is the easiest thing to do for now. We can
always add error reporting if we really want in the future.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250212182558.2865232-2-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When allocating guest stage-2 page-table pages at EL2, pKVM can consume
pages from the host-provided kvm_hyp_memcache. As pgtable.c expects
zeroed pages, guest_s2_zalloc_page() actively implements this zeroing
with a PAGE_SIZE memset. Unfortunately, we don't check the page
alignment of the host-provided address before doing so, which could
lead to the memset overrunning the page if the host was malicious.
Fix this by simply force-aligning all kvm_hyp_memcache allocations to
page boundaries.
Fixes: 60dfe093ec13 ("KVM: arm64: Instantiate guest stage-2 page-tables at EL2")
Reported-by: Ben Simner <ben.simner@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250213153615.3642515-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that EL2 has gained some early timer emulation, it accesses
the offsets pointed to by the timer structure, both of which
live in the KVM structure.
Of course, these are *kernel* pointers, so the dereferencing
of these pointers in non-kernel code must be itself be offset.
Given switch.h its own version of timer_get_offset() and use that
instead.
Fixes: b86fc215dc26d ("KVM: arm64: Handle counter access early in non-HYP context")
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250212173454.2864462-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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At the end of kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp() we check that no bits are set in
SVCR. We only check this for protected mode despite this mattering
equally for non-protected mode, and the comment above this is confusing.
Remove the comment and simplify the check, moving from WARN_ON() to
WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid spamming the log.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the
CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL:
* For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained
by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that
guest's maximum VL.
Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H.
* For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest,
which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL.
Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores
ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the
guest's maximum VL.
This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp().
If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries
to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's
FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread.
This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live
FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and
fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected
before attempting to save the register state:
| if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) {
| force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0);
| return;
| }
Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly
switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this
happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHE
__deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified to enable host access
to all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features.
In protected nVHE/hVHE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored
by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so
from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and
the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp.
Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE")
Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The shared hyp switch header has a number of static functions which
might not be used by all files that include the header, and when unused
they will provoke compiler warnings, e.g.
| In file included from arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:8:
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:703:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
| 703 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:682:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
| 682 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:662:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
| 662 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:458:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
| 458 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:329:13: warning: 'kvm_hyp_handle_mops' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
| 329 | static bool kvm_hyp_handle_mops(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mark these functions as 'inline' to suppress this warning. This
shouldn't result in any functional change.
At the same time, avoid the use of __alias() in the header and alias
kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low() and kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low() to
kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault() using CPP, matching the style in the rest
of the kernel. For consistency, kvm_hyp_handle_memory_fault() is also
marked as 'inline'.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The hyp exit handling logic is largely shared between VHE and nVHE/hVHE,
with common logic in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h. The code
in the header depends on function definitions provided by
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c and arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
when they include the header.
This is an unusual header dependency, and prevents the use of
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h in other files as this would
result in compiler warnings regarding missing definitions, e.g.
| In file included from arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:8:
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:733:31: warning: 'kvm_get_exit_handler_array' used but never defined
| 733 | static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| ./arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h:735:13: warning: 'early_exit_filter' used but never defined
| 735 | static void early_exit_filter(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code);
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Refactor the logic such that the header doesn't depend on anything from
the C files. There should be no functional change as a result of this
patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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For historical reasons, the VHE and nVHE/hVHE implementations of
__activate_cptr_traps() pair with a common implementation of
__kvm_reset_cptr_el2(), which ideally would be named
__deactivate_cptr_traps().
Rename __kvm_reset_cptr_el2() to __deactivate_cptr_traps(), and split it
into separate VHE and nVHE/hVHE variants so that each can be paired with
its corresponding implementation of __activate_cptr_traps().
At the same time, fold kvm_write_cptr_el2() into its callers. This
makes it clear in-context whether a write is made to the CPACR_EL1
encoding or the CPTR_EL2 encoding, and removes the possibility of
confusion as to whether kvm_write_cptr_el2() reformats the sysreg fields
as cpacr_clear_set() does.
In the nVHE/hVHE implementation of __activate_cptr_traps(), placing the
sysreg writes within the if-else blocks requires that the call to
__activate_traps_fpsimd32() is moved earlier, but as this was always
called before writing to CPTR_EL2/CPACR_EL1, this should not result in a
functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When KVM is in VHE mode, the host kernel tries to save and restore the
configuration of CPACR_EL1.SMEN (i.e. CPTR_EL2.SMEN when HCR_EL2.E2H=1)
across kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp() and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), since the
configuration may be clobbered by hyp when running a vCPU. This logic
has historically been broken, and is currently redundant.
This logic was originally introduced in commit:
861262ab86270206 ("KVM: arm64: Handle SME host state when running guests")
At the time, the VHE hyp code would reset CPTR_EL2.SMEN to 0b00 when
returning to the host, trapping host access to SME state. Unfortunately,
this was unsafe as the host could take a softirq before calling
kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), and if a softirq handler were to use kernel mode
NEON the resulting attempt to save the live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state would
result in a fatal trap.
That issue was limited to VHE mode. For nVHE/hVHE modes, KVM always
saved/restored the host kernel's CPACR_EL1 value, and configured
CPTR_EL2.TSM to 0b0, ensuring that host usage of SME would not be
trapped.
The issue above was incidentally fixed by commit:
375110ab51dec5dc ("KVM: arm64: Fix resetting SME trap values on reset for (h)VHE")
That commit changed the VHE hyp code to configure CPTR_EL2.SMEN to 0b01
when returning to the host, permitting host kernel usage of SME,
avoiding the issue described above. At the time, this was not identified
as a fix for commit 861262ab86270206.
Now that the host eagerly saves and unbinds its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state, there's no need to save/restore the state of the EL0 SME trap.
The kernel can safely save/restore state without trapping, as described
above, and will restore userspace state (including trap controls) before
returning to userspace.
Remove the redundant logic.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When KVM is in VHE mode, the host kernel tries to save and restore the
configuration of CPACR_EL1.ZEN (i.e. CPTR_EL2.ZEN when HCR_EL2.E2H=1)
across kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp() and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(), since the
configuration may be clobbered by hyp when running a vCPU. This logic is
currently redundant.
The VHE hyp code unconditionally configures CPTR_EL2.ZEN to 0b01 when
returning to the host, permitting host kernel usage of SVE.
Now that the host eagerly saves and unbinds its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state, there's no need to save/restore the state of the EL0 SVE trap.
The kernel can safely save/restore state without trapping, as described
above, and will restore userspace state (including trap controls) before
returning to userspace.
Remove the redundant logic.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that the host eagerly saves its own FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
non-protected KVM never needs to save the host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state,
and the code to do this is never used. Protected KVM still needs to
save/restore the host FPSIMD/SVE state to avoid leaking guest state to
the host (and to avoid revealing to the host whether the guest used
FPSIMD/SVE/SME), and that code needs to be retained.
Remove the unused code and data structures.
To avoid the need for a stub copy of kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host() in the
VHE hyp code, the nVHE/hVHE version is moved into the shared switch
header, where it is only invoked when KVM is in protected mode.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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There are several problems with the way hyp code lazily saves the host's
FPSIMD/SVE state, including:
* Host SVE being discarded unexpectedly due to inconsistent
configuration of TIF_SVE and CPACR_ELx.ZEN. This has been seen to
result in QEMU crashes where SVE is used by memmove(), as reported by
Eric Auger:
https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-68997
* Host SVE state is discarded *after* modification by ptrace, which was an
unintentional ptrace ABI change introduced with lazy discarding of SVE state.
* The host FPMR value can be discarded when running a non-protected VM,
where FPMR support is not exposed to a VM, and that VM uses
FPSIMD/SVE. In these cases the hyp code does not save the host's FPMR
before unbinding the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, leaving a stale
value in memory.
Avoid these by eagerly saving and "flushing" the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state when loading a vCPU such that KVM does not need to save any of the
host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state. For clarity, fpsimd_kvm_prepare() is
removed and the necessary call to fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() is
placed in kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(). As 'fpsimd_state' and 'fpmr_ptr'
should not be used, they are set to NULL; all uses of these will be
removed in subsequent patches.
Historical problems go back at least as far as v5.17, e.g. erroneous
assumptions about TIF_SVE being clear in commit:
8383741ab2e773a9 ("KVM: arm64: Get rid of host SVE tracking/saving")
... and so this eager save+flush probably needs to be backported to ALL
stable trees.
Fixes: 93ae6b01bafee8fa ("KVM: arm64: Discard any SVE state when entering KVM guests")
Fixes: 8c845e2731041f0f ("arm64/sve: Leave SVE enabled on syscall if we don't context switch")
Fixes: ef3be86021c3bdf3 ("KVM: arm64: Add save/restore support for FPMR")
Reported-by: Eric Auger <eauger@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value
out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware
with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6.
When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest,
KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on
VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs
at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint
only generates one VM-Exit.
For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also
identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest)
and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading
DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop.
But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for
KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas
VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the
guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done
_inside_ the core run loop.
Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common
x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in
hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is
a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and
clobber the guest's actual value.
The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX
preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6
being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is
orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the
VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection
and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the
window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing
DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1).
L1's view:
==========
<L1 disables DR interception>
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
A: L1 Writes DR6
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1
B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec
D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L2 detects failure
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT
L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure)
CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L0's view:
==========
L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216
L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L1 writes DR7, L0 disables DR interception
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005612: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000007
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005613: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
A: <L1 writes DR6 = 1, no interception, arch.dr6 is still '0'>
B: CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason PREEMPTION_TIMER
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: kvm_entry: vcpu 23
C: L0 writes DR6 = 0 (arch.dr6)
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005614: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0
L1 => L2 nested VM-Enter
CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005616: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMRESUME
L0 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0
Reported-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANDhNCq5_F3HfFYABqFGCA1bPd_%2BxgNj-iDQhH4tDk%2Bwi8iZZg%40mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 375e28ffc0cf ("KVM: X86: Set host DR6 only on VMX and for KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT")
Fixes: d67668e9dd76 ("KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Tested-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250125011833.3644371-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
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When preparing vmcb02 for nested VMRUN (or state restore), "enter" guest
mode prior to initializing the MMU for nested NPT so that guest_mode is
set in the MMU's role. KVM's model is that all L2 MMUs are tagged with
guest_mode, as the behavior of hypervisor MMUs tends to be significantly
different than kernel MMUs.
Practically speaking, the bug is relatively benign, as KVM only directly
queries role.guest_mode in kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots() and
kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(), which SVM doesn't use, and in paths
that are optimizations (mmu_page_zap_pte() and
shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages()).
And while the role is incorprated into shadow page usage, because nested
NPT requires KVM to be using NPT for L1, reusing shadow pages across L1
and L2 is impossible as L1 MMUs will always have direct=1, while L2 MMUs
will have direct=0.
Hoist the TLB processing and setting of HF_GUEST_MASK to the beginning
of the flow instead of forcing guest_mode in the MMU, as nothing in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() between the old and new locations touches
TLB flush requests or HF_GUEST_MASK, i.e. there's no reason to present
inconsistent vCPU state to the MMU.
Fixes: 69cb877487de ("KVM: nSVM: move MMU setup to nested_prepare_vmcb_control")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130010825.220346-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
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Add testcases to x86's Hyper-V CPUID test to verify that KVM advertises
support for features that require an in-kernel local APIC appropriately,
i.e. that KVM hides support from the vCPU-scoped ioctl if the VM doesn't
have an in-kernel local APIC.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Allocate, get, and free the CPUID array in the Hyper-V CPUID test in the
test's core helper, instead of copy+pasting code at each call site. In
addition to deduplicating a small amount of code, restricting visibility
of the array to a single invocation of the core test prevents "leaking" an
array across test cases. Passing in @vcpu to the helper will also allow
pivoting on VM-scoped information without needing to pass more booleans,
e.g. to conditionally assert on features that require an in-kernel APIC.
To avoid use-after-free bugs due to overzealous and careless developers,
opportunstically add a comment to explain that the system-scoped helper
caches the Hyper-V CPUID entries, i.e. that the caller is not responsible
for freeing the memory.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Make the Hyper-V CPUID test's local helper test_hv_cpuid_e2big() static,
it's not used outside of the test (and isn't intended to be).
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Advertise support for Hyper-V's SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX hypercalls if and
only if the local API is emulated/virtualized by KVM, and explicitly reject
said hypercalls if the local APIC is emulated in userspace, i.e. don't rely
on userspace to opt-in to KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID.
Rejecting SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if
Hyper-V enlightenments are exposed to the guest without an in-kernel local
APIC:
dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd
__kasan_report.cold+0x34/0x84
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50
__apic_accept_irq+0x3a/0x5c0
kvm_hv_send_ipi.isra.0+0x34e/0x820
kvm_hv_hypercall+0x8d9/0x9d0
kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x506/0x7e0
__vmx_handle_exit+0x283/0xb60
vmx_handle_exit+0x1d/0xd0
vcpu_enter_guest+0x16b0/0x24c0
vcpu_run+0xc0/0x550
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x170/0x6d0
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20
__se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160
do_syscal1_64+0x30/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Note, checking the sending vCPU is sufficient, as the per-VM irqchip_mode
can't be modified after vCPUs are created, i.e. if one vCPU has an
in-kernel local APIC, then all vCPUs have an in-kernel local APIC.
Reported-by: Dongjie Zou <zoudongjie@huawei.com>
Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls")
Fixes: 2bc39970e932 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: Introduce KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Don't use an uninitialised stack variable, and just return 0
on the non-error path.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202502100911.8c9DbtKD-lkp@intel.com/
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
|
|
Commit 3775fc538f53 ("PM: sleep: core: Synchronize runtime PM status of
parents and children") exposed an issue related to simple_pm_bus_pm_ops
that uses pm_runtime_force_suspend() and pm_runtime_force_resume() as
bus type PM callbacks for the noirq phases of system-wide suspend and
resume.
The problem is that pm_runtime_force_suspend() does not distinguish
runtime-suspended devices from devices for which runtime PM has never
been enabled, so if it sees a device with runtime PM status set to
RPM_ACTIVE, it will assume that runtime PM is enabled for that device
and so it will attempt to suspend it with the help of its runtime PM
callbacks which may not be ready for that. As it turns out, this
causes simple_pm_bus_runtime_suspend() to crash due to a NULL pointer
dereference.
Another problem related to the above commit and simple_pm_bus_pm_ops is
that setting runtime PM status of a device handled by the latter to
RPM_ACTIVE will actually prevent it from being resumed because
pm_runtime_force_resume() only resumes devices with runtime PM status
set to RPM_SUSPENDED.
To mitigate these issues, do not allow power.set_active to propagate
beyond the parent of the device with DPM_FLAG_SMART_SUSPEND set that
will need to be resumed, which should be a sufficient stop-gap for the
time being, but they will need to be properly addressed in the future
because in general during system-wide resume it is necessary to resume
all devices in a dependency chain in which at least one device is going
to be resumed.
Fixes: 3775fc538f53 ("PM: sleep: core: Synchronize runtime PM status of parents and children")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/1c2433d4-7e0f-4395-b841-b8eac7c25651@nvidia.com/
Reported-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6137505.lOV4Wx5bFT@rjwysocki.net
|
|
When the handling of a guest stage-2 permission fault races with an MMU
notifier, the faulting page might be gone from the guest's stage-2 by
the point we attempt to call (p)kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms(). In the
normal KVM case, this leads to returning -EAGAIN which user_mem_abort()
handles correctly by simply re-entering the guest. However, the pKVM
hypercall implementation has additional logic to check the page state
using __check_host_shared_guest() which gets confused with absence of a
page mapped at the requested IPA and returns -ENOENT, hence breaking
user_mem_abort() and hilarity ensues.
Luckily, several of the hypercalls for managing the stage-2 page-table
of NP guests have no effect on the pKVM ownership tracking (wrprotect,
test_clear_young, mkyoung, and crucially relax_perms), so the extra
state checking logic is in fact not strictly necessary. So, to fix the
discrepancy between standard KVM and pKVM, let's just drop the
superfluous __check_host_shared_guest() logic from those hypercalls and
make the extra state checking a debug assertion dependent on
CONFIG_NVHE_EL2_DEBUG as we already do for other transitions.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250207145438.1333475-3-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
The check_host_shared_guest() path expects to find a last-level valid
PTE in the guest's stage-2 page-table. However, it checks the PTE's
level before its validity, which makes it hard for callers to figure out
what went wrong.
To make error handling simpler, check the PTE's validity first.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250207145438.1333475-2-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
The code was restructured where the function graph notrace code, that
would not trace a function and all its children is done by setting a
NOTRACE flag when the function that is not to be traced is hit.
There's a TRACE_GRAPH_NOTRACE_BIT which defines the bit in the flags and a
TRACE_GRAPH_NOTRACE which is the mask with that bit set. But the
restructuring used TRACE_GRAPH_NOTRACE_BIT when it should have used
TRACE_GRAPH_NOTRACE.
For example:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo set_track_prepare stack_trace_save > set_graph_notrace
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# cat trace
[..]
0) | __slab_free() {
0) | free_to_partial_list() {
0) | arch_stack_walk() {
0) | __unwind_start() {
0) 0.501 us | get_stack_info();
Where a non filter trace looks like:
# echo > set_graph_notrace
# cat trace
0) | free_to_partial_list() {
0) | set_track_prepare() {
0) | stack_trace_save() {
0) | arch_stack_walk() {
0) | __unwind_start() {
Where the filter should look like:
# cat trace
0) | free_to_partial_list() {
0) | _raw_spin_lock_irqsave() {
0) 0.350 us | preempt_count_add();
0) 0.351 us | do_raw_spin_lock();
0) 2.440 us | }
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250208001511.535be150@batman.local.home
Fixes: b84214890a9bc ("function_graph: Move graph notrace bit to shadow stack global var")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
-Wenum-enum-conversion was strengthened in clang-19 to warn for C, which
caused the kernel to move it to W=1 in commit 75b5ab134bb5 ("kbuild:
Move -Wenum-{compare-conditional,enum-conversion} into W=1") because
there were numerous instances that would break builds with -Werror.
Unfortunately, this is not a full solution, as more and more developers,
subsystems, and distributors are building with W=1 as well, so they
continue to see the numerous instances of this warning.
Since the move to W=1, there have not been many new instances that have
appeared through various build reports and the ones that have appeared
seem to be following similar existing patterns, suggesting that most
instances of this warning will not be real issues. The only alternatives
for silencing this warning are adding casts (which is generally seen as
an ugly practice) or refactoring the enums to macro defines or a unified
enum (which may be undesirable because of type safety in other parts of
the code).
Move the warning to W=2, where warnings that occur frequently but may be
relevant should reside.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 75b5ab134bb5 ("kbuild: Move -Wenum-{compare-conditional,enum-conversion} into W=1")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ZwRA9SOcOjjLJcpi@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
While attempting to build a Debian packages with CC="ccache gcc", I
saw the following error as builddeb builds linux-headers-$KERNELVERSION:
make HOSTCC=ccache gcc VPATH= srcroot=. -f ./scripts/Makefile.build obj=debian/linux-headers-6.14.0-rc1/usr/src/linux-headers-6.14.0-rc1/scripts
make[6]: *** No rule to make target 'gcc'. Stop.
Upon investigation, it seems that one instance of $(CC) variable reference
in ./scripts/package/install-extmod-build was missing quotation marks,
causing the above error.
Add the missing quotation marks around $(CC) to fix build.
Fixes: 5f73e7d0386d ("kbuild: refactor cross-compiling linux-headers package")
Co-developed-by: Mingcong Bai <jeffbai@aosc.io>
Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <jeffbai@aosc.io>
Tested-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: WangYuli <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
|
I no longer have any faith left in the kernel development process or
community management approach.
Apple/ARM platform development will continue downstream. If I feel like
sending some patches upstream in the future myself for whatever subtree
I may, or I may not. Anyone who feels like fighting the upstreaming
fight themselves is welcome to do so.
Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan@marcan.st>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
I need to filter my emails better, switch to pavel@kernel.org address
to help with that.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This costs a strlen() call when instatianating a symlink.
Preferably it would be hidden behind VFS_WARN_ON (or compatible), but
there is no such facility at the moment. With the facility in place the
call can be patched out in production kernels.
In the meantime, since the cost is being paid unconditionally, use the
result to a fixup the bad caller.
This is not expected to persist in the long run (tm).
Sample splat:
bad length passed for symlink [/tmp/syz-imagegen43743633/file0/file0] (got 131109, expected 37)
[rest of WARN blurp goes here]
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250204213207.337980-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Pidfs supports extensible and non-extensible ioctls. The extensible
ioctls need to check for the ioctl number itself not just the ioctl
command otherwise both backward- and forward compatibility are broken.
The pidfs ioctl handler also needs to look at the type of the ioctl
command to guard against cases where "[...] a daemon receives some
random file descriptor from a (potentially less privileged) client and
expects the FD to be of some specific type, it might call ioctl() on
this FD with some type-specific command and expect the call to fail if
the FD is of the wrong type; but due to the missing type check, the
kernel instead performs some action that userspace didn't expect."
(cf. [1]]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250204-work-pidfs-ioctl-v1-1-04987d239575@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez2K9A5GwtgqO31u9ZL292we8ZwAA=TJwwEv7wRuJ3j4Lw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Fixes: 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Acked-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13; please backport with 8ce352818820 ("pidfs: check for valid ioctl commands")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
After introducing pre-content events, we had a regression related to
disabling huge faults on files that should never have pre-content events
enabled.
This happened because the default f_mode of allocated files (0) does
not disable pre-content events.
Pre-content events are disabled in file_set_fsnotify_mode_by_watchers()
but internal files may not get to call this helper.
Initialize f_mode to disable permission and pre-content events for all
files and if needed they will be enabled for the callers of
file_set_fsnotify_mode_by_watchers().
Fixes: 20bf82a898b6 ("mm: don't allow huge faults for files with pre content watches")
Reported-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20250131121703.1e4d00a7.alex.williamson@redhat.com/
Tested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250203223205.861346-4-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
STATMOUNT_MNT_OPTS can actually be missing if there are no options. This
is a change of behavior since 75ead69a7173 ("fs: don't let statmount return
empty strings").
The other checks shouldn't actually trigger, but add them for correctness
and for easier debugging if the test fails.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129160641.35485-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
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Most pseudo files are not applicable for fsnotify events at all,
let alone to the new pre-content events.
Disable notifications to all files allocated with alloc_file_pseudo()
and enable legacy inotify events for the specific cases of pipe and
socket, which have known users of inotify events.
Pre-content events are also kept disabled for sockets and pipes.
Fixes: 20bf82a898b6 ("mm: don't allow huge faults for files with pre content watches")
Reported-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20250131121703.1e4d00a7.alex.williamson@redhat.com/
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAHk-=wi2pThSVY=zhO=ZKxViBj5QCRX-=AS2+rVknQgJnHXDFg@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250203223205.861346-3-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Prepending security options was made conditional on sb->s_op->show_options,
but security options are independent of sb options.
Fixes: 056d33137bf9 ("fs: prepend statmount.mnt_opts string with security_sb_mnt_opts()")
Fixes: f9af549d1fd3 ("fs: export mount options via statmount()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129151253.33241-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The FMODE_NONOTIFY_* bits are a 2-bits mode. Open coding manipulation
of those bits is risky. Use an accessor file_set_fsnotify_mode() to
set the mode.
Rename file_set_fsnotify_mode() => file_set_fsnotify_mode_from_watchers()
to make way for the simple accessor name.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250203223205.861346-2-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
All users of lockref_init() now initialize the count to 1, so hardcode
that and remove the count argument.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130135624.1899988-4-agruenba@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
In qd_alloc(), initialize the lockref count to 1 to cover the common
case. Compensate for that in gfs2_quota_init() by adjusting the count
back down to 0; this only occurs when mounting the filesystem rw.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130135624.1899988-3-agruenba@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Move the initialization of gl_lockref from gfs2_init_glock_once() to
gfs2_glock_get(). This allows to use lockref_init() there.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130135624.1899988-2-agruenba@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Just like it's normal for unset values to be zero, unset strings should be
empty instead of containing random values.
It seems to be a typical mistake that the mask returned by statmount is not
checked, which can result in various bugs.
With this fix, these bugs are prevented, since it is highly likely that
userspace would just want to turn the missing mask case into an empty
string anyway (most of the recently found cases are of this type).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJfpegsVCPfCn2DpM8iiYSS5DpMsLB8QBUCHecoj6s0Vxf4jzg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 68385d77c05b ("statmount: simplify string option retrieval")
Fixes: 46eae99ef733 ("add statmount(2) syscall")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130121500.113446-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Building with GCC 15 results in build error
fs/vboxsf/super.c:24:54: error: initializer-string for array of ‘unsigned char’ is too long [-Werror=unterminated-string-initialization]
24 | static const unsigned char VBSF_MOUNT_SIGNATURE[4] = "\000\377\376\375";
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Due to GCC having enabled -Werror=unterminated-string-initialization[0]
by default. Separately initializing each array element of
VBSF_MOUNT_SIGNATURE to ensure NUL termination, thus satisfying GCC 15
and fixing the build error.
[0]: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Warning-Options.html#index-Wno-unterminated-string-initialization
Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das <brahmajit.xyz@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250121162648.1408743-1-brahmajit.xyz@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Clang static checker(scan-build) warning:
fs/stat.c:287:21: warning: The left expression of the compound assignment is
an uninitialized value. The computed value will also be garbage.
287 | stat->result_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^
fs/stat.c:290:21: warning: The left expression of the compound assignment is
an uninitialized value. The computed value will also be garbage.
290 | stat->result_mask |= STATX_MNT_ID;
When vfs_getattr() failed because of security_inode_getattr(), 'stat' is
uninitialized. In this case, there is a harmless garbage problem in
vfs_statx_path(). It's better to return error directly when
vfs_getattr() failed, avoiding garbage value and more clearly.
Signed-off-by: Su Hui <suhui@nfschina.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250119025946.1168957-1-suhui@nfschina.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Before attaching a new root to the old root, the children counter of the
new root is checked to verify that only the upcoming CPU's top group have
been connected to it. However since the recently added commit b729cc1ec21a
("timers/migration: Fix another race between hotplug and idle entry/exit")
this check is not valid anymore because the old root is pre-accounted
as a child to the new root. Therefore after connecting the upcoming
CPU's top group to the new root, the children count to be expected must
be 2 and not 1 anymore.
This omission results in the old root to not be connected to the new
root. Then eventually the system may run with more than one top level,
which defeats the purpose of a single idle migrator.
Also the old root is pre-accounted but not connected upon the new root
creation. But it can be connected to the new root later on. Therefore
the old root may be accounted twice to the new root. The propagation of
such overcommit can end up creating a double final top-level root with a
groupmask incorrectly initialized. Although harmless given that the final
top level roots will never have a parent to walk up to, this oddity
opportunistically reported the core issue:
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 0 at kernel/time/timer_migration.c:543 tmigr_requires_handle_remote
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/8
RIP: 0010:tmigr_requires_handle_remote
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? tmigr_requires_handle_remote
? hrtimer_run_queues
update_process_times
tick_periodic
tick_handle_periodic
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt
</IRQ>
Fix the problem by taking the old root into account in the children count
of the new root so the connection is not omitted.
Also warn when more than one top level group exists to better detect
similar issues in the future.
Fixes: b729cc1ec21a ("timers/migration: Fix another race between hotplug and idle entry/exit")
Reported-by: Matt Fleming <mfleming@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250205160220.39467-1-frederic@kernel.org
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The space separator was factored out from the multiple chip name prints,
but several irq_chip::irq_print_chip() callbacks still print a leading
space. Remove the superfluous double spaces.
Fixes: 9d9f204bdf7243bf ("genirq/proc: Add missing space separator back")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/893f7e9646d8933cd6786d5a1ef3eb076d263768.1738764803.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
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Previously, bch2_bkey_sectors_need_rebalance() called
bch2_target_accepts_data(), checking whether the target is writable.
However, this means that adding or removing devices from a target would
change the value of bch2_bkey_sectors_need_rebalance() for an existing
extent; this needs to be invariant so that the extent trigger can
correctly maintain rebalance_work accounting.
Instead, check target_accepts_data() in io_opts_to_rebalance_opts(),
before creating the bch_extent_rebalance entry.
This fixes (one?) cause of rebalance_work accounting being off.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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Spotted by sparse.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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The discard path is supposed to issue journal flushes when there's too
many buckets empty buckets that need a journal commit before they can be
written to again, but at some point this code seems to have been lost.
Bring it back with a new optimization to make sure we don't issue too
many journal flushes: the journal now tracks the sequence number of the
most recent flush in progress, which the discard path uses when deciding
which buckets need a journal flush.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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In the previous commit b3d82c2f2761, code was added to prevent journal sequence
overflow. Among them, the code added to journal_entry_open() uses the
bch2_fs_fatal_err_on() function to handle errors.
However, __journal_res_get() , which calls journal_entry_open() , calls
journal_entry_open() while holding journal->lock , but bch2_fs_fatal_err_on()
internally tries to acquire journal->lock , which results in a deadlock.
So we need to add a locked helper to handle fatal errors even when the
journal->lock is held.
Fixes: b3d82c2f2761 ("bcachefs: Guard against journal seq overflow")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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