| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Add a global snapshot of kvm_is_forced_emulation_enabled() and sync it to
all VMs by default so that core library code can force emulation, e.g. to
allow for easier testing of the intersections between emulation and other
features in KVM.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240314185459.2439072-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Move memstress' random bool logic into common code to avoid reinventing
the wheel for basic yes/no decisions. Provide an outer wrapper to handle
the basic/common case of just wanting a 50/50 chance of something
happening.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240314185459.2439072-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Add a global guest_random_state instance, i.e. a pseudo-RNG, so that an
RNG is available for *all* tests. This will allow randomizing behavior
in core library code, e.g. x86 will utilize the pRNG to conditionally
force emulation of writes from within common guest code.
To allow for deterministic runs, and to be compatible with existing tests,
allow tests to override the seed used to initialize the pRNG.
Note, the seed *must* be overwritten before a VM is created in order for
the seed to take effect, though it's perfectly fine for a test to
initialize multiple VMs with different seeds.
And as evidenced by memstress_guest_code(), it's also a-ok to instantiate
more RNGs using the global seed (or a modified version of it). The goal
of the global RNG is purely to ensure that _a_ source of random numbers is
available, it doesn't have to be the _only_ RNG.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240314185459.2439072-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Define _GNU_SOURCE is the base CFLAGS instead of relying on selftests to
manually #define _GNU_SOURCE, which is repetitive and error prone. E.g.
kselftest_harness.h requires _GNU_SOURCE for asprintf(), but if a selftest
includes kvm_test_harness.h after stdio.h, the include guards result in
the effective version of stdio.h consumed by kvm_test_harness.h not
defining asprintf():
In file included from x86_64/fix_hypercall_test.c:12:
In file included from include/kvm_test_harness.h:11:
../kselftest_harness.h:1169:2: error: call to undeclared function
'asprintf'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations
[-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
1169 | asprintf(&test_name, "%s%s%s.%s", f->name,
| ^
When including the rseq selftest's "library" code, #undef _GNU_SOURCE so
that rseq.c controls whether or not it wants to build with _GNU_SOURCE.
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423190308.2883084-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
TDX uses different ABI to get information about VM exit. Pass intr_info to
the NMI and INTR handlers instead of pulling it from vcpu_vmx in
preparation for sharing the bulk of the handlers with TDX.
When the guest TD exits to VMM, RAX holds status and exit reason, RCX holds
exit qualification etc rather than the VMCS fields because VMM doesn't have
access to the VMCS. The eventual code will be
VMX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from VMCS
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)
TDX:
- get exit reason, intr_info, exit_qualification, and etc from guest
registers
- call NMI/INTR handlers (common code)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <0396a9ae70d293c9d0b060349dae385a8a4fbcec.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
KVM accesses Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) with VMX instructions
to operate on VM. TDX doesn't allow VMM to operate VMCS directly.
Instead, TDX has its own data structures, and TDX SEAMCALL APIs for VMM to
indirectly operate those data structures. This means we must have a TDX
version of kvm_x86_ops.
The existing global struct kvm_x86_ops already defines an interface which
can be adapted to TDX, but kvm_x86_ops is a system-wide, not per-VM
structure. To allow VMX to coexist with TDs, the kvm_x86_ops callbacks
will have wrappers "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()" to pick VMX or
TDX at run time.
To split the runtime switch, the VMX implementation, and the TDX
implementation, add main.c, and move out the vmx_x86_ops hooks in
preparation for adding TDX. Use 'vt' for the naming scheme as a nod to
VT-x and as a concatenation of VmxTdx.
The eventually converted code will look like this:
vmx.c:
vmx_op() { ... }
VMX initialization
tdx.c:
tdx_op() { ... }
TDX initialization
x86_ops.h:
vmx_op();
tdx_op();
main.c:
static vt_op() { if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op() }
static struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops = {
.op = vt_op,
initialization functions call both VMX and TDX initialization
Opportunistically, fix the name inconsistency from vmx_create_vcpu() and
vmx_free_vcpu() to vmx_vcpu_create() and vmx_vcpu_free().
Co-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Message-Id: <e603c317587f933a9d1bee8728c84e4935849c16.1705965634.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
By necessity, TDX will use a different register ABI for hypercalls.
Break out the core functionality so that it may be reused for TDX.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-Id: <5134caa55ac3dec33fb2addb5545b52b3b52db02.1705965635.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
With the demise of the .change_pte() MMU notifier callback, there is no
notification happening in set_pte_at_notify(). It is a synonym of
set_pte_at() and can be replaced with it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20240405115815.3226315-5-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The scope of set_pte_at_notify() has reduced more and more through the
years. Initially, it was meant for when the change to the PTE was
not bracketed by mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_{start,end}(). However,
that has not been so for over ten years. During all this period
the only implementation of .change_pte() was KVM and it
had no actual functionality, because it was called after
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() zapped the secondary PTE.
Now that this (nonfunctional) user of the .change_pte() callback is
gone, the whole callback can be removed. For now, leave in place
set_pte_at_notify() even though it is just a synonym for set_pte_at().
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240405115815.3226315-4-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The only user was kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte(), which is now gone.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20240405115815.3226315-3-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The .change_pte() MMU notifier callback was intended as an
optimization. The original point of it was that KSM could tell KVM to flip
its secondary PTE to a new location without having to first zap it. At
the time there was also an .invalidate_page() callback; both of them were
*not* bracketed by calls to mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_{start,end}(),
and .invalidate_page() also doubled as a fallback implementation of
.change_pte().
Later on, however, both callbacks were changed to occur within an
invalidate_range_start/end() block.
In the case of .change_pte(), commit 6bdb913f0a70 ("mm: wrap calls to
set_pte_at_notify with invalidate_range_start and invalidate_range_end",
2012-10-09) did so to remove the fallback from .invalidate_page() to
.change_pte() and allow sleepable .invalidate_page() hooks.
This however made KVM's usage of the .change_pte() callback completely
moot, because KVM unmaps the sPTEs during .invalidate_range_start()
and therefore .change_pte() has no hope of finding a sPTE to change.
Drop the generic KVM code that dispatches to kvm_set_spte_gfn(), as
well as all the architecture specific implementations.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Message-ID: <20240405115815.3226315-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-18-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Allow the caller to set the initial state of the VM. Doing this
before sev_vm_launch() matters for SEV-ES, since that is the
place where the VMSA is updated and after which the guest state
becomes sealed.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-17-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This removes the concept of "subtypes", instead letting the tests use proper
VM types that were recently added. While the sev_init_vm() and sev_es_init_vm()
are still able to operate with the legacy KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT
ioctls, this is limited to VMs that are created manually with
vm_create_barebones().
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-16-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-15-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The DebugSwap feature of SEV-ES provides a way for confidential guests
to use data breakpoints. Its status is record in VMSA, and therefore
attestation signatures depend on whether it is enabled or not. In order
to avoid invalidating the signatures depending on the host machine, it
was disabled by default (see commit 5abf6dceb066, "SEV: disable SEV-ES
DebugSwap by default", 2024-03-09).
However, we now have a new API to create SEV VMs that allows enabling
DebugSwap based on what the user tells KVM to do, and we also changed the
legacy KVM_SEV_ES_INIT API to never enable DebugSwap. It is therefore
possible to re-enable the feature without breaking compatibility with
kernels that pre-date the introduction of DebugSwap, so go ahead.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-14-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The idea that no parameter would ever be necessary when enabling SEV or
SEV-ES for a VM was decidedly optimistic. In fact, in some sense it's
already a parameter whether SEV or SEV-ES is desired. Another possible
source of variability is the desired set of VMSA features, as that affects
the measurement of the VM's initial state and cannot be changed
arbitrarily by the hypervisor.
Create a new sub-operation for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP that can take a struct,
and put the new op to work by including the VMSA features as a field of the
struct. The existing KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT use the full set of
supported VMSA features for backwards compatibility.
The struct also includes the usual bells and whistles for future
extensibility: a flags field that must be zero for now, and some padding
at the end.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-13-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
SEV-ES allows passing custom contents for x87, SSE and AVX state into the VMSA.
Allow userspace to do that with the usual KVM_SET_XSAVE API and only mark
FPU contents as confidential after it has been copied and encrypted into
the VMSA.
Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr(). However, there are other
parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-12-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-11-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-10-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This simplifies the implementation of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES),
and also allows the vendor module to specify which VM types are supported.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-9-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Some VM types have characteristics in common; in fact, the only use
of VM types right now is kvm_arch_has_private_mem and it assumes that
_all_ nonzero VM types have private memory.
We will soon introduce a VM type for SEV and SEV-ES VMs, and at that
point we will have two special characteristics of confidential VMs
that depend on the VM type: not just if memory is private, but
also whether guest state is protected. For the latter we have
kvm->arch.guest_state_protected, which is only set on a fully initialized
VM.
For VM types with protected guest state, we can actually fix a problem in
the SEV-ES implementation, where ioctls to set registers do not cause an
error even if the VM has been initialized and the guest state encrypted.
Make sure that when using VM types that will become an error.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240209183743.22030-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-8-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Right now, the set of features that are stored in the VMSA upon
initialization is fixed and depends on the module parameters for
kvm-amd.ko. However, the hypervisor cannot really change it at will
because the feature word has to match between the hypervisor and whatever
computes a measurement of the VMSA for attestation purposes.
Add a field to kvm_sev_info that holds the set of features to be stored
in the VMSA; and query it instead of referring to the module parameters.
Because KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT accept no parameters, this
does not yet introduce any functional change, but it paves the way for
an API that allows customization of the features per-VM.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240209183743.22030-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Compute the set of features to be stored in the VMSA when KVM is
initialized; move it from there into kvm_sev_info when SEV is initialized,
and then into the initial VMSA.
The new variable can then be used to return the set of supported features
to userspace, via the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Allow vendor modules to provide their own attributes on /dev/kvm.
To avoid proliferation of vendor ops, implement KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR
and KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR in terms of the same function. You're not
supposed to use KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR to do complicated computations,
especially on /dev/kvm.
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-5-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
There is no danger to the kernel if 32-bit userspace provides a 64-bit
value that has the high bits set, but for whatever reason happens to
resolve to an address that has something mapped there. KVM uses the
checked version of get_user() and put_user(), so any faults are caught
properly.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-4-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Stop compiling sev.c when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n, as the number of #ifdefs
in sev.c is getting ridiculous, and having #ifdefs inside of SEV helpers
is quite confusing.
To minimize #ifdefs in code flows, #ifdef away only the kvm_x86_ops hooks
and the #VMGEXIT handler. Stubs are also restricted to functions that
check sev_enabled and to the destruction functions sev_free_cpu() and
sev_vm_destroy(), where the style of their callers is to leave checks
to the callers. Most call sites instead rely on dead code elimination
to take care of functions that are guarded with sev_guest() or
sev_es_guest().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-3-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Leave SEV and SEV_ES '0' in kvm_cpu_caps by default, and instead set them
in sev_set_cpu_caps() if SEV and SEV-ES support are fully enabled. Aside
from the fact that sev_set_cpu_caps() is wildly misleading when it *clears*
capabilities, this will allow compiling out sev.c without falsely
advertising SEV/SEV-ES support in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
srso_alias_untrain_ret() is special code, even if it is a dummy
which is called in the !SRSO case, so annotate it like its real
counterpart, to address the following objtool splat:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x2b290: data relocation to !ENDBR: srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x0
Fixes: 4535e1a4174c ("x86/bugs: Fix the SRSO mitigation on Zen3/4")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405144637.17908-1-bp@kernel.org
|
|
In the FireWire OHCI interrupt handler, if a bus reset interrupt has
occurred, mask bus reset interrupts until bus_reset_work has serviced and
cleared the interrupt.
Normally, we always leave bus reset interrupts masked. We infer the bus
reset from the self-ID interrupt that happens shortly thereafter. A
scenario where we unmask bus reset interrupts was introduced in 2008 in
a007bb857e0b26f5d8b73c2ff90782d9c0972620: If
OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS (8) is set in the debug parameter bitmask, we
will unmask bus reset interrupts so we can log them.
irq_handler logs the bus reset interrupt. However, we can't clear the bus
reset event flag in irq_handler, because we won't service the event until
later. irq_handler exits with the event flag still set. If the
corresponding interrupt is still unmasked, the first bus reset will
usually freeze the system due to irq_handler being called again each
time it exits. This freeze can be reproduced by loading firewire_ohci
with "modprobe firewire_ohci debug=-1" (to enable all debugging output).
Apparently there are also some cases where bus_reset_work will get called
soon enough to clear the event, and operation will continue normally.
This freeze was first reported a few months after a007bb85 was committed,
but until now it was never fixed. The debug level could safely be set
to -1 through sysfs after the module was loaded, but this would be
ineffectual in logging bus reset interrupts since they were only
unmasked during initialization.
irq_handler will now leave the event flag set but mask bus reset
interrupts, so irq_handler won't be called again and there will be no
freeze. If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS is enabled, bus_reset_work will
unmask the interrupt after servicing the event, so future interrupts
will be caught as desired.
As a side effect to this change, OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS can now be
enabled through sysfs in addition to during initial module loading.
However, when enabled through sysfs, logging of bus reset interrupts will
be effective only starting with the second bus reset, after
bus_reset_work has executed.
Signed-off-by: Adam Goldman <adamg@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
|
|
Commit 3ee34eabac2a ("lib/stackdepot: fix first entry having a 0-handle")
changed the meaning of the pool_index field to mean "the pool index plus
1". This made the code accessing this field less self-documenting, as
well as causing debuggers such as drgn to not be able to easily remain
compatible with both old and new kernels, because they typically do that
by testing for presence of the new field. Because stackdepot is a
debugging tool, we should make sure that it is debugger friendly.
Therefore, give the field a different name to improve readability as well
as enabling debugger backwards compatibility.
This is needed in 6.9, which would otherwise become an odd release with
the new semantics and old name so debuggers wouldn't recognize the new
semantics there.
Fixes: 3ee34eabac2a ("lib/stackdepot: fix first entry having a 0-handle")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240402001500.53533-1-pcc@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib3e70c36c1d230dd0a118dc22649b33e768b9f88
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
PAT handling won't do the right thing in COW mappings: the first PTE (or,
in fact, all PTEs) can be replaced during write faults to point at anon
folios. Reliably recovering the correct PFN and cachemode using
follow_phys() from PTEs will not work in COW mappings.
Using follow_phys(), we might just get the address+protection of the anon
folio (which is very wrong), or fail on swap/nonswap entries, failing
follow_phys() and triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn() and
track_pfn_copy(), not properly calling free_pfn_range().
In free_pfn_range(), we either wouldn't call memtype_free() or would call
it with the wrong range, possibly leaking memory.
To fix that, let's update follow_phys() to refuse returning anon folios,
and fallback to using the stored PFN inside vma->vm_pgoff for COW mappings
if we run into that.
We will now properly handle untrack_pfn() with COW mappings, where we
don't need the cachemode. We'll have to fail fork()->track_pfn_copy() if
the first page was replaced by an anon folio, though: we'd have to store
the cachemode in the VMA to make this work, likely growing the VMA size.
For now, lets keep it simple and let track_pfn_copy() just fail in that
case: it would have failed in the past with swap/nonswap entries already,
and it would have done the wrong thing with anon folios.
Simple reproducer to trigger the WARN_ON_ONCE() in untrack_pfn():
<--- C reproducer --->
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <liburing.h>
int main(void)
{
struct io_uring_params p = {};
int ring_fd;
size_t size;
char *map;
ring_fd = io_uring_setup(1, &p);
if (ring_fd < 0) {
perror("io_uring_setup");
return 1;
}
size = p.sq_off.array + p.sq_entries * sizeof(unsigned);
/* Map the submission queue ring MAP_PRIVATE */
map = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE,
ring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
/* We have at least one page. Let's COW it. */
*map = 0;
pause();
return 0;
}
<--- C reproducer --->
On a system with 16 GiB RAM and swap configured:
# ./iouring &
# memhog 16G
# killall iouring
[ 301.552930] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 301.553285] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1402 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:1060 untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.553989] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_g
[ 301.558232] CPU: 7 PID: 1402 Comm: iouring Not tainted 6.7.5-100.fc38.x86_64 #1
[ 301.558772] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebu4
[ 301.559569] RIP: 0010:untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.559893] Code: 75 c4 eb cf 48 8b 43 10 8b a8 e8 00 00 00 3b 6b 28 74 b8 48 8b 7b 30 e8 ea 1a f7 000
[ 301.561189] RSP: 0018:ffffba2c0377fab8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 301.561590] RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: ffff9208c8ce9cc0 RCX: 000000010455e047
[ 301.562105] RDX: 07fffffff0eb1e0a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9208c391d200
[ 301.562628] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffba2c0377fab8 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 301.563145] R10: ffff9208d2292d50 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 00007fea890e0000
[ 301.563669] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba2c0377fc08 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 301.564186] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff920c2fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 301.564773] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 301.565197] CR2: 00007fea88ee8a20 CR3: 00000001033a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 301.565725] PKRU: 55555554
[ 301.565944] Call Trace:
[ 301.566148] <TASK>
[ 301.566325] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.566618] ? __warn+0x81/0x130
[ 301.566876] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.567163] ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
[ 301.567466] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
[ 301.567743] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
[ 301.568038] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 301.568363] ? untrack_pfn+0xf4/0x100
[ 301.568660] ? untrack_pfn+0x65/0x100
[ 301.568947] unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
[ 301.569247] unmap_vmas+0xb5/0x190
[ 301.569532] exit_mmap+0xec/0x340
[ 301.569801] __mmput+0x3e/0x130
[ 301.570051] do_exit+0x305/0xaf0
...
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240403212131.929421-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227122814.3781907-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com
Fixes: b1a86e15dc03 ("x86, pat: remove the dependency on 'vm_pgoff' in track/untrack pfn vma routines")
Fixes: 5899329b1910 ("x86: PAT: implement track/untrack of pfnmap regions for x86 - v3")
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update all remaining vmware.com email addresses to actual broadcom.com.
Add corresponding .mailmap entries for maintainers who contributed in the
past as the vmware.com address will start bouncing soon.
Maintainership update. Jeff Sipek has left VMware, Nick Shi will be
maintaining VMware PTP.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240402232334.33167-1-alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Ronak Doshi <ronak.doshi@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Nick Shi <nick.shi@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Bryan Tan <bryan-bt.tan@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Vishnu Dasa <vishnu.dasa@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Vishal Bhakta <vishal.bhakta@broadcom.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Got a compilation error on Android for ffsl after 91b80cc5b39f
("selftests: mm: fix map_hugetlb failure on 64K page size systems")
included vm_util.h.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329185814.16304-1-edliaw@google.com
Fixes: af605d26a8f2 ("selftests/mm: merge util.h into vm_util.h")
Signed-off-by: Edward Liaw <edliaw@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
A lockdep reports a possible deadlock in the find_vmap_area_exceed_addr_lock()
function:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.9.0-rc1-00060-ged3ccc57b108-dirty #6140 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
drgn/455 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff0000c00131d0 (&vn->busy.lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: find_vmap_area_exceed_addr_lock+0x64/0x124
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000c0011878 (&vn->busy.lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: find_vmap_area_exceed_addr_lock+0x64/0x124
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&vn->busy.lock/1);
lock(&vn->busy.lock/1);
*** DEADLOCK ***
indeed it can happen if the find_vmap_area_exceed_addr_lock() gets called
concurrently because it tries to acquire two nodes locks. It was done to
prevent removing a lowest VA found on a previous step.
To address this a lowest VA is found first without holding a node lock
where it resides. As a last step we check if a VA still there because it
can go away, if removed, proceed with next lowest.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment typos, per Baoquan]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240328140330.4747-1-urezki@gmail.com
Fixes: 53becf32aec1 ("mm: vmalloc: support multiple nodes in vread_iter")
Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Tested-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
During the boot the s390 system triggers "spinlock bad magic" messages
if the spinlock debugging is enabled:
[ 0.465445] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, swapper/0
[ 0.465490] lock: single+0x1860/0x1958, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 0.466067] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.8.0-12955-g8e938e398669 #1
[ 0.466188] Hardware name: QEMU 8561 QEMU (KVM/Linux)
[ 0.466270] Call Trace:
[ 0.466470] [<00000000011f26c8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xd8
[ 0.466516] [<00000000001dcc6a>] do_raw_spin_lock+0x8a/0x108
[ 0.466545] [<000000000042146c>] find_vmap_area+0x6c/0x108
[ 0.466572] [<000000000042175a>] find_vm_area+0x22/0x40
[ 0.466597] [<000000000012f152>] __set_memory+0x132/0x150
[ 0.466624] [<0000000001cc0398>] vmem_map_init+0x40/0x118
[ 0.466651] [<0000000001cc0092>] paging_init+0x22/0x68
[ 0.466677] [<0000000001cbbed2>] setup_arch+0x52a/0x708
[ 0.466702] [<0000000001cb6140>] start_kernel+0x80/0x5c8
[ 0.466727] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40
it happens because such system tries to access some vmap areas
whereas the vmalloc initialization is not even yet done:
[ 0.465490] lock: single+0x1860/0x1958, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 0.466067] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.8.0-12955-g8e938e398669 #1
[ 0.466188] Hardware name: QEMU 8561 QEMU (KVM/Linux)
[ 0.466270] Call Trace:
[ 0.466470] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117)
[ 0.466516] do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:87 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115)
[ 0.466545] find_vmap_area (mm/vmalloc.c:1059 mm/vmalloc.c:2364)
[ 0.466572] find_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3150)
[ 0.466597] __set_memory (arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c:360 arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c:393)
[ 0.466624] vmem_map_init (./arch/s390/include/asm/set_memory.h:55 arch/s390/mm/vmem.c:660)
[ 0.466651] paging_init (arch/s390/mm/init.c:97)
[ 0.466677] setup_arch (arch/s390/kernel/setup.c:972)
[ 0.466702] start_kernel (init/main.c:899)
[ 0.466727] startup_continue (arch/s390/kernel/head64.S:35)
[ 0.466811] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
...
[ 0.718250] vmalloc init - busy lock init 0000000002871860
[ 0.718328] vmalloc init - busy lock init 00000000028731b8
Some background. It worked before because the lock that is in question
was statically defined and initialized. As of now, the locks and data
structures are initialized in the vmalloc_init() function.
To address that issue add the check whether the "vmap_initialized"
variable is set, if not find_vmap_area() bails out on entry returning NULL.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240323141544.4150-1-urezki@gmail.com
Fixes: 72210662c5a2 ("mm: vmalloc: offload free_vmap_area_lock lock")
Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
If a member of a cpio archive for an initrd or initrams is larger than
2Gb, we'll eventually fail to write to that file when we get to that
limit, unless O_LARGEFILE is set.
The problem can be seen with this recipe, assuming that BLK_DEV_RAM
is not configured:
cd /tmp
dd if=/dev/zero of=BIGFILE bs=1048576 count=2200
echo BIGFILE | cpio -o -H newc -R root:root > initrd.img
kexec -l /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) --initrd=initrd.img --reuse-cmdline
kexec -e
The console will show 'Initramfs unpacking failed: write error'. With
the patch, the error is gone.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240323152934.3307391-1-jsperbeck@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
folio_is_secretmem() currently relies on secretmem folios being LRU
folios, to save some cycles.
However, folios might reside in a folio batch without the LRU flag set, or
temporarily have their LRU flag cleared. Consequently, the LRU flag is
unreliable for this purpose.
In particular, this is the case when secretmem_fault() allocates a fresh
page and calls filemap_add_folio()->folio_add_lru(). The folio might be
added to the per-cpu folio batch and won't get the LRU flag set until the
batch was drained using e.g., lru_add_drain().
Consequently, folio_is_secretmem() might not detect secretmem folios and
GUP-fast can succeed in grabbing a secretmem folio, crashing the kernel
when we would later try reading/writing to the folio, because the folio
has been unmapped from the directmap.
Fix it by removing that unreliable check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240326143210.291116-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABOYnLyevJeravW=QrH0JUPYEcDN160aZFb7kwndm-J2rmz0HQ@mail.gmail.com/
Debugged-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Tested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
list_del_init_careful() needs to be the last access to the wait queue
entry - it effectively unlocks access.
Previously, finish_wait() would see the empty list head and skip taking
the lock, and then we'd return - but the completion path would still
attempt to do the wakeup after the task_struct pointer had been
overwritten.
Fixes: 71eb6b6b0ba9 ("fs/aio: obey min_nr when doing wakeups")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAHTA-ubfwwB51A5Wg5M6H_rPEQK9pNf8FkAGH=vr=FEkyRrtqw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20240331215212.522544-1-kent.overstreet%40linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240331215212.522544-1-kent.overstreet@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Add CPUID_LNX_5 to track cpufeatures' word 21, and add the appropriate
compile-time assert in KVM to prevent direct lookups on the features in
CPUID_LNX_5. KVM uses X86_FEATURE_* flags to manage guest CPUID, and so
must translate features that are scattered by Linux from the Linux-defined
bit to the hardware-defined bit, i.e. should never try to directly access
scattered features in guest CPUID.
Opportunistically add NR_CPUID_WORDS to enum cpuid_leafs, along with a
compile-time assert in KVM's CPUID infrastructure to ensure that future
additions update cpuid_leafs along with NCAPINTS.
No functional change intended.
Fixes: 7f274e609f3d ("x86/cpufeatures: Add new word for scattered features")
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.
[From the email thread]
The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:
1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
happen at user/kernel boundaries.
3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
registers it returns.
4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
Fixes: 7db91e57a0ac ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
patch_map() uses fixmap mappings to circumvent the non-writability of
the kernel text mapping.
The __set_fixmap() function only flushes the current cpu tlb, it does
not emit an IPI so we must make sure that while we use a fixmap mapping,
the current task is not migrated on another cpu which could miss the
newly introduced fixmap mapping.
So in order to avoid any task migration, disable the preemption.
Reported-by: Andrea Parri <andrea@rivosinc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZcS+GAaM25LXsBOl@andrea/
Reported-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/CABgGipUMz3Sffu-CkmeUB1dKVwVQ73+7=sgC45-m0AE9RCjOZg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: cad539baa48f ("riscv: implement a memset like function for text")
Fixes: 0ff7c3b33127 ("riscv: Use text_mutex instead of patch_lock")
Co-developed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326203017.310422-3-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
The following warning appears when using ftrace:
[89855.443413] RCU not on for: arch_cpu_idle+0x0/0x1c
[89855.445640] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 0 at include/linux/trace_recursion.h:162 arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.445824] Modules linked in: xt_conntrack(E) nft_chain_nat(E) xt_MASQUERADE(E) nf_conntrack_netlink(E) xt_addrtype(E) nft_compat(E) nf_tables(E) nfnetlink(E) br_netfilter(E) cfg80211(E) nls_iso8859_1(E) ofpart(E) redboot(E) cmdlinepart(E) cfi_cmdset_0001(E) virtio_net(E) cfi_probe(E) cfi_util(E) 9pnet_virtio(E) gen_probe(E) net_failover(E) virtio_rng(E) failover(E) 9pnet(E) physmap(E) map_funcs(E) chipreg(E) mtd(E) uio_pdrv_genirq(E) uio(E) dm_multipath(E) scsi_dh_rdac(E) scsi_dh_emc(E) scsi_dh_alua(E) drm(E) efi_pstore(E) backlight(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) raid10(E) raid456(E) async_raid6_recov(E) async_memcpy(E) async_pq(E) async_xor(E) xor(E) async_tx(E) raid6_pq(E) raid1(E) raid0(E) virtio_blk(E)
[89855.451563] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Tainted: G E 6.8.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2
[89855.451726] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[89855.451899] epc : arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.452016] ra : arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.452119] epc : ffffffff8016b216 ra : ffffffff8016b216 sp : ffffaf808090fdb0
[89855.452171] gp : ffffffff827c7680 tp : ffffaf808089ad40 t0 : ffffffff800c0dd8
[89855.452216] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffaf808090fe30
[89855.452306] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000026 a1 : ffffffff82cd6ac8
[89855.452423] a2 : ffffffff800458c8 a3 : ffffaf80b1870640 a4 : 0000000000000000
[89855.452646] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 00000000ffffffff a7 : ffffffffffffffff
[89855.452698] s2 : ffffffff82766872 s3 : ffffffff80004caa s4 : ffffffff80ebea90
[89855.452743] s5 : ffffaf808089bd40 s6 : 8000000a00006e00 s7 : 0000000000000008
[89855.452787] s8 : 0000000000002000 s9 : 0000000080043700 s10: 0000000000000000
[89855.452831] s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 0000000000100000 t4 : 0000000000000064
[89855.452874] t5 : 000000000000000c t6 : ffffaf80b182dbfc
[89855.452929] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[89855.453053] [<ffffffff8016b216>] arch_ftrace_ops_list_func+0x208/0x228
[89855.453191] [<ffffffff8000e082>] ftrace_call+0x8/0x22
[89855.453265] [<ffffffff800a149c>] do_idle+0x24c/0x2ca
[89855.453357] [<ffffffff8000da54>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
[89855.453429] [<ffffffff8000b716>] smp_callin+0x92/0xb6
[89855.453785] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
To fix this, mark arch_cpu_idle() as noinstr, like it is done in commit
a9cbc1b471d2 ("s390/idle: mark arch_cpu_idle() noinstr").
Reported-by: Evgenii Shatokhin <e.shatokhin@yadro.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/51f21b87-ebed-4411-afbc-c00d3dea2bab@yadro.com/
Fixes: cfbc4f81c9d0 ("riscv: Select ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326203017.310422-2-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
Print the instruction dump with info instead of emergency level. The
unhandled signal message is only for informational purpose.
Fixes: b8a03a634129 ("riscv: add userland instruction dump to RISC-V splats")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/mvmy1aegrhm.fsf@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
In cases where the sof driver is unable to find the firmware and/or
topology file [1], it exits without releasing the i915 runtime
pm wakeref [2]. This results in dmesg warnings[3] during
suspend/resume or driver unbind. Add remove_late() to the failure path
of sof_init_environment so that i915 wakeref is released appropriately
[1]
[ 8.990366] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: SOF firmware and/or topology file not found.
[ 8.990396] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: Supported default profiles
[ 8.990398] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: - ipc type 1 (Requested):
[ 8.990399] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: Firmware file: intel/sof-ipc4/mtl/sof-mtl.ri
[ 8.990401] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: Topology file: intel/sof-ace-tplg/sof-mtl-rt711-2ch.tplg
[ 8.990402] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: Check if you have 'sof-firmware' package installed.
[ 8.990403] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: Optionally it can be manually downloaded from:
[ 8.990404] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: https://github.com/thesofproject/sof-bin/
[ 8.999088] sof-audio-pci-intel-mtl 0000:00:1f.3: error: sof_probe_work failed err: -2
[2]
ref_tracker: 0000:00:02.0@ffff9b8511b6a378 has 1/5 users at
track_intel_runtime_pm_wakeref.part.0+0x36/0x70 [i915]
__intel_runtime_pm_get+0x51/0xb0 [i915]
intel_runtime_pm_get+0x17/0x20 [i915]
intel_display_power_get+0x2f/0x70 [i915]
i915_audio_component_get_power+0x23/0x120 [i915]
snd_hdac_display_power+0x89/0x130 [snd_hda_core]
hda_codec_i915_init+0x3f/0x50 [snd_sof_intel_hda]
hda_dsp_probe_early+0x170/0x250 [snd_sof_intel_hda_common]
snd_sof_device_probe+0x224/0x320 [snd_sof]
sof_pci_probe+0x15b/0x220 [snd_sof_pci]
hda_pci_intel_probe+0x30/0x70 [snd_sof_intel_hda_common]
local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb0
pci_device_probe+0xcc/0x250
really_probe+0x18e/0x420
__driver_probe_device+0x7e/0x170
driver_probe_device+0x23/0xa0
[3]
[ 484.105070] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 484.108238] thunderbolt 0000:00:0d.2: PM: pci_pm_suspend_late+0x0/0x50 returned 0 after 0 usecs
[ 484.117106] i915 0000:00:02.0: i915 raw-wakerefs=1 wakelocks=1 on cleanup
[ 484.792005] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2405 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_runtime_pm.c:444 intel_runtime_pm_driver_release+0x6c/0x80
Tested-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Link: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/pull/4878
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240404184813.134566-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit 1b600da51073 ("PM: EM: Optimize em_cpu_energy() and remove division")
has added back map_util_perf() in em_cpu_energy() computation which has
been removed with the rework of scheduler/cpufreq interface.
This is wrong because sugov_effective_cpu_perf() already takes care of
mapping the utilization to a performance level.
Fixes: 1b600da51073 ("PM: EM: Optimize em_cpu_energy() and remove division")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Lukasz Luba <lukasz.luba@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
|
|
When adding sanitization of the label, the path through
edge_detector_setup() that leads to debounce_setup() was overlooked.
A request taking this path does not allocate a new label and the
request label is freed twice when the request is released, resulting
in memory corruption.
Add label sanitization to debounce_setup().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b34490879baa ("gpio: cdev: sanitize the label before requesting the interrupt")
Signed-off-by: Kent Gibson <warthog618@gmail.com>
[Bartosz: rebased on top of the fix for empty GPIO labels]
Co-developed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
|
|
I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")
setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
before copying data.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238
CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7238:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73
flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249
allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412
new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615
__slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089
kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62
device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558
dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232
do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617
discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline]
__put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980
put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055
__slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076
kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634
bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline]
rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367
rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
>ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
^
ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
syzbot found that tcf_skbmod_dump() was copying four bytes
from kernel stack to user space [1].
The issue here is that 'struct tc_skbmod' has a four bytes hole.
We need to clear the structure before filling fields.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline]
iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline]
iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline]
iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline]
_copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline]
simple_copy_to_iter net/core/datagram.c:532 [inline]
__skb_datagram_iter+0x185/0x1000 net/core/datagram.c:420
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546
skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4050 [inline]
netlink_recvmsg+0x432/0x1610 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1962
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068
__sys_recvfrom+0x35a/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2242
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2256 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0x126/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2256
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was stored to memory at:
pskb_expand_head+0x30f/0x19d0 net/core/skbuff.c:2253
netlink_trim+0x2c2/0x330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317
netlink_unicast+0x9f/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1351
nlmsg_unicast include/net/netlink.h:1144 [inline]
nlmsg_notify+0x21d/0x2f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2610
rtnetlink_send+0x73/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:741
rtnetlink_maybe_send include/linux/rtnetlink.h:17 [inline]
tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2048 [inline]
tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline]
tc_ctl_action+0x146e/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595
netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was stored to memory at:
__nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1041 [inline]
nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1099
tcf_skbmod_dump+0x23f/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:256
tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline]
tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227
tcf_action_dump+0x1fd/0x460 net/sched/act_api.c:1251
tca_get_fill+0x519/0x7a0 net/sched/act_api.c:1628
tcf_add_notify_msg net/sched/act_api.c:2023 [inline]
tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2042 [inline]
tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline]
tc_ctl_action+0x1365/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595
netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Local variable opt created at:
tcf_skbmod_dump+0x9d/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:244
tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline]
tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227
Bytes 188-191 of 248 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 248 starts at ffff888117697680
Data copied to user address 00007ffe56d855f0
Fixes: 86da71b57383 ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403130908.93421-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
Sean Christopherson
Paolo Bonzini
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Adam Goldman
Peter Collingbourne
David Hildenbrand
Alexey Makhalov
Edward Liaw
Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)
John Sperbeck
Kent Overstreet
Stefan O'Rear
Alexandre Ghiti
Andreas Schwab
Chaitanya Kumar Borah
Vincent Guittot
Kent Gibson
Eric Dumazet