| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Use attack vector controls to determine if MDS mitigation is required.
The global mitigations=off command now simply disables all attack vectors
so explicit checking of mitigations=off is no longer needed.
If cross-thread attack mitigations are required, disable SMT.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-6-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Add a function which defines which vulnerabilities should be mitigated
based on the selected attack vector controls. The selections here are
based on the individual characteristics of each vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
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ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS should be set for architectures which implement
the new attack-vector based controls for CPU mitigations. If an arch does
not support attack-vector based controls then an attempt to use them
results in a warning.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Define 4 new attack vectors that are used for controlling CPU speculation
mitigations. These may be individually disabled as part of the
mitigations= command line. Attack vector controls are combined with global
options like 'auto' or 'auto,nosmt' like 'mitigations=auto,no_user_kernel'.
The global options come first in the mitigations= string.
Cross-thread mitigations can either remain enabled fully, including
potentially disabling SMT ('auto,nosmt'), remain enabled except for
disabling SMT ('auto'), or entirely disabled through the new
'no_cross_thread' attack vector option.
The default settings for these attack vectors are consistent with existing
kernel defaults, other than the automatic disabling of VM-based attack
vectors if KVM support is not present.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Document the 5 new attack vector command line options, how they
interact with existing vulnerability controls, and recommendations on when
they can be disabled.
Note that while mitigating against untrusted userspace requires both
user-to-kernel and user-to-user protection, these are kept separate. The
kernel can control what code executes inside of it and that may affect the
risk associated with vulnerabilities especially if new kernel mitigations
are implemented. The same isn't typically true of userspace.
In other words, the risk associated with user-to-user or guest-to-guest
attacks is unlikely to change over time. While the risk associated with
user-to-kernel or guest-to-host attacks may change. Therefore, these
controls are separated.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709155731.3279419-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
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SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs. For those CPUs, the microcode
is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective. Safe-RET
can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode.
Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is
selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't
present.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
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If spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb then this mitigates retbleed as well. This
is relevant for AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs which are vulnerable to both bugs.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
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AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs with SMT disabled are not vulnerable to SRSO.
Instead of overloading the X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO bit to indicate this,
define a separate mitigation to make the code cleaner.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-2-david.kaplan@amd.com
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After a recent restructuring of the ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer
be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only
allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since
eIBRS mitigates retbleed.
However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The
restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow
it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the
restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also.
Fixes: 61ab72c2c6bf ("x86/bugs: Restructure ITS mitigation")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250519235101.2vm6sc5txyoykb2r@desk/
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-7-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Allow ITS to enable stuffing independent of retbleed. The dependency is only
on retpoline. It is a valid case for retbleed to be mitigated by eIBRS while
ITS deploys stuffing at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-6-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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In preparation to allow ITS to also enable stuffing aka Call Depth
Tracking (CDT) independently of retbleed, introduce a helper
cdt_possible().
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-5-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Prepare to apply stuffing mitigation in its_apply_mitigation(). This is
currently only done via retbleed mitigation. Also using switch/case
makes it evident that mitigation mode like VMEXIT_ONLY doesn't need any
special handling.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-4-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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The purpose of the warning is to prevent an unexpected change to the return
thunk mitigation. However, there are legitimate cases where the return
thunk is intentionally set more than once. For example, ITS and SRSO both
can set the return thunk after retbleed has set it. In both the cases
retbleed is still mitigated.
Replace the warning with an info about the active return thunk.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-3-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-2-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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The retbleed select function leaves the mitigation to AUTO in some cases.
Moreover, the update function can also set the mitigation to AUTO. This
is inconsistent with other mitigations and requires explicit handling of
AUTO at the end of update step.
Make sure a mitigation gets selected in the select step, and do not change
it to AUTO in the update step. When no mitigation can be selected leave it
to NONE, which is what AUTO was getting changed to in the end.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-1-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Move the VERW clearing before the MONITOR so that VERW doesn't disarm it
and the machine never enters C1.
Original idea by Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Synthesize the TSA CPUID feature bits for guests. Set TSA_{SQ,L1}_NO on
unaffected machines.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Add the required features detection glue to bugs.c et all in order to
support the TSA mitigation.
Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
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It will be used by other x86 mitigations.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
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As we always iterate through the entire die_map when expanding
type strings, recursively processing referenced types in
type_expand_child() is not actually necessary. Furthermore,
the type_string kABI rule added in commit c9083467f7b9
("gendwarfksyms: Add a kABI rule to override type strings") can
fail to override type strings for structures due to a missing
kabi_get_type_string() check in this function.
Fix the issue by dropping the unnecessary recursion and moving
the override check to type_expand(). Note that symbol versions
are otherwise unchanged with this patch.
Fixes: c9083467f7b9 ("gendwarfksyms: Add a kABI rule to override type strings")
Reported-by: Giuliano Procida <gprocida@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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This hides excessive warnings, as nobody builds with W=2.
Fixes: a934a57a42f6 ("scripts/misc-check: check missing #include <linux/export.h> when W=1")
Fixes: 7d95680d64ac ("scripts/misc-check: check unnecessary #include <linux/export.h> when W=1")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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In preparation for needing to shift NVMe passthrough to always use
task_work for polled IO completions, ensure that those are suitably
run at exit time. See commit:
9ce6c9875f3e ("nvme: always punt polled uring_cmd end_io work to task_work")
for details on why that is necessary.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Currently NVMe uring_cmd completions will complete locally, if they are
polled. This is done because those completions are always invoked from
task context. And while that is true, there's no guarantee that it's
invoked under the right ring context, or even task. If someone does
NVMe passthrough via multiple threads and with a limited number of
poll queues, then ringA may find completions from ringB. For that case,
completing the request may not be sound.
Always just punt the passthrough completions via task_work, which will
redirect the completion, if needed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 585079b6e425 ("nvme: wire up async polling for io passthrough commands")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and
calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent
or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand().
If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be
able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or
lock_task_sighand() will fail.
Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this.
This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because
exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still
makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail
anyway in this case.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Benoît Sevens <bsevens@google.com>
Fixes: 0bdd2ed4138e ("sched: run_posix_cpu_timers: Don't check ->exit_state, use lock_task_sighand()")
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If peeking a bunch of buffers, normally io_ring_buffers_peek() will
truncate the end buffer. This isn't optimal as presumably more data will
be arriving later, and hence it's better to stop with the last full
buffer rather than truncate the end buffer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 35c8711c8fc4 ("io_uring/kbuf: add helpers for getting/peeking multiple buffers")
Reported-by: Christian Mazakas <christian.mazakas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Stephen Rothwell reports htmldocs warning on ublk docs:
Documentation/block/ublk.rst:414: ERROR: Unexpected indentation. [docutils]
Fix the warning by separating sublists of auto buffer registration
fallback behavior from their appropriate parent list item.
Fixes: ff20c516485e ("ublk: document auto buffer registration(UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG)")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20250612132638.193de386@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250613023857.15971-1-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This driver uses a mixture of ways to get the size of a PTE,
tegra_smmu_set_pde() did it as sizeof(*pd) which became wrong when pd
switched to a struct tegra_pd.
Switch pd back to a u32* in tegra_smmu_set_pde() so the sizeof(*pd)
returns 4.
Fixes: 50568f87d1e2 ("iommu/terga: Do not use struct page as the handle for as->pd memory")
Reported-by: Diogo Ivo <diogo.ivo@tecnico.ulisboa.pt>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/62e7f7fe-6200-4e4f-ad42-d58ad272baa6@tecnico.ulisboa.pt/
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Diogo Ivo <diogo.ivo@tecnico.ulisboa.pt>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-da7b8b3d57eb+ce-iommu_terga_sizeof_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
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Similarly to 26064d3e2b4d ("block: fix adding folio to bio"), if
we attempt to add a folio that is larger than 4GB, we'll silently
truncate the offset and len. Widen the parameters to size_t, assert
that the length is less than 4GB and set the first page that contains
the interesting data rather than the first page of the folio.
Fixes: 26db5ee15851 (block: add a bvec_set_folio helper)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612144255.2850278-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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It is possible for physically contiguous folios to have discontiguous
struct pages if SPARSEMEM is enabled and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is not.
This is correctly handled by folio_page_idx(), so remove this open-coded
implementation.
Fixes: 640d1930bef4 (block: Add bio_for_each_folio_all())
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612144126.2849931-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Removes MSI-X from the interrupt request path, as the DMA engine used by
the SPI controller does not support MSI-X interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Thangaraj Samynathan <thangaraj.s@microchip.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250612023059.71726-1-thangaraj.s@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Nested file systems, that is those which invoke call_mmap() within their
own f_op->mmap() handlers, may encounter underlying file systems which
provide the f_op->mmap_prepare() hook introduced by commit c84bf6dd2b83
("mm: introduce new .mmap_prepare() file callback").
We have a chicken-and-egg scenario here - until all file systems are
converted to using .mmap_prepare(), we cannot convert these nested
handlers, as we can't call f_op->mmap from an .mmap_prepare() hook.
So we have to do it the other way round - invoke the .mmap_prepare() hook
from an .mmap() one.
in order to do so, we need to convert VMA state into a struct vm_area_desc
descriptor, invoking the underlying file system's f_op->mmap_prepare()
callback passing a pointer to this, and then setting VMA state accordingly
and safely.
This patch achieves this via the compat_vma_mmap_prepare() function, which
we invoke from call_mmap() if f_op->mmap_prepare() is specified in the
passed in file pointer.
We place the fundamental logic into mm/vma.h where VMA manipulation
belongs. We also update the VMA userland tests to accommodate the
changes.
The compat_vma_mmap_prepare() function and its associated machinery is
temporary, and will be removed once the conversion of file systems is
complete.
We carefully place this code so it can be used with CONFIG_MMU and also
with cutting edge nommu silicon.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export compat_vma_mmap_prepare tp fix build]
[lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com: remove unused declarations]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac3ae324-4c65-432a-8c6d-2af988b18ac8@lucifer.local
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250609165749.344976-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Fixes: c84bf6dd2b83 ("mm: introduce new .mmap_prepare() file callback").
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAG48ez04yOEVx1ekzOChARDDBZzAKwet8PEoPM4Ln3_rk91AzQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently, cached directory contents were not reused across subsequent
'ls' operations because the cache validity check relied on comparing
the ctx pointer, which changes with each readdir invocation. As a
result, the cached dir entries was not marked as valid and the cache was
not utilized for subsequent 'ls' operations.
This change uses the file pointer, which remains consistent across all
readdir calls for a given directory instance, to associate and validate
the cache. As a result, cached directory contents can now be
correctly reused, improving performance for repeated directory listings.
Performance gains with local windows SMB server:
Without the patch and default actimeo=1:
1000 directory enumeration operations on dir with 10k files took 135.0s
With this patch and actimeo=0:
1000 directory enumeration operations on dir with 10k files took just 5.1s
Signed-off-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Customer reported that one of their applications started failing to
open files with STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES due to NetApp server
hitting the maximum number of opens to same file that it would allow
for a single client connection.
It turned out the client was failing to reuse open handles with
deferred closes because matching ->f_flags directly without masking
off O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_TRUNC bits first broke the comparision and then
client ended up with thousands of deferred closes to same file. Those
bits are already satisfied on the original open, so no need to check
them against existing open handles.
Reproducer:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#define NR_THREADS 4
#define NR_ITERATIONS 2500
#define TEST_FILE "/mnt/1/test/dir/foo"
static char buf[64];
static void *worker(void *arg)
{
int i, j;
int fd;
for (i = 0; i < NR_ITERATIONS; i++) {
fd = open(TEST_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0666);
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
pthread_t t[NR_THREADS];
int fd;
int i;
fd = open(TEST_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0666);
close(fd);
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < NR_THREADS; i++)
pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, worker, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < NR_THREADS; i++)
pthread_join(t[i], NULL);
return 0;
}
Before patch:
$ mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt/1 -o ...
$ mkdir -p /mnt/1/test/dir
$ gcc repro.c && ./a.out
...
number of opens: 1391
After patch:
$ mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt/1 -o ...
$ mkdir -p /mnt/1/test/dir
$ gcc repro.c && ./a.out
...
number of opens: 1
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Cc: Pierguido Lambri <plambri@redhat.com>
Fixes: b8ea3b1ff544 ("smb: enable reuse of deferred file handles for write operations")
Acked-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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In case the BO is in iomem, we can't simply take the vaddr and write to
it. Instead, prepare a separate buffer that is later copied into io
memory. Right now it's just a few words that could be using
xe_map_write32(), but the intention is to grow the WA BB for other
uses.
Fixes: 617d824c5323 ("drm/xe: Add WA BB to capture active context utilization")
Cc: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <umesh.nerlige.ramappa@intel.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Umesh Nerlige Ramappa <umesh.nerlige.ramappa@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250604-wa-bb-fix-v1-1-0dfc5dafcef0@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef48715b2d3df17c060e23b9aa636af3d95652f8)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
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Add test_rss_default_context_rule() to verify that ntuple rules can
correctly direct traffic to the default RSS context (context 0).
The test creates two ntuple rules with explicit location priorities:
- A high-priority rule (loc 0) directing specific port traffic to
context 0.
- A low-priority rule (loc 1) directing all other TCP traffic to context
1.
This validates that:
1. Rules targeting the default context function properly.
2. Traffic steering works as expected when mixing default and
additional RSS contexts.
The test was written by AI, and reviewed by humans.
Reviewed-by: Nimrod Oren <noren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250612071958.1696361-3-gal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Context 0 (default context) always exists, there is no need to check
whether it exists or not when adding a flow steering rule.
The existing check fails when creating a flow steering rule for context
0 as it is not stored in the rss_ctx xarray.
For example:
$ ethtool --config-ntuple eth2 flow-type tcp4 dst-ip 194.237.147.23 dst-port 19983 context 0 loc 618
rmgr: Cannot insert RX class rule: Invalid argument
Cannot insert classification rule
An example usecase for this could be:
- A high-priority rule (loc 0) directing specific port traffic to
context 0.
- A low-priority rule (loc 1) directing all other TCP traffic to context
1.
This is a user-visible regression that was caught in our testing
environment, it was not reported by a user yet.
Fixes: de7f7582dff2 ("net: ethtool: prevent flow steering to RSS contexts which don't exist")
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nimrod Oren <noren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com>
Reviewed-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250612071958.1696361-2-gal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Before the cited commit, the kernel unconditionally embedded SCM
credentials to skb for embryo sockets even when both the sender
and listener disabled SO_PASSCRED and SO_PASSPIDFD.
Now, the credentials are added to skb only when configured by the
sender or the listener.
However, as reported in the link below, it caused a regression for
some programs that assume credentials are included in every skb,
but sometimes not now.
The only problematic scenario would be that a socket starts listening
before setting the option. Then, there will be 2 types of non-small
race window, where a client can send skb without credentials, which
the peer receives as an "invalid" message (and aborts the connection
it seems ?):
Client Server
------ ------
s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}
s2.connect()
s2.send() <-- w/o cred
s1.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD})
s2.send() <-- w/ cred
or
Client Server
------ ------
s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}
s2.connect()
s2.send() <-- w/o cred
s3, _ = s1.accept() <-- Inherit cred options
s2.send() <-- w/o cred but not set yet
s3.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD})
s2.send() <-- w/ cred
It's unfortunate that buggy programs depend on the behaviour,
but let's restore the previous behaviour.
Fixes: 3f84d577b79d ("af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect().")
Reported-by: Jacek Łuczak <difrost.kernel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68d38b0b-1666-4974-85d4-15575789c8d4@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Tested-by: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu>
Tested-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Tested-by: Jacek Łuczak <difrost.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611202758.3075858-1-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzkaller created an IPv6 route from a malformed packet, which has
a prefix len > 128, triggering the splat below. [0]
This is a similar issue fixed by commit 586ceac9acb7 ("ipv6: Restore
fib6_config validation for SIOCADDRT.").
The cited commit removed fib6_config validation from some callers
of ip6_add_route().
Let's move the validation back to ip6_route_add() and
ip6_route_multipath_add().
[0]:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/ipv6.h:616:34
index 20 is out of range for type '__u8 [16]'
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7444 Comm: syz.0.708 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-g19272b37aa4f #0 PREEMPT
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff80078a80>] dump_backtrace+0x2e/0x3c arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c:132
[<ffffffff8000327a>] show_stack+0x30/0x3c arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c:138
[<ffffffff80061012>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
[<ffffffff80061012>] dump_stack_lvl+0x12e/0x1a6 lib/dump_stack.c:120
[<ffffffff800610a6>] dump_stack+0x1c/0x24 lib/dump_stack.c:129
[<ffffffff8001c0ea>] ubsan_epilogue+0x14/0x46 lib/ubsan.c:233
[<ffffffff819ba290>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xf6/0xf8 lib/ubsan.c:455
[<ffffffff85b363a4>] ipv6_addr_prefix include/net/ipv6.h:616 [inline]
[<ffffffff85b363a4>] ip6_route_info_create+0x8f8/0x96e net/ipv6/route.c:3793
[<ffffffff85b635da>] ip6_route_add+0x2a/0x1aa net/ipv6/route.c:3889
[<ffffffff85b02e08>] addrconf_prefix_route+0x2c4/0x4e8 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:2487
[<ffffffff85b23bb2>] addrconf_prefix_rcv+0x1720/0x1e62 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:2878
[<ffffffff85b92664>] ndisc_router_discovery+0x1a06/0x3504 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1570
[<ffffffff85b99038>] ndisc_rcv+0x500/0x600 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1874
[<ffffffff85bc2c18>] icmpv6_rcv+0x145e/0x1e0a net/ipv6/icmp.c:988
[<ffffffff85af6798>] ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x18a/0x1976 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
[<ffffffff85af8078>] ip6_input_finish+0xf4/0x174 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
[<ffffffff85af8262>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af8262>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af8262>] ip6_input+0x16a/0x70c net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
[<ffffffff85af8dcc>] ip6_mc_input+0x5c8/0x1268 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:588
[<ffffffff85af6112>] dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af6112>] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af6112>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af6112>] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
[<ffffffff85af6112>] ipv6_rcv+0x5ae/0x6e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
[<ffffffff85087e84>] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x106/0x16e net/core/dev.c:5977
[<ffffffff85088104>] __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x144 net/core/dev.c:6090
[<ffffffff850883c6>] netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6176 [inline]
[<ffffffff850883c6>] netif_receive_skb+0x1aa/0xbf2 net/core/dev.c:6235
[<ffffffff8328656e>] tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x430/0x686 drivers/net/tun.c:1485
[<ffffffff8329ed3a>] tun_get_user+0x2952/0x3d6c drivers/net/tun.c:1938
[<ffffffff832a21e0>] tun_chr_write_iter+0xc4/0x21c drivers/net/tun.c:1984
[<ffffffff80b9b9ae>] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
[<ffffffff80b9b9ae>] vfs_write+0x56c/0xa9a fs/read_write.c:686
[<ffffffff80b9c2be>] ksys_write+0x126/0x228 fs/read_write.c:738
[<ffffffff80b9c42e>] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
[<ffffffff80b9c42e>] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
[<ffffffff80b9c42e>] __riscv_sys_write+0x6e/0x94 fs/read_write.c:746
[<ffffffff80076912>] syscall_handler+0x94/0x118 arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall.h:112
[<ffffffff8637e31e>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x396/0x530 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c:341
[<ffffffff863a69e2>] handle_exception+0x146/0x152 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S:197
Fixes: fa76c1674f2e ("ipv6: Move some validation from ip6_route_info_create() to rtm_to_fib6_config().")
Reported-by: syzbot+4c2358694722d304c44e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6849b8c3.a00a0220.1eb5f5.00f0.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611193551.2999991-1-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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netdevsim supports netpoll. Make sure we don't call napi_complete()
from it, since it may not be scheduled. Breno reports hitting a
warning in napi_complete_done():
WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 104 at net/core/dev.c:6592 napi_complete_done+0x2cc/0x560
__napi_poll+0x2d8/0x3a0
handle_softirqs+0x1fe/0x710
This is presumably after netpoll stole the SCHED bit prematurely.
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Fixes: 3762ec05a9fb ("netdevsim: add NAPI support")
Tested-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611174643.2769263-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Check for if ida_alloc() or rhashtable_lookup_get_insert_fast() fails.
Fixes: 17e0accac577 ("net/mlx5: HWS, support complex matchers")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aEmBONjyiF6z5yCV@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The veth peer device is RCU protected, but when the peer device gets
deleted (veth_dellink) then the pointer is assigned NULL (via
RCU_INIT_POINTER).
This patch adds a necessary NULL check in veth_xdp_rcv when accessing
the veth peer net_device.
This fixes a bug introduced in commit dc82a33297fc ("veth: apply qdisc
backpressure on full ptr_ring to reduce TX drops"). The bug is a race
and only triggers when having inflight packets on a veth that is being
deleted.
Reported-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/fecfcad0-7a16-42b8-bff2-66ee83a6e5c4@linux.dev/
Reported-by: syzbot+c4c7bf27f6b0c4bd97fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/683da55e.a00a0220.d8eae.0052.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: dc82a33297fc ("veth: apply qdisc backpressure on full ptr_ring to reduce TX drops")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/174964557873.519608.10855046105237280978.stgit@firesoul
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This function is no longer used after the four prior fixes.
Given all prior uses were wrong, it seems better to remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611111515.1983366-6-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in ETS, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
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| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
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[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes: b05972f01e7d ("net: sched: tbf: don't call qdisc_put() while holding tree lock")
Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Suggested-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611111515.1983366-5-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in TBF, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
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| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
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[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes: b05972f01e7d ("net: sched: tbf: don't call qdisc_put() while holding tree lock")
Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Suggested-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611111515.1983366-4-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in RED, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
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[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes: 0c8d13ac9607 ("net: sched: red: delay destroying child qdisc on replace")
Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Suggested-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611111515.1983366-3-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in PRIO, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
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[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock.
Fixes: 7b8e0b6e6599 ("net: sched: prio: delay destroying child qdiscs on change")
Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Suggested-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611111515.1983366-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Gerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet,
and this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.
We want to make sure ctl->perturb_period * HZ will not overflow
and is positive.
Tested:
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value
tc -s -d qd sh dev lo
qdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec
Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)
backlog 0b 0p requeues 0
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611083501.1810459-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When performing a non-exact phy_caps lookup, we are looking for a
supported mode that matches as closely as possible the passed speed/duplex.
Blamed patch broke that logic by returning a match too early in case
the caller asks for half-duplex, as a full-duplex linkmode may match
first, and returned as a non-exact match without even trying to mach on
half-duplex modes.
Reported-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250603102500.4ec743cf@fedora/T/#m22ed60ca635c67dc7d9cbb47e8995b2beb5c1576
Tested-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Fixes: fc81e257d19f ("net: phy: phy_caps: Allow looking-up link caps based on speed and duplex")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250606094321.483602-1-maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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David Kaplan
Pawan Gupta
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Linus Torvalds
Sami Tolvanen
Masahiro Yamada
Jens Axboe
Oleg Nesterov
Bagas Sanjaya
Jason Gunthorpe
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
Thangaraj Samynathan
Lorenzo Stoakes
Bharath SM
Paulo Alcantara
Lucas De Marchi
Gal Pressman
Kuniyuki Iwashima
Jakub Kicinski
Dan Carpenter
Jesper Dangaard Brouer
Eric Dumazet
Maxime Chevallier