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Restricted pointers ("%pK") are not meant to be used through printk().
It can unintentionally expose security sensitive, raw pointer values.
Use regular pointer formatting instead.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250113171731-dc10e3c1-da64-4af0-b767-7c7070468023@linutronix.de/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217-restricted-pointers-arm64-v1-1-14bb1f516b01@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Adding the writel() calls needs io.h, which apparently gets
transiently included somewhere on arm64, but not elsewhere.
Fixes: 6de0298a3925 ("perf/arm_cspmu: Generalise event filtering")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202503150649.Dol8RBSh-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202503152245.cAG4FMfi-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/657935ca177024ad08d5ec6f85e8faf75f82cf65.1742212833.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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When comparing to the ARM list [1], it appears that several ARM cores
were missing from the lists in spectre_bhb_loop_affected(). Add them.
NOTE: for some of these cores it may not matter since other ways of
clearing the BHB may be used (like the CLRBHB instruction or ECBHB),
but it still seems good to have all the info from ARM's whitepaper
included.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.5.I4a9a527e03f663040721c5401c41de587d015c82@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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>From the TRM, MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE has a partnum of 0xDOE and an
implementor of 0x41 (ARM). Add the values.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # dependency of the next fix in the series
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.4.I151f3b7ee323bcc3082179b8c60c3cd03308aa94@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Qualcomm has confirmed that, much like Cortex A53 and A55, KRYO
2XX/3XX/4XX silver cores are unaffected by Spectre BHB. Add them to
the safe list.
Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Scott Bauer <sbauer@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.3.Iab8dbfb5c9b1e143e7a29f410bce5f9525a0ba32@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The code for detecting CPUs that are vulnerable to Spectre BHB was
based on a hardcoded list of CPU IDs that were known to be affected.
Unfortunately, the list mostly only contained the IDs of standard ARM
cores. The IDs for many cores that are minor variants of the standard
ARM cores (like many Qualcomm Kyro CPUs) weren't listed. This led the
code to assume that those variants were not affected.
Flip the code on its head and instead assume that a core is vulnerable
if it doesn't have CSV2_3 but is unrecognized as being safe. This
involves creating a "Spectre BHB safe" list.
As of right now, the only CPU IDs added to the "Spectre BHB safe" list
are ARM Cortex A35, A53, A55, A510, and A520. This list was created by
looking for cores that weren't listed in ARM's list [1] as per review
feedback on v2 of this patch [2]. Additionally Brahma A53 is added as
per mailing list feedback [3].
NOTE: this patch will not actually _mitigate_ anyone, it will simply
cause them to report themselves as vulnerable. If any cores in the
system are reported as vulnerable but not mitigated then the whole
system will be reported as vulnerable though the system will attempt
to mitigate with the information it has about the known cores.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219175128.GA25477@willie-the-truck
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/18dbd7d1-a46c-4112-a425-320c99f67a8d@broadcom.com
Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.2.I2040fa004dafe196243f67ebcc647cbedbb516e6@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Qualcomm Kryo 400-series Gold cores have a derivative of an ARM Cortex
A76 in them. Since A76 needs Spectre mitigation via looping then the
Kyro 400-series Gold cores also need Spectre mitigation via looping.
Qualcomm has confirmed that the proper "k" value for Kryo 400-series
Gold cores is 24.
Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Scott Bauer <sbauer@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250107120555.v4.1.Ie4ef54abe02e7eb0eee50f830575719bf23bda48@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Opening and closing tokens can also match on words with common prefixes
like "Endsysreg" vs "EndsysregFields". This could potentially make the
script go wrong in weird ways so make it fall through to the fatal
unhandled statement catcher if it doesn't fully match the current
block.
Closing ones also get expect_fields(1) to ensure nothing other than
whitespace follows.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250115162600.2153226-3-james.clark@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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This is a sysreg block so close it with one. This doesn't make a
difference to the output because the script only matches on the
beginning of the word to close blocks which is correct by coincidence
here.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250115162600.2153226-2-james.clark@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Enable HOTPLUG_SMT for SMT control.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311075143.61078-5-yangyicong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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For ACPI we'll build the topology from PPTT and we cannot directly
get the SMT number of each core. Instead using a temporary xarray
to record the heterogeneous information (from ACPI_PPTT_ACPI_IDENTICAL)
and SMT information of the first core in its heterogeneous CPU cluster
when building the topology. Then we can know the largest SMT number
in the system. If a homogeneous system's using ACPI 6.2 or later,
all the CPUs should be under the root node of PPTT. There'll be
only one entry in the xarray and all the CPUs in the system will
be assumed identical.
The framework's SMT control provides two interface to the users [1]
through /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
(Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu):
1) enable SMT by writing "on" and disable by "off"
2) enable SMT by writing max_thread_number or disable by writing 1
Both method support to completely disable/enable the SMT cores so both
work correctly for symmetric SMT platform and asymmetric platform with
non-SMT and one type SMT cores like:
core A: 1 thread
core B: X (X!=1) threads
Note that for a theoretically possible multiple SMT-X (X>1) core
platform the SMT control is also supported as expected but only
by writing the "on/off" method.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311075143.61078-4-yangyicong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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On building the topology from the devicetree, we've already gotten the
SMT thread number of each core. Update the largest SMT thread number
and enable the SMT control by the end of topology parsing.
The framework's SMT control provides two interface to the users through
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
(Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu):
1) enable SMT by writing "on" and disable by "off"
2) enable SMT by writing max_thread_number or disable by writing 1
Both method support to completely disable/enable the SMT cores so both
work correctly for symmetric SMT platform and asymmetric platform with
non-SMT and one type SMT cores like:
core A: 1 thread
core B: X (X!=1) threads
Note that for a theoretically possible multiple SMT-X (X>1) core
platform the SMT control is also supported as expected but only
by writing the "on/off" method.
Reviewed-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311075143.61078-3-yangyicong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Currently if architectures want to support HOTPLUG_SMT they need to
provide a topology_is_primary_thread() telling the framework which
thread in the SMT cannot offline. However arm64 doesn't have a
restriction on which thread in the SMT cannot offline, a simplest
choice is that just make 1st thread as the "primary" thread. So
just make this as the default implementation in the framework and
let architectures like x86 that have special primary thread to
override this function (which they've already done).
There's no need to provide a stub function if !CONFIG_SMP or
!CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT. In such case the testing CPU is already
the 1st CPU in the SMT so it's always the primary thread.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311075143.61078-2-yangyicong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Address bytes shifted with a single 64 bit page table entry (any page table
level) has been always hard coded as 3 (aka 2^3 = 8). Although intuitive it
is not very readable or easy to reason about. Besides it is going to change
with D128, where each 128 bit page table entry will shift address bytes by
4 (aka 2^4 = 16) instead.
Let's just formalise this address bytes shift value into a new macro called
PTDESC_ORDER establishing a logical abstraction, thus improving readability
as well. While here re-organize EARLY_LEVEL macro along with its dependents
for better clarity. This does not cause any functional change. Also replace
all (PAGE_SHIFT - PTDESC_ORDER) instances with PTDESC_TABLE_SHIFT.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311045710.550625-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Architecturally we have two filters for each regular event counter,
so add generic support for the second one too.
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b11be3f23a72bc27088b115099c8fe865b70babc.1741190362.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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The notion of a single u32 filter value for any event doesn't scale well
when the potential architectural scope is already two 64-bit values, and
implementations may add custom stuff on the side too. Rather than try to
thread arbitrary filter data through the common path, let's just make
the set_ev_filter op self-contained in terms of parsing and configuring
any and all filtering for the given event - splitting out a distinct op
for cycles events which inherently differ - and let implementations
override the whole thing if they want to do something different. This
already allows the Ampere code to stop looking a bit hacky.
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c0cd4d4c12566dbf1b062ccd60241b3e0639f4cc.1741190362.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Implementations may occasionally want to refer to register offsets, so
for the sake of consistency move all of the register definitions to join
the PMIIDR fields in the private header where they can be shared. As an
example nicety, we can then define Ampere's imp-def filters in terms of
the architectural PMIMPDEF range rather than open-coded offsets.
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5a3c796560665b51cb63fec0d473afd8f8d0a836.1741190362.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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The page table population code in map_range() uses a recursive algorithm
to create the early mappings of the kernel, the DTB and the ID mapped
text and data pages, and this fails to take into account that the way
these page tables may be constructed is not precisely the same at each
level. In particular, block mappings are not permitted at each level,
and the code as it exists today might inadvertently create such a
forbidden block mapping if it were used to map a region of the
appropriate size and alignment.
This never happens in practice, given the limited size of the assets
being mapped by the early boot code. Nonetheless, it would be better if
this code would behave correctly in all circumstances.
So only permit block mappings at level 2, and page mappings at level 3,
for any page size, and use table mappings exclusively at all other
levels. This change should have no impact in practice, but it makes the
code more robust.
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reported-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311073043.96795-2-ardb+git@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Drop all PXD_TABLE_BIT macros as they are not used any more.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-9-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Check for pmd_table() in pmd_trans_huge() rather then just checking for the
PMD_TABLE_BIT. But ensure all present-invalid entries are handled correctly
by always setting PTE_VALID before checking with pmd_table().
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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pud_bad() is currently defined in terms of pud_table(). Although for some
configs, pud_table() is hard-coded to true i.e. when using 64K base pages
or when page table levels are less than 3.
pud_bad() is intended to check that the pud is configured correctly. Hence
let's open-code the same check that the full version of pud_table() uses
into pud_bad(). Then it always performs the check regardless of the config.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-7-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Check page table entries against PXD_TYPE_TABLE on PXD_TYPE_MASK mask bits
in [p4d|pgd]_bad() while determining a table entry instead of just checking
only for PXD_TABLE_BIT.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-6-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Clear PXX_TYPE_MASK in [pmd|pud]_mkhuge() while creating section mappings
instead of just the PXX_TABLE_BIT and also set PXD_TYPE_SECT. Also ensure
PTE_VALID does not get modified in these helpers, because present-invalid
entries should preserve their state across.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-5-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Clear PXX_TYPE_MASK bits in mk_[pmd|pud]_sect_prot() while creating section
mappings instead of just clearing the PXX_TABLE_BIT.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-4-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Test given page table entries against PMD_TYPE_SECT on PMD_TYPE_MASK mask
bits for identifying block mappings in stage 1 page tables.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-3-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Test given page table entries against PMD_TYPE_SECT on PMD_TYPE_MASK mask
bits for identifying block mappings in stage 2 page tables.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221044227.1145393-2-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The PMU appears to have a separate register for filtering 'guest'
exception levels (i.e. EL1 and !ELIsInHost(EL0)) which has the same
layout as PMCR1_EL1. Conveniently, there exists a VHE register alias
(PMCR1_EL12) that can be used to configure it.
Support guest events by programming the EL12 register with the intended
guest kernel/userspace filters. Limit support for guest events to VHE
(i.e. kernel running at EL2), as it avoids involving KVM to context
switch PMU registers. VHE is the only supported mode on M* parts anyway,
so this isn't an actual feature limitation.
Tested-by: Janne Grunau <j@jannau.net>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250305202641.428114-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Supporting guest mode events will necessitate programming two event
filters. Prepare by splitting up the programming of the event selector +
event filter into separate headers.
Opportunistically replace RMW patterns with sysreg_clear_set_s().
Tested-by: Janne Grunau <j@jannau.net>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250305202641.428114-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Commit fbc7e61195e2 ("KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host
FPSIMD/SVE/SME state") removed the implementation but leave declaration.
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250309070723.1390958-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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FEAT_PMUv3p9 registers such as PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1
access from EL1 requires appropriate EL2 fine grained trap configuration
via FEAT_FGT2 based trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
Otherwise such register accesses will result in traps into EL2.
Add a new helper __init_el2_fgt2() which initializes FEAT_FGT2 based fine
grained trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2 (setting the
bits nPMICNTR_EL0, nPMICFILTR_EL0 and nPMUACR_EL1) to enable access into
PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 registers.
Also update booting.rst with SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 requirement for all FEAT_FGT2
based registers to be accessible in EL2.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Fixes: 0bbff9ed8165 ("perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control")
Fixes: d8226d8cfbaf ("perf: arm_pmuv3: Add support for Armv9.4 PMU instruction counter")
Tested-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227035119.2025171-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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When a device performs DMA to a shared buffer using physical addresses,
(without Stage1 translation), the device must use the "{I}PA address" with the
top bit set in Realm. This is to make sure that a trusted device will be able
to write to shared buffers as well as the protected buffers. Thus, a Realm must
always program the full address including the "protection" bit, like AMD SME
encryption bits.
Enable this by providing arm64 specific dma_addr_{encrypted, canonical}
helpers for Realms. Please note that the VMM needs to similarly make sure that
the SMMU Stage2 in the Non-secure world is setup accordingly to map IPA at the
unprotected alias.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Fixes: 42be24a4178f ("arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227144150.1667735-4-suzuki.poulose@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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AMD SME added __sme_set/__sme_clr primitives to modify the DMA address for
encrypted/decrypted traffic. However this doesn't fit in with other models,
e.g., Arm CCA where the meanings are the opposite. i.e., "decrypted" traffic
has a bit set and "encrypted" traffic has the top bit cleared.
In preparation for adding the support for Arm CCA DMA conversions, convert the
existing primitives to more generic ones that can be provided by the backends.
i.e., add helpers to
1. dma_addr_encrypted - Convert a DMA address to "encrypted" [ == __sme_set() ]
2. dma_addr_unencrypted - Convert a DMA address to "decrypted" [ None exists today ]
3. dma_addr_canonical - Clear any "encryption"/"decryption" bits from DMA
address [ SME uses __sme_clr() ] and convert to a canonical DMA address.
Since the original __sme_xxx helpers come from linux/mem_encrypt.h, use that
as the home for the new definitions and provide dummy ones when none is provided
by the architectures.
With the above, phys_to_dma_unencrypted() uses the newly added dma_addr_unencrypted()
helper and to make it a bit more easier to read and avoid double conversion,
provide __phys_to_dma().
Suggested-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Fixes: 42be24a4178f ("arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227144150.1667735-3-suzuki.poulose@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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phys_to_dma() sets the encryption bit on the translated DMA address. But
dma_to_phys() clears the encryption bit after it has been translated back
to the physical address, which could fail if the device uses DMA ranges.
AMD SME doesn't use the DMA ranges and thus this is harmless. But as we
are about to add support for other architectures, let us fix this.
Reported-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/yq5amsen9stc.fsf@kernel.org
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Fixes: 42be24a4178f ("arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227144150.1667735-2-suzuki.poulose@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Build break was reported in the powerpc mailing list for next-20250218 with below errors
make[1]: Nothing to be done for 'all'.
BUILD_TARGET=/root/venkat/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm; mkdir -p $BUILD_TARGET; make OUTPUT=$BUILD_TARGET -k -C mm all
CC pkey_exec_prot
In file included from pkey_exec_prot.c:18:
/root/venkat/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/pkeys.h: In function ‘pkeys_unsupported’:
/root/venkat/linux-next/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/pkeys.h:96:34: error: ‘PKEY_UNRESTRICTED’ undeclared (first use in this function)
96 | pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250113170619.484698-2-yury.khrustalev@arm.com/ patchset
has been queued to arm64/for-next/pkey_unrestricted which is causing a build break
in the selftest/powerpc builds.
Commit 6d61527d931ba ("mm/pkey: Add PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro") added a macro
PKEY_UNRESTRICTED to handle implicit literal value of 0x0 (which is "unrestricted").
Add the same to selftest/powerpc/pkeys.h to fix the reported build break.
Fixes: 00894c3fc917 ("selftests/powerpc: Use PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro")
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3267ea6e-5a1a-4752-96ef-8351c912d386@linux.ibm.com/T/
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311084129.39308-1-maddy@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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As tested on one example of a Qualcomm Kryo 5XX CPU [1] and one
example of a Qualcomm Kryo 6XX CPU [2], we don't need any extra MIDR
definitions for the cores in those processors. Add comments to make it
clear that these IDs weren't forgotten and just aren't needed.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/l5rqbbxn6hktlcxooolkvi5n3arkht6zzhrvdjf6kis322nsup@5hsrak4cgteq/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/tx7vtur7yea6ruefrkpkccqptahgmxnsrudwdz5uzcfxnng25b@afrr5bmdk2xa/
Suggested-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219131107.v3.2.I520dfa10ad9f598581c2591d631aa6e9e26f7603@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Add a definition for the Qualcomm Kryo 300-series Gold cores.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219131107.v3.1.I18e0288742871393228249a768e5d56ea65d93dc@changeid
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The value of POR_EL0_INIT is not architectural, it is a software
decision. Since we have a dedicated header for POR_ELx, we might as
well define POR_EL0_INIT there.
While at it also define POR_EL0_INIT using POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(),
making it clearer that we are setting permissions for POIndex/pkey
0.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219164029.2309119-4-kevin.brodsky@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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It is customary to list R, W, X permissions in that order. In fact
this is already the case for PIE constants (PIE_RWX). Rename POE_RXW
accordingly, as well as POE_XW (currently unused).
While at it also swap the W/X lines in
compute_s1_overlay_permissions() to follow the R, W, X order.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219164029.2309119-3-kevin.brodsky@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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We currently have one helper to set a PIRx_ELx's permission field to
a given value, PIRx_ELx_PERM(), and another helper to extract a
permission field from POR_ELx, POR_ELx_IDX(). The naming is pretty
confusing - it isn't clear at all that "_PERM" corresponds to a
setter and "_IDX" to a getter.
This patch aims at improving the situation by using the same
suffixes as FIELD_PREP()/FIELD_GET(), which we have already adopted
for SYS_FIELD_{PREP,GET}():
* PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(), POR_ELx_PERM_PREP() create a register value
where the permission field for a given index is set to a given value.
* POR_ELx_PERM_GET() extracts the permission field from a given
register value for a given index.
These helpers are not implemented using FIELD_PREP()/FIELD_GET()
because the mask may not be constant, and they need to be usable in
assembly. They are all defined in asm/sysreg.h, as one would expect
for basic sysreg-related helpers.
Finally the new POR_ELx_PERM_* macros are used for existing
calculations in signal.c and mmu.c.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219164029.2309119-2-kevin.brodsky@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Similarly to what was done with the memcpy() routines, make
copy_to_user(), copy_from_user() and clear_user() also use the Armv8.8
FEAT_MOPS instructions.
Both MOPS implementation options (A and B) are supported, including
asymmetric systems. The exception fixup code fixes up the registers
according to the option used.
In case of a fault the routines return precisely how much was not copied
(as required by the comment in include/linux/uaccess.h), as unprivileged
versions of CPY/SET are guaranteed not to have written past the
addresses reported in the GPRs.
The MOPS instructions could possibly be inlined into callers (and
patched to branch to the generic implementation if not detected;
similarly to what x86 does), but as a first step this patch just uses
them in the out-of-line routines.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228170006.390100-4-kristina.martsenko@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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A subsequent patch will use CPY* instructions to copy between user and
kernel memory. Add handling for PAN faults caused by an intended kernel
memory access erroneously accessing user memory, in order to make it
easier to debug kernel bugs and to keep the same behavior as with
regular loads/stores.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228170006.390100-3-kristina.martsenko@arm.com
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: Folded the extable search into insn_may_access_user()]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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A subsequent patch will use CPY* instructions to copy between user and
kernel memory. Add a new exception fixup type to avoid fixing up faults
on kernel memory accesses, in order to make it easier to debug kernel
bugs and to keep the same behavior as with regular loads/stores.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228170006.390100-2-kristina.martsenko@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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While the kselftest was added at the same time with the kernel support
for MTE on hugetlb mappings, the tests may be run on older kernels. Skip
the tests if PROT_MTE is not supported on MAP_HUGETLB mappings.
Fixes: 27879e8cb6b0 ("selftests: arm64: add hugetlb mte tests")
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221093331.2184245-3-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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The architecture doesn't define precise/imprecise MTE tag check modes,
only synchronous and asynchronous. Use the correct naming and also
ensure they match the MTE_{ASYNC,SYNC}_ERR type.
Fixes: 27879e8cb6b0 ("selftests: arm64: add hugetlb mte tests")
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221093331.2184245-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Let's be consistent in using pud_sect_supported() for PUD_SIZE sized pages.
Hence change hugetlb_mask_last_page() and arch_make_huge_pte() as required.
Also re-arranged the switch statement for a common warning message.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220050534.799645-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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When CONFIG_ARM64_PA_BITS_52 is enabled, page table helpers __pte_to_phys()
and __phys_to_pte_val() are functions which return phys_addr_t and pteval_t
respectively as expected. But otherwise without this config being enabled,
they are defined as macros and their return types are implicit.
Until now this has worked out correctly as both pte_t and phys_addr_t data
types have been 64 bits. But with the introduction of 128 bit page tables,
pte_t becomes 128 bits. Hence this ends up with incorrect widths after the
conversions, which leads to compiler warnings.
Fix these warnings by converting __pte_to_phys() and __phys_to_pte_val()
as functions instead where the return types are handled explicitly.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227022412.2015835-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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During platform_device_register, wrongly using struct device
pci_dev as platform_data caused a kmemdup copy of pci_dev. Worse
still, accessing the duplicated device leads to list corruption as its
mutex content (e.g., list, magic) remains the same as the original.
Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220121716.50324-3-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
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Release leaked resources, such as plat_dev and dev_info.
Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220121716.50324-2-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
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While handling RN-D nodes under the functionally-identical RN-I type
works fine for perf tool users using the "rnid_" event aliases, and that
is the documented and expected ABI, there's little reason not to be
permissive and accept the actual RN-D type as an additional encoding for
the same events as well. This may be convenient for other tooling
generating event configs directly from its own topology data.
In the RN-I event mood, it also seems as good a time as any to clean up
a forgotten macro for CCLA_RNI events which ended up being unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ef46a47fc4ab909093f14b2b4289a4835836ab6c.1738851844.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
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A few fields in struct arm_pmu are only used with PMUv3, and soon we
will need to add more for BRBE. Group the fields together so that we
have a logical place to add more data in future.
At the same time, remove the comment for reg_pmmir as it doesn't convey
anything useful.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Tested-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250218-arm-brbe-v19-v20-7-4e9922fc2e8e@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
Thomas Weißschuh
Robin Murphy
Douglas Anderson
James Clark
Yicong Yang
Anshuman Khandual
Ard Biesheuvel
Ryan Roberts
Oliver Upton
Yue Haibing
Suzuki K Poulose
Madhavan Srinivasan
Kevin Brodsky
Kristina Martšenko
Catalin Marinas
Yunhui Cui
Mark Rutland