From 5b0eea835d4e9cb5229e696c5763929fc2394f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:12:22 +0200
Subject: selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes

Currently, SELinux doesn't allow distinguishing between kernel threads
and userspace processes that are started before the policy is first
loaded - both get the label corresponding to the kernel SID. The only
way a process that persists from early boot can get a meaningful label
is by doing a voluntary dyntransition or re-executing itself.

Reusing the kernel label for userspace processes is problematic for
several reasons:
1. The kernel is considered to be a privileged domain and generally
   needs to have a wide range of permissions allowed to work correctly,
   which prevents the policy writer from effectively hardening against
   early boot processes that might remain running unintentionally after
   the policy is loaded (they represent a potential extra attack surface
   that should be mitigated).
2. Despite the kernel being treated as a privileged domain, the policy
   writer may want to impose certain special limitations on kernel
   threads that may conflict with the requirements of intentional early
   boot processes. For example, it is a good hardening practice to limit
   what executables the kernel can execute as usermode helpers and to
   confine the resulting usermode helper processes. However, a
   (legitimate) process surviving from early boot may need to execute a
   different set of executables.
3. As currently implemented, overlayfs remembers the security context of
   the process that created an overlayfs mount and uses it to bound
   subsequent operations on files using this context. If an overlayfs
   mount is created before the SELinux policy is loaded, these "mounter"
   checks are made against the kernel context, which may clash with
   restrictions on the kernel domain (see 2.).

To resolve this, introduce a new initial SID (reusing the slot of the
former "init" initial SID) that will be assigned to any userspace
process started before the policy is first loaded. This is easy to do,
as we can simply label any process that goes through the
bprm_creds_for_exec LSM hook with the new init-SID instead of
propagating the kernel SID from the parent.

To provide backwards compatibility for existing policies that are
unaware of this new semantic of the "init" initial SID, introduce a new
policy capability "userspace_initial_context" and set the "init" SID to
the same context as the "kernel" SID unless this capability is set by
the policy.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 31b08b34c722..cfe77ef24ee2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -863,6 +863,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	struct ocontext *head, *c;
+	bool isid_init_supported = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
+						   POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = sidtab_init(s);
@@ -886,6 +888,13 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		if (!name)
 			continue;
 
+		/*
+		 * Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare
+		 * support for it
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init_supported)
+			continue;
+
 		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
@@ -893,6 +902,24 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 			sidtab_destroy(s);
 			return rc;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If the policy doesn't support the "userspace_initial_context"
+		 * capability, set SECINITSID_INIT to the same context as
+		 * SECINITSID_KERNEL. This ensures the same behavior as before
+		 * the reintroduction of SECINITSID_INIT, where all tasks
+		 * started before policy load would initially get the context
+		 * corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL.
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init_supported) {
+			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT, &c->context[0]);
+			if (rc) {
+				pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+				       name);
+				sidtab_destroy(s);
+				return rc;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From bbea03f474850b3bce329aa3b990b1a4853136f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:16 +0200
Subject: selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The function is always inlined and most of the time both relevant
arguments are compile time constants, allowing compilers to elide the
check.  Also the function is part of outputting the policy, which is not
performance critical.

Also convert the type of the third parameter into a size_t, since it
should always be a non-negative number of elements.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 74b63ed1173f..6b4ad8e91265 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -366,9 +366,12 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
-	size_t len = bytes * num;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len)))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (len > fp->len)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From f785c54101e01f8e5f84464f8755671246b13794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:18 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid avtab overflows
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Prevent inserting more than the supported U32_MAX number of entries.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 6766edc0fe68..7d21de48c28d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
 		return NULL;
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
 	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 7128578c79a73760305f89ff975047c124919dfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:29 +0200
Subject: selinux: use consistent type for AV rule specifier
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The specifier for avtab keys is always supplied with a type of u16,
either as a macro to security_compute_sid() or the member specified of
the struct avtab_key.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 7d21de48c28d..8d7c14ca27a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 }
 
 struct avtab_node*
-avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index d6742fd9c560..f265e9da18e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 				     const struct avtab_key *key);
 
-struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified);
 
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 78946b71c1c1..83b85536cd2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u32 specified,
+				u16 specified,
 				const char *objname,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 0e83c9c6fb0d7d2fddd2cd02575d7ad157e12837 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:31 +0200
Subject: selinux: fix implicit conversions in the symtab
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

hashtab_init() takes an u32 as size parameter type.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index c42a6648a07d..7a77571fb275 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = {
 	.cmp = symcmp,
 };
 
-int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size)
 {
 	s->nprim = 0;
 	return hashtab_init(&s->table, size);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
index f2614138d0cd..3033c4db6cb6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct symtab {
 	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
 };
 
-int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
 
 int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
 void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 08a12b39e289fedf755afbc81de44a5cd1286b4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:06:27 +0200
Subject: selinux: drop avtab_search()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

avtab_search() shares the same logic with avtab_search_node(), except
that it returns, if found, a pointer to the struct avtab_node member
datum instead of the node itself.  Since the member is an embedded
struct, and not a pointer, the returned value of avtab_search() and
avtab_search_node() will always in unison either be NULL or non-NULL.

Drop avtab_search() and replace its calls by avtab_search_node() to
deduplicate logic and adopt the only caller caring for the type of
the returned value accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 32 --------------------------------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  1 -
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c    | 13 ++++++-------
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 8d7c14ca27a2..5fd439c5b8a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -180,38 +180,6 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 	return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
 }
 
-struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key)
-{
-	int hvalue;
-	struct avtab_node *cur;
-	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
-
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
-		return NULL;
-
-	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
-	     cur = cur->next) {
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
-		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
-		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
-			return &cur->datum;
-
-		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
-			break;
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
-			break;
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
-		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
 /* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
  * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
  */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index f265e9da18e2..c2b88430c916 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ struct avtab {
 void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
 int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
-struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *k);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index b156c181c3c1..81ff676f209a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 	 * cond_te_avtab.
 	 */
 	if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
-		if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+		if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 				}
 			}
 		} else {
-			if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+			if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
 				pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 83b85536cd2b..fa47e4e38935 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1706,8 +1706,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
 	struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
-	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
-	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct avtab_node *avnode, *node;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
@@ -1815,22 +1814,22 @@ retry:
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
-	if (!avdatum) {
+	if (!avnode) {
 		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
-				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				avnode = node;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (avdatum) {
+	if (avnode) {
 		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
-		newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+		newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data;
 	}
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From e5faa839c3eee199447573c4e227daeb76d402cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 21:00:24 +0200
Subject: selinux: add missing newlines in pr_err() statements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The kernel print statements do not append an implicit newline to format
strings.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9aa60ce23209..dc51f28815b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2930,7 +2930,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
 		struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
 			selinux_inode(context_inode);
 		if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
-			pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized");
+			pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index cfe77ef24ee2..61e0e5000025 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
-			       "too deep or looped boundary",
+			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
 			       (char *) key);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 		if (upper->attribute) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
-			       "bounded by attribute %s",
+			       "bounded by attribute %s\n",
 			       (char *) key,
 			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -3675,7 +3675,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
-		    "version %d", p->policyvers);
+		    "version %d\n", p->policyvers);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 0fe53224bf5be183d263f262212c06ff00c69ca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 11:12:50 -0400
Subject: selinux: update my email address

Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c              | 2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/constraint.h    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/context.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c           | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.h           | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h     | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h        | 2 +-
 25 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index cd55479cce25..32eb67fb3e42 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
  *
- * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dc51f28815b0..a85a9f52e0c3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
  *
- *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	      Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
  *	      Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
  *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 9e055f74daf6..8f0aa66ccb13 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
 #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index b9668be7b443..88b139e086c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
 #define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 8f50e8fe0488..8159fd53c3de 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
  *
- *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *		Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
  *		Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
  *		James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 6b8b8fc3badd..668e393a9709 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Security server interface.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *
  */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 5fd439c5b8a4..32f92da00b0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the access vector table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index c2b88430c916..2ef5d1ae2844 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * table is used to represent the type enforcement
  * tables.
  *
- *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 4e563be9ef5f..f76eb3128ad5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * process from labeling an object with a different user
  * identity.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
 #define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index aed704b8c642..1f59468c0759 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * security server and can be changed without affecting
  * clients of the security server.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
 #define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index d31b87be9a1e..77875ad355f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index e5b57dc3fc53..e3c807cfad90 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
  * the total bitmap.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 #define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 3fb8f9026e9b..30532ec319ce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the hash table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 043a773bf0b7..9dac6da45b98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
  * provided by the creator of the table.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
 #define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 99571b19d4a9..b2c6c846ea03 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 15cacde0ff61..107681dd1824 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
index 7d48d5e52233..f492cf148891 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 61e0e5000025..b903a4dfdce1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the policy database.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 6b4ad8e91265..b97cda489753 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
  * configuration data for the security policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fa47e4e38935..2c5be06fbada 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the security services.
  *
- * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 8a9b85f44b66..ed2ee6600467 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the security services.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
 #define _SS_SERVICES_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 38d25173aebd..d8ead463b8df 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the SID table type.
  *
- * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index 72810a080e77..22258201cd14 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
  * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
  *
- * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index 7a77571fb275..43d7f0319ccd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the symbol table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
index 3033c4db6cb6..0a3b5de79a0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
  * using the hash table type (hashtab).
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
 #define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 55a0e73806ec64279ea31d57b2116672631696a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:49:19 +0200
Subject: selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configuration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The policy database code contains several debug output statements
related to hashtable utilization.  Those are guarded by the macro
DEBUG_HASHES, which is neither documented nor set anywhere.

Introduce a new Kconfig configuration guarding this and potential
other future debugging related code.  Disable the setting by default.

Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: fixed line lengths in the help text]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/Kconfig       | 9 +++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index c275115b5088..d30348fbe0df 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -68,3 +68,12 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE
 	  conversion.  Setting this option to 0 disables the cache completely.
 
 	  If unsure, keep the default value.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
+	bool "SELinux kernel debugging support"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables debugging code designed to help SELinux kernel
+	  developers, unless you know what this does in the kernel code you
+	  should leave this disabled.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index b903a4dfdce1..dc66868ff62c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #include "mls.h"
 #include "services.h"
 
-#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 	"common prefixes",
 	"classes",
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	cat_index,
 };
 
-#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 {
 	struct hashtab_info info;
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 {
 }
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
 /*
  * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
 		 p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
 
-#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
 	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
 #endif
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From f01dd5904519574017a4938ffb4424b31ba79cf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:19:31 +0200
Subject: selinux: move debug functions into debug configuration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

avtab_hash_eval() and hashtab_stat() are only used in policydb.c when
the configuration SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG is enabled.

Move the function definitions under that configuration as well and
provide empty definitions in case SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG is disabled, to
avoid using #ifdef in the callers.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c    | 2 ++
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h    | 7 +++++++
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c  | 3 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h  | 6 ++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +++--
 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 32f92da00b0e..243e5dabfa86 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
 	return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 {
 	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
@@ -352,6 +353,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 	       tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
 	       chain2_len_sum);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
 static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
 	AVTAB_ALLOWED,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 2ef5d1ae2844..3c3904bf02b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -91,7 +91,14 @@ void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
 int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
+#else
+static inline void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
+{
+}
+#endif
 
 struct policydb;
 int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 30532ec319ce..e3747b5dd3e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 {
 	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 	info->slots_used = slots_used;
 	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
 int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
 		int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 9dac6da45b98..f9713b56d3d0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -142,7 +142,13 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
 		int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
 		void *args);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+#else
+static inline void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+}
+#endif
 
 #endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index dc66868ff62c..a424997c79eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -701,6 +701,9 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 {
 }
+static inline void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
 /*
@@ -725,10 +728,8 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 	pr_debug("SELinux:  %d classes, %d rules\n",
 		 p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 	avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
 	symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
-#endif
 
 	p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
 					 sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c17c55c2d1ab19db289b566bba98b53e35e5e261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:54:53 +0200
Subject: selinux: use identical iterator type in hashtab_duplicate()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use the identical type u32 for the loop iterator.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: remove extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index e3747b5dd3e7..ac5cdddfbf78 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
 		void *args)
 {
 	struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
-	int i, rc;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
 
 	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From fd5a90ff1e95671e5b22dfa88d7359729b6c42b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:54:54 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in mls code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use u32 for ebitmap bits and sensitivity levels, char for the default
range of a class.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: description tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index b2c6c846ea03..cd38f5913b63 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
 
 	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+		u32 index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
 		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
 
 		/* categories */
@@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
 	char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
 	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
-	int l, rc, i;
+	u32 i;
+	int l, rc;
 	char *rangep[2];
 
 	if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	struct level_datum *levdatum;
 	struct cat_datum *catdatum;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
-	int l, i;
+	u32 i;
+	int l;
 
 	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
@@ -495,7 +497,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
 	struct range_trans rtr;
 	struct mls_range *r;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
-	int default_range = 0;
+	char default_range = 0;
 
 	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From c50e125d057152bc68dfd5669b73611343653eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 17:54:56 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use u32 as the output parameter type in security_get_classes() and
security_get_permissions(), based on the type of the symtab nprim
member.

Declare the read-only class string parameter of
security_get_permissions() const.

Avoid several implicit conversions by using the identical type for the
destination.

Use the type identical to the source for local variables.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: cleanup extra whitespace in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |  7 ++++---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 668e393a9709..074d439fe9ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -312,9 +312,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 *peer_sid);
 
 int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			 char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses);
 int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+			     const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms);
 int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
 int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f79e96f0f221..b969e87fd870 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1798,7 +1798,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
 			char *objclass, int classvalue,
 			struct dentry *dir)
 {
-	int i, rc, nperms;
+	u32 i, nperms;
+	int rc;
 	char **perms;
 
 	rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
@@ -1868,8 +1869,8 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy,
 			    struct dentry *class_dir,
 			    unsigned long *last_class_ino)
 {
-
-	int rc, nclasses, i;
+	u32 i, nclasses;
+	int rc;
 	char **classes;
 
 	rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 2c5be06fbada..3ec0bb39c234 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
 	struct type_datum *type;
-	int index;
+	u32 index;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized())
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
-		int i;
+		u32 i;
 
 		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
 			const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
@@ -2821,7 +2821,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
 	struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
-	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
 	struct ocontext *c;
@@ -2843,7 +2842,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
-		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
 		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
 		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
 			break;
@@ -3331,7 +3330,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 {
 	struct class_datum *datum = d;
 	char *name = k, **classes = args;
-	int value = datum->value - 1;
+	u32 value = datum->value - 1;
 
 	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!classes[value])
@@ -3341,7 +3340,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 }
 
 int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int rc;
@@ -3357,7 +3356,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 	rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			 *classes);
 	if (rc) {
-		int i;
+		u32 i;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
 			kfree((*classes)[i]);
 		kfree(*classes);
@@ -3371,7 +3371,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 {
 	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
 	char *name = k, **perms = args;
-	int value = datum->value - 1;
+	u32 value = datum->value - 1;
 
 	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!perms[value])
@@ -3381,10 +3381,11 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 }
 
 int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+			     const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
-	int rc, i;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3599,7 +3600,7 @@ err:
 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 2b86e04bce141311c3a68940be2c8d5984274fca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 20:05:18 +0200
Subject: selinux: use GFP_KERNEL while reading binary policy
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_ATOMIC while reading a binary policy in
sens_read() and cat_read(), similar to surrounding code.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index a424997c79eb..bb850b608dc6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1597,7 +1597,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	__le32 buf[2];
 	u32 len;
 
-	levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!levdatum)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1608,12 +1608,12 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
-	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!levdatum->level)
 		goto bad;
 
@@ -1638,7 +1638,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	u32 len;
 
-	catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!catdatum)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1650,7 +1650,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 	catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 
-	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 817199e006e514e6c39a17ed2e9fece1bd56b898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 22:57:22 -0400
Subject: selinux: revert SECINITSID_INIT support

This commit reverts 5b0eea835d4e ("selinux: introduce an initial SID
for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on
distros with old SELinux userspace tools/libraries, specifically
Ubuntu 16.04.

Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later
date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and
backwards compatible SELinux tree.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/87edkseqf8.fsf@mail.lhotse
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                         | 28 ------------------------
 security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h             |  1 -
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h       |  1 -
 security/selinux/include/security.h              |  6 -----
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c                   | 27 -----------------------
 6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 64 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index cf787eaca755..7138083c5bef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2313,19 +2313,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
 	new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
-	 * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
-	 * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
-	 * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
-	 */
-	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
-		new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
-		/* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
-		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
 		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
@@ -4542,21 +4529,6 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
 		return 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
-	 * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
-	 * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
-	 *
-	 * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
-	 * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
-	 * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
-	 * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
-	 * setting.
-	 */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
-	    sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
-		return 0;
-
 	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
 
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
index 5e5f0993dac2..ecc6e74fa09b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {
 	NULL,
 	"file",
 	NULL,
-	"init",
+	NULL,
 	"any_socket",
 	"port",
 	"netif",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index c7373e6effe5..f35d3458e71d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
-	POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT,
 	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index 28e4c9ee2399..49bbe120d173 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition",
 	"genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
 	"ioctl_skip_cloexec",
-	"userspace_initial_context",
 };
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 074d439fe9ad..a9de89af8fdc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -189,12 +189,6 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
 		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
 }
 
-static inline bool selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context(void)
-{
-	return READ_ONCE(
-		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT]);
-}
-
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index bb850b608dc6..cd44b13b8d3f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -864,8 +864,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	struct ocontext *head, *c;
-	bool isid_init_supported = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
-						   POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = sidtab_init(s);
@@ -889,13 +887,6 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		if (!name)
 			continue;
 
-		/*
-		 * Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare
-		 * support for it
-		 */
-		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init_supported)
-			continue;
-
 		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
@@ -903,24 +894,6 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 			sidtab_destroy(s);
 			return rc;
 		}
-
-		/*
-		 * If the policy doesn't support the "userspace_initial_context"
-		 * capability, set SECINITSID_INIT to the same context as
-		 * SECINITSID_KERNEL. This ensures the same behavior as before
-		 * the reintroduction of SECINITSID_INIT, where all tasks
-		 * started before policy load would initially get the context
-		 * corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL.
-		 */
-		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init_supported) {
-			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT, &c->context[0]);
-			if (rc) {
-				pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
-				       name);
-				sidtab_destroy(s);
-				return rc;
-			}
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From df9d4749250dd8ed56a91336c3c54ea7a52fd1c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 19:11:42 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in avtab code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Return u32 from avtab_hash() instead of int, since the hashing is done
on u32 and the result is used as an index on the hash array.

Use the type of the limit in for loops.

Avoid signed to unsigned conversion of multiplication result in
avtab_hash_eval() and perform multiplication in destination type.

Use unsigned loop iterator for index operations, to avoid sign
extension.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 243e5dabfa86..86d98a8e291b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
 /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
  * public domain.
  */
-static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
+static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 {
 	static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
 	static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 }
 
 static struct avtab_node*
-avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, u32 hvalue,
 		  struct avtab_node *prev,
 		  const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
 static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
 			const struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
-	int hvalue;
+	u32 hvalue;
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 					  const struct avtab_key *key,
 					  const struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
-	int hvalue;
+	u32 hvalue;
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 				     const struct avtab_key *key)
 {
-	int hvalue;
+	u32 hvalue;
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified)
 
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 	struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
 
 	if (!h)
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 {
-	int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
 	unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
 
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 
 			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
 				max_chain_len = chain_len;
-			chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len;
+			chain2_len_sum += (unsigned long long)chain_len * chain_len;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -374,13 +374,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 {
 	__le16 buf16[4];
 	u16 enabled;
-	u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
+	u32 items, items2, val, i;
 	struct avtab_key key;
 	struct avtab_datum datum;
 	struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
 	__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
-	int i, rc;
-	unsigned set;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
 
 	memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
 	memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
 
 int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
+	u32 i;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
 	__le32 buf[1];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From 002903e1d10fd8c9e215d88e0c71f609a4af5755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 19:11:37 +0200
Subject: selinux: update type for number of class permissions in services code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Security classes have only up to 32 permissions, hence using an u16 is
sufficient (while improving padding in struct selinux_mapping).

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3ec0bb39c234..dacec2ebdcd7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
 {
 	u16 i, j;
-	unsigned k;
 	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
 
 	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
@@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 	while (map[j].name) {
 		const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
 		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+		u16 k;
 
 		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
 		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index ed2ee6600467..d24b0a3d198e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 /* Mapping for a single class */
 struct selinux_mapping {
 	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
-	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u16 num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
 	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
 };
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From aa4b60518280834529f75cb7667ffac91967abea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 19:11:38 +0200
Subject: selinux: make left shifts well defined
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The loops upper bound represent the number of permissions used (for the
current class or in general).  The limit for this is 32, thus we might
left shift of one less, 31.  Shifting a base of 1 results in undefined
behavior; use (u32)1 as base.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index dacec2ebdcd7..1eeffc66ea7d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -207,22 +207,22 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		}
 		avd->allowed = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
 			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		avd->auditallow = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
 		 * should audit that denial
 		 */
 		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
-			result |= 1<<i;
+			result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		avd->auditdeny = result;
 	}
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b


From dee15375484326a684377d6e741fc222a80a15bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 19:11:40 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in policydb code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use the identical type for local variables, e.g. loop counters.

Declare members of struct policydb_compat_info unsigned to consistently
use unsigned iterators.  They hold read-only non-negative numbers in the
global variable policydb_compat.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/selinux/ss')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index cd44b13b8d3f..28bd75dc6f71 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ static const char *const symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 #endif
 
 struct policydb_compat_info {
-	int version;
-	int sym_num;
-	int ocon_num;
+	unsigned int version;
+	unsigned int sym_num;
+	unsigned int ocon_num;
 };
 
 /* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
@@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 	},
 };
 
-static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
+static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int version)
 {
-	int i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
 		if (policydb_compat[i].version == version)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static int role_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)
 {
 	if (!c)
 		return;
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
 	struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
@@ -1128,8 +1128,8 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct common_datum *comdatum;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 len, nel;
-	int i, rc;
+	u32 i, len, nel;
+	int rc;
 
 	comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!comdatum)
@@ -1194,13 +1194,13 @@ static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
 
 static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
 				struct constraint_node **nodep,
-				int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+				u32 ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
 	struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
 	__le32 buf[3];
-	u32 nexpr;
-	int rc, i, j, depth;
+	u32 i, j, nexpr;
+	int rc, depth;
 
 	lc = NULL;
 	for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
@@ -1292,8 +1292,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
-	int i, rc;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!cladatum)
@@ -1386,7 +1386,8 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct role_datum *role;
-	int rc, to_read = 2;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 2;
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	u32 len;
 
@@ -1442,7 +1443,8 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct type_datum *typdatum;
-	int rc, to_read = 3;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 3;
 	__le32 buf[4];
 	u32 len;
 
@@ -1516,7 +1518,8 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
-	int rc, to_read = 2;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int to_read = 2;
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	u32 len;
 
@@ -1657,7 +1660,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 	upper = user = datum;
 	while (upper->bounds) {
 		struct ebitmap_node *node;
-		unsigned long bit;
+		u32 bit;
 
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
@@ -1693,7 +1696,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 	upper = role = datum;
 	while (upper->bounds) {
 		struct ebitmap_node *node;
-		unsigned long bit;
+		u32 bit;
 
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
@@ -1808,9 +1811,9 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
 	struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
 	struct mls_range *r = NULL;
-	int i, rc;
+	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[2];
-	u32 nel;
+	u32 i, nel;
 
 	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
 		return 0;
@@ -2056,9 +2059,9 @@ out:
 
 static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	u32 nel;
+	u32 nel, i;
 	__le32 buf[1];
-	int rc, i;
+	int rc;
 
 	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
 		return 0;
@@ -2097,8 +2100,8 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	int i, j, rc;
-	u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
+	int rc;
+	u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
 	__le32 buf[1];
 	struct ocontext *l, *c;
 	struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
@@ -2211,8 +2214,9 @@ out:
 static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
 			 void *fp)
 {
-	int i, j, rc;
-	u32 nel, len;
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int i;
+	u32 j, nel, len;
 	__be64 prefixbuf[1];
 	__le32 buf[3];
 	struct ocontext *l, *c;
@@ -2403,9 +2407,9 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
 	struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL;
 	struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
-	int i, j, rc;
+	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 len, nprim, nel, perm;
+	u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
 
 	char *policydb_str;
 	const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -3256,7 +3260,8 @@ static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
 			  void *fp)
 {
-	unsigned int i, j, rc;
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int rc;
 	size_t nel, len;
 	__be64 prefixbuf[1];
 	__le32 buf[3];
@@ -3605,10 +3610,10 @@ static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
  */
 int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	unsigned int i, num_syms;
+	unsigned int num_syms;
 	int rc;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 config;
+	u32 config, i;
 	size_t len;
 	const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3-59-g8ed1b