wireguard-openbsd/libexec/ld.so, branch jd/queueboosts WireGuard implementation for the OpenBSD kernel https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-openbsd/atom/libexec/ld.so?h=jd%2Fqueueboosts 2020-05-08T11:04:50Z ld.so(1) also ignores LD_LIBRARY_PATH an friends for set-group-ID executables 2020-05-08T11:04:50Z jca jca@openbsd.org 2020-05-08T11:04:50Z urn:sha1:c6bdb7a3b4a9b5a31f18446370e0b65f007d4b8c While here, use consistent casing and don't use .Ev for set-user-ID/set-group-ID. from Miod LD_DEBUG is ignored for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables 2020-05-08T10:57:50Z jca jca@openbsd.org 2020-05-08T10:57:50Z urn:sha1:b3f796b2e608b9c07cbbff10841e7a52807b9c94 from Miod Add missing space in stack smash handler error message. 2020-03-27T22:17:47Z matthieu matthieu@openbsd.org 2020-03-27T22:17:47Z urn:sha1:fa9f194654f351d5755593abf760e3720c8f75dc ok kettenis@, deraadt@ Anthony Steinhauser reports that 32-bit arm cpus have the same speculation 2020-03-13T09:31:24Z deraadt deraadt@openbsd.org 2020-03-13T09:31:24Z urn:sha1:f74a2b77455090a00a6234c40c5f02aa52986a5b problems as 64-bit models. To resolve the syscall speculation, as a first step "nop; nop" was added after all occurances of the syscall ("swi 0") instruction. Then the kernel was changed to jump over the 2 extra instructions. In this final step, those pair of nops are converted into the speculation-blocking sequence ("dsb nsh; isb"). Don't try to build through these multiple steps, use a snapshot instead. Packages matching the new ABI will be out in a while... ok kettenis Anthony Steinhauser reports that 32-bit arm cpus have the same speculation 2020-03-13T06:38:55Z deraadt deraadt@openbsd.org 2020-03-13T06:38:55Z urn:sha1:ded5ef52d3291f96a0c7cf356fdf60838643405d problems as 64-bit models. For the syscall instruction issue, add nop;nop after swi 0, in preparation for jumping over a speculation barrier here later. (a lonely swi 0 was hiding in __asm in this file) Anthony Steinhauser reports that 32-bit arm cpus have the same speculation 2020-03-11T12:53:19Z deraadt deraadt@openbsd.org 2020-03-11T12:53:19Z urn:sha1:f377c7672bd38a70b428cd7751ceff0af609e750 problems as 64-bit models. For the syscall instruction issue, add nop;nop after swi 0, in preparation for jumping over a speculation barrier here later. ok kettenis Now that the kernel skips the two instructions immediately following 2020-02-18T12:19:11Z kettenis kettenis@openbsd.org 2020-02-18T12:19:11Z urn:sha1:5ecc9681133f1894e81c385eddd09981f78f1193 a syscall, replace the double nop with a dsb nsh; isb; sequence which stops the CPU from speculating any further. This fix was suggested by Anthony Steinhauser. ok deraadt@ Insert two nop instructions after each svc #0 instruction in userland. 2020-01-26T02:19:43Z kettenis kettenis@openbsd.org 2020-01-26T02:19:43Z urn:sha1:0c401ffc2a2550c32105ce180746b0a95071123b The will be replaced by a speculation barrier as soon as we teach the kernel to skip over these two instructions when returning from a system call. ok patrick@, deraadt@ Eliminate failure returns from _dl_split_path(): if malloc fails just _dl_oom() 2019-12-17T17:16:32Z guenther guenther@openbsd.org 2019-12-17T17:16:32Z urn:sha1:3d8e19a1e88234ef8b946d7c79832ee657fb249a Prompted by Qualys's leveraging malloc failure in _dl_split_path() to get stuff past. ok deraadt@ millert@ Don't look up env variables until we know we'll trust them. Otherwise, 2019-12-17T03:16:07Z guenther guenther@openbsd.org 2019-12-17T03:16:07Z urn:sha1:4b65c70c5e05dc7a3d5ef502a5b4dc938ecf3bc5 just delete them without looking. ok millert@