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<title>wireguard-openbsd/libexec/security, branch jd/histogram</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard implementation for the OpenBSD kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-openbsd/atom/libexec/security?h=jd%2Fhistogram</id>
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<updated>2016-12-27T09:17:52Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Remove user uucp and group news from base.</title>
<updated>2016-12-27T09:17:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>jca</name>
<email>jca@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-27T09:17:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:28e4bf3df6c372846df146c14145c7ed0f21596e</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When checking ownership and modes of files in /var/mail/,</title>
<updated>2016-10-22T18:35:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-22T18:35:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8e6fa7367df578e60e99ec4141d489e5abe3f186</id>
<content type='text'>
ignore *.lock files, to avoid pointless warning mails
reported by Philippe Meunier &lt;meunier at ccs dot neu dot edu&gt;;
OK florian@ jca@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When reading untrusted user files, don't risk blocking, such that</title>
<updated>2015-07-21T19:07:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-21T19:07:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91f416ab0fdc502754c926d4a0ad8b5e3d911eac</id>
<content type='text'>
users can't mount a DOS attack against security(8), and for additional
safety against race attacks, make sure they are regular files after
opening and before actually reading them.

Issue originally hinted at by Sevan Janiyan &lt;venture37 at
geeklan dot com dot uk&gt; based on a NetBSD commit message,
then commented on by tedu@, problem finally confirmed by guenther@,
who also provided feedback on the actual patch.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When diff(1) finds differences, it returns an exit status of 1.</title>
<updated>2015-04-21T10:24:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T10:24:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f3fe92c90f987a8ad7d71dfb52646b676ea4db88</id>
<content type='text'>
In that particular case, refrain from printing "diff: exit code 1"
because that exit status doesn't indicate an error condition.

Issue noticed by and patch OK'ed by ajacoutot@.
"I agree with the goal, and I suspect the diff actually achieves it" guenther@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>In mount(8) output, do not misparse lines where fs_spec ends with the</title>
<updated>2015-03-27T13:26:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-27T13:26:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:46d53d6e458e6b1e5ed45c9e19fadb15dd00077f</id>
<content type='text'>
two characters "on", which can for example happen for NFS mounts.
Patch from Lauri Tirkkonen &lt;lotheac at iki dot fi&gt; on bugs@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>If /etc/passwd contains incomplete lines ending before the</title>
<updated>2015-03-27T12:33:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-27T12:33:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e4edfe2a77ec509a9c11d5d2077fc949c324b159</id>
<content type='text'>
home directory field, warn explicitly rather than stumbling
into Perl "uninitialized value" warnings.
Issue reported by Denis Lapshin &lt;deniza at mindall dot org&gt;.
OK afresh1@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AnonCVS is designed to work with a user account that has no password and a</title>
<updated>2014-12-04T00:07:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-04T00:07:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:90622da5738d844632eb0b975f5b2ae35de580a0</id>
<content type='text'>
very special shell, so do not complain about that particular combination.
Idea originally brought up by landry@ five years ago, repeatedly forgotten.
Using feedback from sthen@ millert@ halex@; OK landry@ ajacoutot@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The file /etc/exports is now optional and not installed by default,</title>
<updated>2014-07-14T08:49:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-14T08:49:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b8d87d2e414b4061f0637fcf138604a17a19077d</id>
<content type='text'>
so do not complain when it is absent.

issue found by and patch ok by ajacoutot@
"I don't do perl, but seems ok" deraadt@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Do not redirect STDERR of the main security(8) script to /dev/null,</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T16:00:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-26T16:00:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dcefff7d9751aa84390b5525e0b67836e1451ce8</id>
<content type='text'>
not even for calling three particular functions, as that carries a risk
of hiding serious errors in the security(8) script itself: otto@ found
and reported a bug (already fixed by now) where that hurt him.

Instead, only do the redirection where it is really needed, that is,
inside the forked csh(1) child process.  The csh(1) "eval" builtin is
required because the csh(1) "source" builtin apparently ignores
redirections.

No objections came up when showing this diff on tech@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The Perl close() function, when called on pipe file descriptors,</title>
<updated>2014-06-24T16:18:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-24T16:18:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fcd0deb3b46f185dbfacdb97675dd9d3ab07b02b</id>
<content type='text'>
provides information from wait(2), which needs careful inspection
in order to not hide errors.

Problem identified by florian@ after a bug report from otto@.
Fix based on a patch from florian@, considerably tweaked by me.
OK florian@
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