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<title>wireguard-openbsd/libexec/security, branch master</title>
<subtitle>WireGuard implementation for the OpenBSD kernel</subtitle>
<id>https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-openbsd/atom/libexec/security?h=master</id>
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<updated>2020-10-11T18:28:17Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Don't skip file systems just because the parent fs is nodev and nosuid.</title>
<updated>2020-10-11T18:28:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>millert</name>
<email>millert@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-11T18:28:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:14dbc6804011bf8bc03e02f7e0718c4149b8a1bf</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes instances where a mount point uses the nodev and nosuid options
but another file system mounted inside that hierarchy does not.
OK schwarze@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>afs, nnpfs, and procfs are no longer supported,</title>
<updated>2020-09-17T06:51:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-17T06:51:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:352e64a166b7bb06ff5892484e1670bd431699d7</id>
<content type='text'>
so stop looking for them in mount(8) output;
no functional change intended;
OK millert@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Do not bother scanning file systems that are both nodev and nosuid</title>
<updated>2020-09-14T14:43:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-14T14:43:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0a0d7ac4dfb968623be53fdf206413eca1ce8a24</id>
<content type='text'>
for SUID, SGID, and device files, implementing an idea that deraadt@
came up with based on a somewhat similar idea from millert@ after
a loosely related comment from Rupert Gallagher on misc@.

While here, minimally simplify the way mount options are parsed,
hoping to make the parsing more readable and also more robust.

OK millert@ deraadt@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove user uucp and group news from base.</title>
<updated>2016-12-27T09:17:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>jca</name>
<email>jca@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-27T09:17:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:28e4bf3df6c372846df146c14145c7ed0f21596e</id>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When checking ownership and modes of files in /var/mail/,</title>
<updated>2016-10-22T18:35:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-22T18:35:12Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8e6fa7367df578e60e99ec4141d489e5abe3f186</id>
<content type='text'>
ignore *.lock files, to avoid pointless warning mails
reported by Philippe Meunier &lt;meunier at ccs dot neu dot edu&gt;;
OK florian@ jca@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When reading untrusted user files, don't risk blocking, such that</title>
<updated>2015-07-21T19:07:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-21T19:07:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:91f416ab0fdc502754c926d4a0ad8b5e3d911eac</id>
<content type='text'>
users can't mount a DOS attack against security(8), and for additional
safety against race attacks, make sure they are regular files after
opening and before actually reading them.

Issue originally hinted at by Sevan Janiyan &lt;venture37 at
geeklan dot com dot uk&gt; based on a NetBSD commit message,
then commented on by tedu@, problem finally confirmed by guenther@,
who also provided feedback on the actual patch.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>When diff(1) finds differences, it returns an exit status of 1.</title>
<updated>2015-04-21T10:24:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T10:24:22Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f3fe92c90f987a8ad7d71dfb52646b676ea4db88</id>
<content type='text'>
In that particular case, refrain from printing "diff: exit code 1"
because that exit status doesn't indicate an error condition.

Issue noticed by and patch OK'ed by ajacoutot@.
"I agree with the goal, and I suspect the diff actually achieves it" guenther@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>In mount(8) output, do not misparse lines where fs_spec ends with the</title>
<updated>2015-03-27T13:26:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-27T13:26:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:46d53d6e458e6b1e5ed45c9e19fadb15dd00077f</id>
<content type='text'>
two characters "on", which can for example happen for NFS mounts.
Patch from Lauri Tirkkonen &lt;lotheac at iki dot fi&gt; on bugs@.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>If /etc/passwd contains incomplete lines ending before the</title>
<updated>2015-03-27T12:33:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-27T12:33:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e4edfe2a77ec509a9c11d5d2077fc949c324b159</id>
<content type='text'>
home directory field, warn explicitly rather than stumbling
into Perl "uninitialized value" warnings.
Issue reported by Denis Lapshin &lt;deniza at mindall dot org&gt;.
OK afresh1@
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AnonCVS is designed to work with a user account that has no password and a</title>
<updated>2014-12-04T00:07:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>schwarze</name>
<email>schwarze@openbsd.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-04T00:07:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:90622da5738d844632eb0b975f5b2ae35de580a0</id>
<content type='text'>
very special shell, so do not complain about that particular combination.
Idea originally brought up by landry@ five years ago, repeatedly forgotten.
Using feedback from sthen@ millert@ halex@; OK landry@ ajacoutot@.
</content>
</entry>
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