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authorMathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk>2020-02-01 14:39:19 +0100
committerMathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk>2020-02-01 14:39:19 +0100
commitdcd567c08f126b09548a98df0468ef1fe86d9f0a (patch)
tree2786e76e656739d4f6cdc260a0378751735265ee /src/wireguard/handshake
parentFixed typo in under load code (diff)
downloadwireguard-rs-dcd567c08f126b09548a98df0468ef1fe86d9f0a.tar.xz
wireguard-rs-dcd567c08f126b09548a98df0468ef1fe86d9f0a.zip
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 1e26a0bef44e65023a97a16ecf3b123e688d19f7 Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Sat Feb 1 14:36:50 2020 +0100 Initial version of sticky sockets for Linux commit 605cc656ad235d09ba6cd12d03dee2c5e0a9a80a Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Thu Jan 30 14:57:00 2020 +0100 Clear src when sendmsg fails with EINVAL commit dffd2b228af70f681e2a161642bbdaa348419bf3 Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Sun Jan 26 14:01:28 2020 +0100 Fix typoes commit 2015663706fbe15ed1ac443a31de86b3e6c643c7 Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Sun Jan 26 13:51:59 2020 +0100 Restructure of public key -> peer state Restructured the mapping of public keys to peer state in the project. The handshake device is now generic over an opaque type, which enables it to be the sole place where public keys are mapped to the peer states. This gets rid of the "peer" map in the WireGuard devices and avoids having to include the public key in the handshake peer state. commit bbcfaad4bcc5cf16bacdef0cefe7d29ba1519a23 Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Fri Jan 10 21:10:27 2020 +0100 Fixed bind6 also binding on IPv4 commit acbca236b70598c20c24de474690bcad883241d4 Author: Mathias Hall-Andersen <mathias@hall-andersen.dk> Date: Thu Jan 9 11:24:13 2020 +0100 Work on sticky sockets
Diffstat (limited to 'src/wireguard/handshake')
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs198
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/macs.rs6
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/noise.rs46
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/peer.rs26
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/tests.rs62
-rw-r--r--src/wireguard/handshake/types.rs14
6 files changed, 206 insertions, 146 deletions
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs
index edd1a07..4b5d8f6 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
use spin::RwLock;
+use std::collections::hash_map;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Mutex;
@@ -6,7 +7,10 @@ use zerocopy::AsBytes;
use byteorder::{ByteOrder, LittleEndian};
-use rand::prelude::*;
+use rand::Rng;
+use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+
+use clear_on_drop::clear::Clear;
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;
@@ -22,42 +26,101 @@ use super::types::*;
const MAX_PEER_PER_DEVICE: usize = 1 << 20;
pub struct KeyState {
- pub sk: StaticSecret, // static secret key
- pub pk: PublicKey, // static public key
- macs: macs::Validator, // validator for the mac fields
+ pub(super) sk: StaticSecret, // static secret key
+ pub(super) pk: PublicKey, // static public key
+ macs: macs::Validator, // validator for the mac fields
}
-pub struct Device {
- keyst: Option<KeyState>, // secret/public key
- pk_map: HashMap<[u8; 32], Peer>, // public key -> peer state
- id_map: RwLock<HashMap<u32, [u8; 32]>>, // receiver ids -> public key
+/// The device is generic over an "opaque" type
+/// which can be used to associate the public key with this value.
+/// (the instance is a Peer object in the parent module)
+pub struct Device<O> {
+ keyst: Option<KeyState>,
+ id_map: RwLock<HashMap<u32, [u8; 32]>>,
+ pk_map: HashMap<[u8; 32], Peer<O>>,
limiter: Mutex<RateLimiter>,
}
+pub struct Iter<'a, O> {
+ iter: hash_map::Iter<'a, [u8; 32], Peer<O>>,
+}
+
+impl<'a, O> Iterator for Iter<'a, O> {
+ type Item = (PublicKey, &'a O);
+
+ fn next(&mut self) -> Option<Self::Item> {
+ self.iter
+ .next()
+ .map(|(pk, peer)| (PublicKey::from(*pk), &peer.opaque))
+ }
+}
+
+/* These methods enable the Device to act as a map
+ * from public keys to the set of contained opaque values.
+ *
+ * It also abstracts away the problem of PublicKey not being hashable.
+ */
+impl<O> Device<O> {
+ pub fn clear(&mut self) {
+ self.id_map.write().clear();
+ self.pk_map.clear();
+ }
+
+ pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+ self.pk_map.len()
+ }
+
+ /// Enables enumeration of (public key, opaque) pairs
+ /// without exposing internal peer type.
+ pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<O> {
+ Iter {
+ iter: self.pk_map.iter(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Enables lookup by public key without exposing internal peer type.
+ pub fn get(&self, pk: &PublicKey) -> Option<&O> {
+ self.pk_map.get(pk.as_bytes()).map(|peer| &peer.opaque)
+ }
+
+ pub fn contains_key(&self, pk: &PublicKey) -> bool {
+ self.pk_map.contains_key(pk.as_bytes())
+ }
+}
+
/* A mutable reference to the device needs to be held during configuration.
* Wrapping the device in a RwLock enables peer config after "configuration time"
*/
-impl Device {
+impl<O> Device<O> {
/// Initialize a new handshake state machine
- pub fn new() -> Device {
+ pub fn new() -> Device<O> {
Device {
keyst: None,
- pk_map: HashMap::new(),
id_map: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
+ pk_map: HashMap::new(),
limiter: Mutex::new(RateLimiter::new()),
}
}
- fn update_ss(&self, peer: &mut Peer) -> Option<PublicKey> {
- if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
- if *peer.pk.as_bytes() == *key.pk.as_bytes() {
- return Some(peer.pk);
+ fn update_ss(&mut self) -> (Vec<u32>, Option<PublicKey>) {
+ let mut same = None;
+ let mut ids = Vec::with_capacity(self.pk_map.len());
+ for (pk, peer) in self.pk_map.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
+ if key.pk.as_bytes() == pk {
+ same = Some(PublicKey::from(*pk));
+ peer.ss.clear()
+ } else {
+ let pk = PublicKey::from(*pk);
+ peer.ss = *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes();
+ }
+ } else {
+ peer.ss.clear();
}
- peer.ss = *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes();
- } else {
- peer.ss = [0u8; 32];
- };
- None
+ peer.reset_state().map(|id| ids.push(id));
+ }
+
+ (ids, same)
}
/// Update the secret key of the device
@@ -74,29 +137,15 @@ impl Device {
});
// recalculate / erase the shared secrets for every peer
- let mut ids = vec![];
- let mut same = None;
- for mut peer in self.pk_map.values_mut() {
- // clear any existing handshake state
- peer.reset_state().map(|id| ids.push(id));
-
- // update precomputed shared secret
- if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
- peer.ss = *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes();
- if *peer.pk.as_bytes() == *key.pk.as_bytes() {
- same = Some(peer.pk)
- }
- } else {
- peer.ss = [0u8; 32];
- };
- }
+ let (ids, same) = self.update_ss();
// release ids from aborted handshakes
for id in ids {
self.release(id)
}
- // if we found a peer matching the device public key, remove it.
+ // if we found a peer matching the device public key
+ // remove it and return its value to the caller
same.map(|pk| {
self.pk_map.remove(pk.as_bytes());
pk
@@ -119,29 +168,32 @@ impl Device {
///
/// * `pk` - The public key to add
/// * `identifier` - Associated identifier which can be used to distinguish the peers
- pub fn add(&mut self, pk: PublicKey) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
+ pub fn add(&mut self, pk: PublicKey, opaque: O) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
// ensure less than 2^20 peers
if self.pk_map.len() > MAX_PEER_PER_DEVICE {
return Err(ConfigError::new("Too many peers for device"));
}
- // create peer and precompute static secret
- let mut peer = Peer::new(
- pk,
- self.keyst
- .as_ref()
- .map(|key| *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes())
- .unwrap_or([0u8; 32]),
- );
-
- // add peer to device
- match self.update_ss(&mut peer) {
- Some(_) => Err(ConfigError::new("Public key of peer matches the device")),
- None => {
- self.pk_map.insert(*pk.as_bytes(), peer);
- Ok(())
+ // error if public key matches device
+ if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
+ if pk.as_bytes() == key.pk.as_bytes() {
+ return Err(ConfigError::new("Public key of peer matches the device"));
}
}
+
+ // pre-compute shared secret and add to pk_map
+ self.pk_map.insert(
+ *pk.as_bytes(),
+ Peer::new(
+ pk,
+ self.keyst
+ .as_ref()
+ .map(|key| *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes())
+ .unwrap_or([0u8; 32]),
+ opaque,
+ ),
+ );
+ Ok(())
}
/// Remove a peer by public key
@@ -163,7 +215,7 @@ impl Device {
.remove(pk.as_bytes())
.ok_or(ConfigError::new("Public key not in device"))?;
- // pruge the id map (linear scan)
+ // purge the id map (linear scan)
id_map.retain(|_, v| v != pk.as_bytes());
Ok(())
}
@@ -231,11 +283,11 @@ impl Device {
(_, None) => Err(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey),
(None, _) => Err(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey),
(Some(keyst), Some(peer)) => {
- let local = self.allocate(rng, peer);
+ let local = self.allocate(rng, pk);
let mut msg = Initiation::default();
// create noise part of initation
- noise::create_initiation(rng, keyst, peer, local, &mut msg.noise)?;
+ noise::create_initiation(rng, keyst, peer, pk, local, &mut msg.noise)?;
// add macs to initation
peer.macs
@@ -253,11 +305,11 @@ impl Device {
///
/// * `msg` - Byte slice containing the message (untrusted input)
pub fn process<'a, R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
- &self,
- rng: &mut R, // rng instance to sample randomness from
- msg: &[u8], // message buffer
+ &'a self,
+ rng: &mut R, // rng instance to sample randomness from
+ msg: &[u8], // message buffer
src: Option<SocketAddr>, // optional source endpoint, set when "under load"
- ) -> Result<Output, HandshakeError> {
+ ) -> Result<Output<'a, O>, HandshakeError> {
// ensure type read in-range
if msg.len() < 4 {
return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessageFormat);
@@ -303,17 +355,17 @@ impl Device {
}
// consume the initiation
- let (peer, st) = noise::consume_initiation(self, keyst, &msg.noise)?;
+ let (peer, pk, st) = noise::consume_initiation(self, keyst, &msg.noise)?;
// allocate new index for response
- let local = self.allocate(rng, peer);
+ let local = self.allocate(rng, &pk);
// prepare memory for response, TODO: take slice for zero allocation
let mut resp = Response::default();
// create response (release id on error)
- let keys =
- noise::create_response(rng, peer, local, st, &mut resp.noise).map_err(|e| {
+ let keys = noise::create_response(rng, peer, &pk, local, st, &mut resp.noise)
+ .map_err(|e| {
self.release(local);
e
})?;
@@ -324,7 +376,11 @@ impl Device {
.generate(resp.noise.as_bytes(), &mut resp.macs);
// return unconfirmed keypair and the response as vector
- Ok((Some(peer.pk), Some(resp.as_bytes().to_owned()), Some(keys)))
+ Ok((
+ Some(&peer.opaque),
+ Some(resp.as_bytes().to_owned()),
+ Some(keys),
+ ))
}
TYPE_RESPONSE => {
let msg = Response::parse(msg)?;
@@ -363,7 +419,7 @@ impl Device {
let msg = CookieReply::parse(msg)?;
// lookup peer
- let peer = self.lookup_id(msg.f_receiver.get())?;
+ let (peer, _) = self.lookup_id(msg.f_receiver.get())?;
// validate cookie reply
peer.macs.lock().process(&msg)?;
@@ -379,7 +435,7 @@ impl Device {
// Internal function
//
// Return the peer associated with the public key
- pub(crate) fn lookup_pk(&self, pk: &PublicKey) -> Result<&Peer, HandshakeError> {
+ pub(super) fn lookup_pk(&self, pk: &PublicKey) -> Result<&Peer<O>, HandshakeError> {
self.pk_map
.get(pk.as_bytes())
.ok_or(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey)
@@ -388,11 +444,11 @@ impl Device {
// Internal function
//
// Return the peer currently associated with the receiver identifier
- pub(crate) fn lookup_id(&self, id: u32) -> Result<&Peer, HandshakeError> {
+ pub(super) fn lookup_id(&self, id: u32) -> Result<(&Peer<O>, PublicKey), HandshakeError> {
let im = self.id_map.read();
let pk = im.get(&id).ok_or(HandshakeError::UnknownReceiverId)?;
match self.pk_map.get(pk) {
- Some(peer) => Ok(peer),
+ Some(peer) => Ok((peer, PublicKey::from(*pk))),
_ => unreachable!(), // if the id-lookup succeeded, the peer should exist
}
}
@@ -400,7 +456,7 @@ impl Device {
// Internal function
//
// Allocated a new receiver identifier for the peer
- fn allocate<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(&self, rng: &mut R, peer: &Peer) -> u32 {
+ fn allocate<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(&self, rng: &mut R, pk: &PublicKey) -> u32 {
loop {
let id = rng.gen();
@@ -412,7 +468,7 @@ impl Device {
// take write lock and add index
let mut m = self.id_map.write();
if !m.contains_key(&id) {
- m.insert(id, *peer.pk.as_bytes());
+ m.insert(id, *pk.as_bytes());
return id;
}
}
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/macs.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/macs.rs
index 689826b..cb5d7d4 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/macs.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/macs.rs
@@ -286,8 +286,7 @@ mod tests {
use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;
fn new_validator_generator() -> (Validator, Generator) {
- let mut rng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
- let sk = StaticSecret::new(&mut rng);
+ let sk = StaticSecret::new(&mut OsRng);
let pk = PublicKey::from(&sk);
(Validator::new(pk), Generator::new(pk))
}
@@ -296,7 +295,6 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_cookie_reply(inner1 : Vec<u8>, inner2 : Vec<u8>, receiver : u32) {
let mut msg = CookieReply::default();
- let mut rng = OsRng::new().expect("failed to create rng");
let mut macs = MacsFooter::default();
let src = "192.0.2.16:8080".parse().unwrap();
let (validator, mut generator) = new_validator_generator();
@@ -309,7 +307,7 @@ mod tests {
// check validity of mac1
validator.check_mac1(&inner1[..], &macs).expect("mac1 of inner1 did not validate");
assert_eq!(validator.check_mac2(&inner1[..], &src, &macs), false, "mac2 of inner2 did not validate");
- validator.create_cookie_reply(&mut rng, receiver, &src, &macs, &mut msg);
+ validator.create_cookie_reply(&mut OsRng, receiver, &src, &macs, &mut msg);
// consume cookie reply
generator.process(&msg).expect("failed to process CookieReply");
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/noise.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/noise.rs
index 072ac13..9e431cf 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/noise.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/noise.rs
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use hmac::Hmac;
use aead::{Aead, NewAead, Payload};
use chacha20poly1305::ChaCha20Poly1305;
-use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
use log::debug;
@@ -215,20 +215,21 @@ mod tests {
}
}
-pub fn create_initiation<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+pub(super) fn create_initiation<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, O>(
rng: &mut R,
keyst: &KeyState,
- peer: &Peer,
+ peer: &Peer<O>,
+ pk: &PublicKey,
local: u32,
msg: &mut NoiseInitiation,
) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
- debug!("create initation");
+ debug!("create initiation");
clear_stack_on_return(CLEAR_PAGES, || {
// initialize state
let ck = INITIAL_CK;
let hs = INITIAL_HS;
- let hs = HASH!(&hs, peer.pk.as_bytes());
+ let hs = HASH!(&hs, pk.as_bytes());
msg.f_type.set(TYPE_INITIATION as u32);
msg.f_sender.set(local); // from us
@@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ pub fn create_initiation<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
// (C, k) := Kdf2(C, DH(E_priv, S_pub))
- let (ck, key) = KDF2!(&ck, eph_sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes());
+ let (ck, key) = KDF2!(&ck, eph_sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes());
// msg.static := Aead(k, 0, S_pub, H)
@@ -297,12 +298,12 @@ pub fn create_initiation<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
})
}
-pub fn consume_initiation<'a>(
- device: &'a Device,
+pub(super) fn consume_initiation<'a, O>(
+ device: &'a Device<O>,
keyst: &KeyState,
msg: &NoiseInitiation,
-) -> Result<(&'a Peer, TemporaryState), HandshakeError> {
- debug!("consume initation");
+) -> Result<(&'a Peer<O>, PublicKey, TemporaryState), HandshakeError> {
+ debug!("consume initiation");
clear_stack_on_return(CLEAR_PAGES, || {
// initialize new state
@@ -369,13 +370,18 @@ pub fn consume_initiation<'a>(
// return state (to create response)
- Ok((peer, (msg.f_sender.get(), eph_r_pk, hs, ck)))
+ Ok((
+ peer,
+ PublicKey::from(pk),
+ (msg.f_sender.get(), eph_r_pk, hs, ck),
+ ))
})
}
-pub fn create_response<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+pub(super) fn create_response<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, O>(
rng: &mut R,
- peer: &Peer,
+ peer: &Peer<O>,
+ pk: &PublicKey,
local: u32, // sending identifier
state: TemporaryState, // state from "consume_initiation"
msg: &mut NoiseResponse, // resulting response
@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ pub fn create_response<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
msg.f_type.set(TYPE_RESPONSE as u32);
msg.f_sender.set(local); // from us
- msg.f_receiver.set(receiver); // to the sender of the initation
+ msg.f_receiver.set(receiver); // to the sender of the initiation
// (E_priv, E_pub) := DH-Generate()
@@ -413,7 +419,7 @@ pub fn create_response<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
// C := Kdf1(C, DH(E_priv, S_pub))
- let ck = KDF1!(&ck, eph_sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes());
+ let ck = KDF1!(&ck, eph_sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes());
// (C, tau, k) := Kdf3(C, Q)
@@ -460,15 +466,15 @@ pub fn create_response<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
* allow concurrent processing of potential responses to the initiation,
* in order to better mitigate DoS from malformed response messages.
*/
-pub fn consume_response(
- device: &Device,
+pub(super) fn consume_response<'a, O>(
+ device: &'a Device<O>,
keyst: &KeyState,
msg: &NoiseResponse,
-) -> Result<Output, HandshakeError> {
+) -> Result<Output<'a, O>, HandshakeError> {
debug!("consume response");
clear_stack_on_return(CLEAR_PAGES, || {
// retrieve peer and copy initiation state
- let peer = device.lookup_id(msg.f_receiver.get())?;
+ let (peer, _) = device.lookup_id(msg.f_receiver.get())?;
let (hs, ck, local, eph_sk) = match *peer.state.lock() {
State::InitiationSent {
@@ -537,7 +543,7 @@ pub fn consume_response(
// return confirmed key-pair
Ok((
- Some(peer.pk),
+ Some(&peer.opaque),
None,
Some(KeyPair {
birth,
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/peer.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/peer.rs
index a4df560..f4d15fc 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/peer.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/peer.rs
@@ -22,19 +22,21 @@ const TIME_BETWEEN_INITIATIONS: Duration = Duration::from_millis(20);
*
* This type is only for internal use and not exposed.
*/
-pub struct Peer {
+pub(super) struct Peer<O> {
+ // opaque type which identifies a peer
+ pub opaque: O,
+
// mutable state
- pub(crate) state: Mutex<State>,
- pub(crate) timestamp: Mutex<Option<timestamp::TAI64N>>,
- pub(crate) last_initiation_consumption: Mutex<Option<Instant>>,
+ pub state: Mutex<State>,
+ pub timestamp: Mutex<Option<timestamp::TAI64N>>,
+ pub last_initiation_consumption: Mutex<Option<Instant>>,
// state related to DoS mitigation fields
- pub(crate) macs: Mutex<macs::Generator>,
+ pub macs: Mutex<macs::Generator>,
// constant state
- pub(crate) pk: PublicKey, // public key of peer
- pub(crate) ss: [u8; 32], // precomputed DH(static, static)
- pub(crate) psk: Psk, // psk of peer
+ pub ss: [u8; 32], // precomputed DH(static, static)
+ pub psk: Psk, // psk of peer
}
pub enum State {
@@ -60,14 +62,14 @@ impl Drop for State {
}
}
-impl Peer {
- pub fn new(pk: PublicKey, ss: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+impl<O> Peer<O> {
+ pub fn new(pk: PublicKey, ss: [u8; 32], opaque: O) -> Self {
Self {
+ opaque,
macs: Mutex::new(macs::Generator::new(pk)),
state: Mutex::new(State::Reset),
timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
last_initiation_consumption: Mutex::new(None),
- pk,
ss,
psk: [0u8; 32],
}
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ impl Peer {
/// * ts_new - The associated timestamp
pub fn check_replay_flood(
&self,
- device: &Device,
+ device: &Device<O>,
timestamp_new: &timestamp::TAI64N,
) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
let mut state = self.state.lock();
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/tests.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/tests.rs
index ff27b3e..bfdc5ab 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/tests.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/tests.rs
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;
use super::messages::{Initiation, Response};
-fn setup_devices<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> (PublicKey, Device, PublicKey, Device) {
- // generate new keypairs
+fn setup_devices<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, O: Default>(
+ rng: &mut R,
+) -> (PublicKey, Device<O>, PublicKey, Device<O>) {
+ // generate new key pairs
let sk1 = StaticSecret::new(rng);
let pk1 = PublicKey::from(&sk1);
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ fn setup_devices<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> (PublicKey, Device, Pub
let mut psk = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut psk[..]);
- // intialize devices on both ends
+ // initialize devices on both ends
let mut dev1 = Device::new();
let mut dev2 = Device::new();
@@ -34,8 +36,8 @@ fn setup_devices<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> (PublicKey, Device, Pub
dev1.set_sk(Some(sk1));
dev2.set_sk(Some(sk2));
- dev1.add(pk2).unwrap();
- dev2.add(pk1).unwrap();
+ dev1.add(pk2, O::default()).unwrap();
+ dev2.add(pk1, O::default()).unwrap();
dev1.set_psk(pk2, psk).unwrap();
dev2.set_psk(pk1, psk).unwrap();
@@ -49,45 +51,44 @@ fn wait() {
/* Test longest possible handshake interaction (7 messages):
*
- * 1. I -> R (initation)
+ * 1. I -> R (initiation)
* 2. I <- R (cookie reply)
- * 3. I -> R (initation)
+ * 3. I -> R (initiation)
* 4. I <- R (response)
* 5. I -> R (cookie reply)
- * 6. I -> R (initation)
+ * 6. I -> R (initiation)
* 7. I <- R (response)
*/
#[test]
fn handshake_under_load() {
- let mut rng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
- let (_pk1, dev1, pk2, dev2) = setup_devices(&mut rng);
+ let (_pk1, dev1, pk2, dev2): (_, Device<usize>, _, _) = setup_devices(&mut OsRng);
let src1: SocketAddr = "172.16.0.1:8080".parse().unwrap();
let src2: SocketAddr = "172.16.0.2:7070".parse().unwrap();
- // 1. device-1 : create first initation
- let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();
+ // 1. device-1 : create first initiation
+ let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut OsRng, &pk2).unwrap();
// 2. device-2 : responds with CookieReply
- let msg_cookie = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
+ let msg_cookie = match dev2.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
(None, Some(msg), None) => msg,
_ => panic!("unexpected response"),
};
// device-1 : processes CookieReply (no response)
- match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_cookie, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
+ match dev1.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_cookie, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
(None, None, None) => (),
_ => panic!("unexpected response"),
}
- // avoid initation flood detection
+ // avoid initiation flood detection
wait();
- // 3. device-1 : create second initation
- let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();
+ // 3. device-1 : create second initiation
+ let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut OsRng, &pk2).unwrap();
// 4. device-2 : responds with noise response
- let msg_response = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
+ let msg_response = match dev2.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
(Some(_), Some(msg), Some(kp)) => {
assert_eq!(kp.initiator, false);
msg
@@ -96,25 +97,25 @@ fn handshake_under_load() {
};
// 5. device-1 : responds with CookieReply
- let msg_cookie = match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_response, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
+ let msg_cookie = match dev1.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_response, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
(None, Some(msg), None) => msg,
_ => panic!("unexpected response"),
};
// device-2 : processes CookieReply (no response)
- match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_cookie, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
+ match dev2.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_cookie, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
(None, None, None) => (),
_ => panic!("unexpected response"),
}
- // avoid initation flood detection
+ // avoid initiation flood detection
wait();
- // 6. device-1 : create third initation
- let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();
+ // 6. device-1 : create third initiation
+ let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut OsRng, &pk2).unwrap();
// 7. device-2 : responds with noise response
- let (msg_response, kp1) = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
+ let (msg_response, kp1) = match dev2.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_init, Some(src1)).unwrap() {
(Some(_), Some(msg), Some(kp)) => {
assert_eq!(kp.initiator, false);
(msg, kp)
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ fn handshake_under_load() {
};
// device-1 : process noise response
- let kp2 = match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_response, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
+ let kp2 = match dev1.process(&mut OsRng, &msg_response, Some(src2)).unwrap() {
(Some(_), None, Some(kp)) => {
assert_eq!(kp.initiator, true);
kp
@@ -137,8 +138,7 @@ fn handshake_under_load() {
#[test]
fn handshake_no_load() {
- let mut rng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
- let (pk1, mut dev1, pk2, mut dev2) = setup_devices(&mut rng);
+ let (pk1, mut dev1, pk2, mut dev2): (_, Device<usize>, _, _) = setup_devices(&mut OsRng);
// do a few handshakes (every handshake should succeed)
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ fn handshake_no_load() {
// create initiation
- let msg1 = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();
+ let msg1 = dev1.begin(&mut OsRng, &pk2).unwrap();
println!("msg1 = {} : {} bytes", hex::encode(&msg1[..]), msg1.len());
println!(
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ fn handshake_no_load() {
// process initiation and create response
let (_, msg2, ks_r) = dev2
- .process(&mut rng, &msg1, None)
+ .process(&mut OsRng, &msg1, None)
.expect("failed to process initiation");
let ks_r = ks_r.unwrap();
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ fn handshake_no_load() {
// process response and obtain confirmed key-pair
let (_, msg3, ks_i) = dev1
- .process(&mut rng, &msg2, None)
+ .process(&mut OsRng, &msg2, None)
.expect("failed to process response");
let ks_i = ks_i.unwrap();
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ fn handshake_no_load() {
dev1.release(ks_i.local_id());
dev2.release(ks_r.local_id());
- // avoid initation flood detection
+ // avoid initiation flood detection
wait();
}
diff --git a/src/wireguard/handshake/types.rs b/src/wireguard/handshake/types.rs
index 5f984cc..ed2fcbb 100644
--- a/src/wireguard/handshake/types.rs
+++ b/src/wireguard/handshake/types.rs
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
+use super::super::types::KeyPair;
+
use std::error::Error;
use std::fmt;
-use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
-
-use super::super::types::KeyPair;
-
/* Internal types for the noise IKpsk2 implementation */
// config error
@@ -79,10 +77,10 @@ impl Error for HandshakeError {
}
}
-pub type Output = (
- Option<PublicKey>, // external identifier associated with peer
- Option<Vec<u8>>, // message to send
- Option<KeyPair>, // resulting key-pair of successful handshake
+pub type Output<'a, O> = (
+ Option<&'a O>, // external identifier associated with peer
+ Option<Vec<u8>>, // message to send
+ Option<KeyPair>, // resulting key-pair of successful handshake
);
// preshared key