path: root/src/wireguard/handshake/device.rs

use spin::RwLock;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use zerocopy::AsBytes;

use byteorder::{ByteOrder, LittleEndian};

use rand::prelude::*;

use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret;

use super::macs;
use super::messages::{CookieReply, Initiation, Response};
use super::messages::{TYPE_COOKIE_REPLY, TYPE_INITIATION, TYPE_RESPONSE};
use super::noise;
use super::peer::Peer;
use super::ratelimiter::RateLimiter;
use super::types::*;

const MAX_PEER_PER_DEVICE: usize = 1 << 20;

pub struct KeyState {
    pub sk: StaticSecret,  // static secret key
    pub pk: PublicKey,     // static public key
    macs: macs::Validator, // validator for the mac fields
}

pub struct Device {
    keyst: Option<KeyState>,                // secret/public key
    pk_map: HashMap<[u8; 32], Peer>,        // public key  -> peer state
    id_map: RwLock<HashMap<u32, [u8; 32]>>, // receiver ids -> public key
    limiter: Mutex<RateLimiter>,
}

/* A mutable reference to the device needs to be held during configuration.
 * Wrapping the device in a RwLock enables peer config after "configuration time"
 */
impl Device {
    /// Initialize a new handshake state machine
    pub fn new() -> Device {
        Device {
            keyst: None,
            pk_map: HashMap::new(),
            id_map: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
            limiter: Mutex::new(RateLimiter::new()),
        }
    }

    fn update_ss(&self, peer: &mut Peer) -> Option<PublicKey> {
        if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
            if *peer.pk.as_bytes() == *key.pk.as_bytes() {
                return Some(peer.pk);
            }
            peer.ss = *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes();
        } else {
            peer.ss = [0u8; 32];
        };
        None
    }

    /// Update the secret key of the device
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `sk` - x25519 scalar representing the local private key
    pub fn set_sk(&mut self, sk: Option<StaticSecret>) -> Option<PublicKey> {
        // update secret and public key
        self.keyst = sk.map(|sk| {
            let pk = PublicKey::from(&sk);
            let macs = macs::Validator::new(pk);
            KeyState { pk, sk, macs }
        });

        // recalculate / erase the shared secrets for every peer
        let mut ids = vec![];
        let mut same = None;
        for mut peer in self.pk_map.values_mut() {
            // clear any existing handshake state
            peer.reset_state().map(|id| ids.push(id));

            // update precomputed shared secret
            if let Some(key) = self.keyst.as_ref() {
                peer.ss = *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&peer.pk).as_bytes();
                if *peer.pk.as_bytes() == *key.pk.as_bytes() {
                    same = Some(peer.pk)
                }
            } else {
                peer.ss = [0u8; 32];
            };
        }

        // release ids from aborted handshakes
        for id in ids {
            self.release(id)
        }

        // if we found a peer matching the device public key, remove it.
        same.map(|pk| {
            self.pk_map.remove(pk.as_bytes());
            pk
        })
    }

    /// Return the secret key of the device
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// A secret key (x25519 scalar)
    pub fn get_sk(&self) -> Option<&StaticSecret> {
        self.keyst.as_ref().map(|key| &key.sk)
    }

    /// Add a new public key to the state machine
    /// To remove public keys, you must create a new machine instance
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `pk` - The public key to add
    /// * `identifier` - Associated identifier which can be used to distinguish the peers
    pub fn add(&mut self, pk: PublicKey) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
        // ensure less than 2^20 peers
        if self.pk_map.len() > MAX_PEER_PER_DEVICE {
            return Err(ConfigError::new("Too many peers for device"));
        }

        // create peer and precompute static secret
        let mut peer = Peer::new(
            pk,
            self.keyst
                .as_ref()
                .map(|key| *key.sk.diffie_hellman(&pk).as_bytes())
                .unwrap_or([0u8; 32]),
        );

        // add peer to device
        match self.update_ss(&mut peer) {
            Some(_) => Err(ConfigError::new("Public key of peer matches the device")),
            None => {
                self.pk_map.insert(*pk.as_bytes(), peer);
                Ok(())
            }
        }
    }

    /// Remove a peer by public key
    /// To remove public keys, you must create a new machine instance
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `pk` - The public key of the peer to remove
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// The call might fail if the public key is not found
    pub fn remove(&mut self, pk: PublicKey) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
        // take write-lock on receive id table
        let mut id_map = self.id_map.write();

        // remove the peer
        self.pk_map
            .remove(pk.as_bytes())
            .ok_or(ConfigError::new("Public key not in device"))?;

        // pruge the id map (linear scan)
        id_map.retain(|_, v| v != pk.as_bytes());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Add a psk to the peer
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `pk` - The public key of the peer
    /// * `psk` - The psk to set / unset
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// The call might fail if the public key is not found
    pub fn set_psk(&mut self, pk: PublicKey, psk: Option<Psk>) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
        match self.pk_map.get_mut(pk.as_bytes()) {
            Some(mut peer) => {
                peer.psk = match psk {
                    Some(v) => v,
                    None => [0u8; 32],
                };
                Ok(())
            }
            _ => Err(ConfigError::new("No such public key")),
        }
    }

    /// Return the psk for the peer
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `pk` - The public key of the peer
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// A 32 byte array holding the PSK
    ///
    /// The call might fail if the public key is not found
    pub fn get_psk(&self, pk: PublicKey) -> Result<Psk, ConfigError> {
        match self.pk_map.get(pk.as_bytes()) {
            Some(peer) => Ok(peer.psk),
            _ => Err(ConfigError::new("No such public key")),
        }
    }

    /// Release an id back to the pool
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `id` - The (sender) id to release
    pub fn release(&self, id: u32) {
        let mut m = self.id_map.write();
        debug_assert!(m.contains_key(&id), "Releasing id not allocated");
        m.remove(&id);
    }

    /// Begin a new handshake
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `pk` - Public key of peer to initiate handshake for
    pub fn begin<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
        &self,
        rng: &mut R,
        pk: &PublicKey,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HandshakeError> {
        match (self.keyst.as_ref(), self.pk_map.get(pk.as_bytes())) {
            (_, None) => Err(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey),
            (None, _) => Err(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey),
            (Some(keyst), Some(peer)) => {
                let sender = self.allocate(rng, peer);
                let mut msg = Initiation::default();

                // create noise part of initation
                noise::create_initiation(rng, keyst, peer, sender, &mut msg.noise)?;

                // add macs to initation
                peer.macs
                    .lock()
                    .generate(msg.noise.as_bytes(), &mut msg.macs);

                Ok(msg.as_bytes().to_owned())
            }
        }
    }

    /// Process a handshake message.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `msg` - Byte slice containing the message (untrusted input)
    pub fn process<'a, R: RngCore + CryptoRng, S>(
        &self,
        rng: &mut R,        // rng instance to sample randomness from
        msg: &[u8],         // message buffer
        src: Option<&'a S>, // optional source endpoint, set when "under load"
    ) -> Result<Output, HandshakeError>
    where
        &'a S: Into<&'a SocketAddr>,
    {
        // ensure type read in-range
        if msg.len() < 4 {
            return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessageFormat);
        }

        // obtain reference to key state
        // if no key is configured return a noop.
        let keyst = match self.keyst.as_ref() {
            Some(key) => key,
            None => {
                return Ok((None, None, None));
            }
        };

        // de-multiplex the message type field
        match LittleEndian::read_u32(msg) {
            TYPE_INITIATION => {
                // parse message
                let msg = Initiation::parse(msg)?;

                // check mac1 field
                keyst.macs.check_mac1(msg.noise.as_bytes(), &msg.macs)?;

                // address validation & DoS mitigation
                if let Some(src) = src {
                    // obtain ref to socket addr
                    let src = src.into();

                    // check mac2 field
                    if !keyst.macs.check_mac2(msg.noise.as_bytes(), src, &msg.macs) {
                        let mut reply = Default::default();
                        keyst.macs.create_cookie_reply(
                            rng,
                            msg.noise.f_sender.get(),
                            src,
                            &msg.macs,
                            &mut reply,
                        );
                        return Ok((None, Some(reply.as_bytes().to_owned()), None));
                    }

                    // check ratelimiter
                    if !self.limiter.lock().unwrap().allow(&src.ip()) {
                        return Err(HandshakeError::RateLimited);
                    }
                }

                // consume the initiation
                let (peer, st) = noise::consume_initiation(self, keyst, &msg.noise)?;

                // allocate new index for response
                let sender = self.allocate(rng, peer);

                // prepare memory for response, TODO: take slice for zero allocation
                let mut resp = Response::default();

                // create response (release id on error)
                let keys = noise::create_response(rng, peer, sender, st, &mut resp.noise).map_err(
                    |e| {
                        self.release(sender);
                        e
                    },
                )?;

                // add macs to response
                peer.macs
                    .lock()
                    .generate(resp.noise.as_bytes(), &mut resp.macs);

                // return unconfirmed keypair and the response as vector
                Ok((Some(peer.pk), Some(resp.as_bytes().to_owned()), Some(keys)))
            }
            TYPE_RESPONSE => {
                let msg = Response::parse(msg)?;

                // check mac1 field
                keyst.macs.check_mac1(msg.noise.as_bytes(), &msg.macs)?;

                // address validation & DoS mitigation
                if let Some(src) = src {
                    // obtain ref to socket addr
                    let src = src.into();

                    // check mac2 field
                    if !keyst.macs.check_mac2(msg.noise.as_bytes(), src, &msg.macs) {
                        let mut reply = Default::default();
                        keyst.macs.create_cookie_reply(
                            rng,
                            msg.noise.f_sender.get(),
                            src,
                            &msg.macs,
                            &mut reply,
                        );
                        return Ok((None, Some(reply.as_bytes().to_owned()), None));
                    }

                    // check ratelimiter
                    if !self.limiter.lock().unwrap().allow(&src.ip()) {
                        return Err(HandshakeError::RateLimited);
                    }
                }

                // consume inner playload
                noise::consume_response(self, keyst, &msg.noise)
            }
            TYPE_COOKIE_REPLY => {
                let msg = CookieReply::parse(msg)?;

                // lookup peer
                let peer = self.lookup_id(msg.f_receiver.get())?;

                // validate cookie reply
                peer.macs.lock().process(&msg)?;

                // this prompts no new message and
                // DOES NOT cryptographically verify the peer
                Ok((None, None, None))
            }
            _ => Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessageFormat),
        }
    }

    // Internal function
    //
    // Return the peer associated with the public key
    pub(crate) fn lookup_pk(&self, pk: &PublicKey) -> Result<&Peer, HandshakeError> {
        self.pk_map
            .get(pk.as_bytes())
            .ok_or(HandshakeError::UnknownPublicKey)
    }

    // Internal function
    //
    // Return the peer currently associated with the receiver identifier
    pub(crate) fn lookup_id(&self, id: u32) -> Result<&Peer, HandshakeError> {
        let im = self.id_map.read();
        let pk = im.get(&id).ok_or(HandshakeError::UnknownReceiverId)?;
        match self.pk_map.get(pk) {
            Some(peer) => Ok(peer),
            _ => unreachable!(), // if the id-lookup succeeded, the peer should exist
        }
    }

    // Internal function
    //
    // Allocated a new receiver identifier for the peer
    fn allocate<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(&self, rng: &mut R, peer: &Peer) -> u32 {
        loop {
            let id = rng.gen();

            // check membership with read lock
            if self.id_map.read().contains_key(&id) {
                continue;
            }

            // take write lock and add index
            let mut m = self.id_map.write();
            if !m.contains_key(&id) {
                m.insert(id, *peer.pk.as_bytes());
                return id;
            }
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::super::messages::*;
    use super::*;
    use hex;
    use rand::rngs::OsRng;
    use std::net::SocketAddr;
    use std::thread;
    use std::time::Duration;

    fn setup_devices<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
        rng: &mut R,
    ) -> (PublicKey, Device, PublicKey, Device) {
        // generate new keypairs

        let sk1 = StaticSecret::new(rng);
        let pk1 = PublicKey::from(&sk1);

        let sk2 = StaticSecret::new(rng);
        let pk2 = PublicKey::from(&sk2);

        // pick random psk

        let mut psk = [0u8; 32];
        rng.fill_bytes(&mut psk[..]);

        // intialize devices on both ends

        let mut dev1 = Device::new();
        let mut dev2 = Device::new();

        dev1.set_sk(Some(sk1));
        dev2.set_sk(Some(sk2));

        dev1.add(pk2).unwrap();
        dev2.add(pk1).unwrap();

        dev1.set_psk(pk2, Some(psk)).unwrap();
        dev2.set_psk(pk1, Some(psk)).unwrap();

        (pk1, dev1, pk2, dev2)
    }

    /* Test longest possible handshake interaction (7 messages):
     *
     * 1. I -> R (initation)
     * 2. I <- R (cookie reply)
     * 3. I -> R (initation)
     * 4. I <- R (response)
     * 5. I -> R (cookie reply)
     * 6. I -> R (initation)
     * 7. I <- R (response)
     */
    #[test]
    fn handshake_under_load() {
        let mut rng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
        let (_pk1, dev1, pk2, dev2) = setup_devices(&mut rng);

        let src1: SocketAddr = "172.16.0.1:8080".parse().unwrap();
        let src2: SocketAddr = "172.16.0.2:7070".parse().unwrap();

        // 1. device-1 : create first initation
        let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();

        // 2. device-2 : responds with CookieReply
        let msg_cookie = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(&src1)).unwrap() {
            (None, Some(msg), None) => msg,
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        };

        // device-1 : processes CookieReply (no response)
        match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_cookie, Some(&src2)).unwrap() {
            (None, None, None) => (),
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        }

        // avoid initation flood
        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));

        // 3. device-1 : create second initation
        let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();

        // 4. device-2 : responds with noise response
        let msg_response = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(&src1)).unwrap() {
            (Some(_), Some(msg), Some(kp)) => {
                assert_eq!(kp.initiator, false);
                msg
            }
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        };

        // 5. device-1 : responds with CookieReply
        let msg_cookie = match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_response, Some(&src2)).unwrap() {
            (None, Some(msg), None) => msg,
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        };

        // device-2 : processes CookieReply (no response)
        match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_cookie, Some(&src1)).unwrap() {
            (None, None, None) => (),
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        }

        // avoid initation flood
        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));

        // 6. device-1 : create third initation
        let msg_init = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();

        // 7. device-2 : responds with noise response
        let (msg_response, kp1) = match dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg_init, Some(&src1)).unwrap() {
            (Some(_), Some(msg), Some(kp)) => {
                assert_eq!(kp.initiator, false);
                (msg, kp)
            }
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        };

        // device-1 : process noise response
        let kp2 = match dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg_response, Some(&src2)).unwrap() {
            (Some(_), None, Some(kp)) => {
                assert_eq!(kp.initiator, true);
                kp
            }
            _ => panic!("unexpected response"),
        };

        assert_eq!(kp1.send, kp2.recv);
        assert_eq!(kp1.recv, kp2.send);
    }

    #[test]
    fn handshake_no_load() {
        let mut rng = OsRng::new().unwrap();
        let (pk1, mut dev1, pk2, mut dev2) = setup_devices(&mut rng);

        // do a few handshakes (every handshake should succeed)

        for i in 0..10 {
            println!("handshake : {}", i);

            // create initiation

            let msg1 = dev1.begin(&mut rng, &pk2).unwrap();

            println!("msg1 = {} : {} bytes", hex::encode(&msg1[..]), msg1.len());
            println!("msg1 = {:?}", Initiation::parse(&msg1[..]).unwrap());

            // process initiation and create response

            let (_, msg2, ks_r) = dev2.process(&mut rng, &msg1, None).unwrap();

            let ks_r = ks_r.unwrap();
            let msg2 = msg2.unwrap();

            println!("msg2 = {} : {} bytes", hex::encode(&msg2[..]), msg2.len());
            println!("msg2 = {:?}", Response::parse(&msg2[..]).unwrap());

            assert!(!ks_r.initiator, "Responders key-pair is confirmed");

            // process response and obtain confirmed key-pair

            let (_, msg3, ks_i) = dev1.process(&mut rng, &msg2, None).unwrap();
            let ks_i = ks_i.unwrap();

            assert!(msg3.is_none(), "Returned message after response");
            assert!(ks_i.initiator, "Initiators key-pair is not confirmed");

            assert_eq!(ks_i.send, ks_r.recv, "KeyI.send != KeyR.recv");
            assert_eq!(ks_i.recv, ks_r.send, "KeyI.recv != KeyR.send");

            dev1.release(ks_i.send.id);
            dev2.release(ks_r.send.id);

            // to avoid flood detection
            thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
        }

        dev1.remove(pk2).unwrap();
        dev2.remove(pk1).unwrap();
    }
}