wireguard-windows/manager/ipc_server.go, branch v0.3.9

global: bump copyright date

2021-02-01T15:55:02Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: pipeline UAPI requests

2021-02-01T15:55:02Z

This avoids the somewhat expensive pipe setup. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

ringlogger: hook into global panic writer

2020-12-09T15:01:47Z

This is a grotesque hack, and hopefully upstream Go will provide a nicer way of doing this, but already it seems quite adept at catching panics. See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42888 for more info. This requires us to rewrite the ringlogger path to avoid all allocations. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: do not respond to update state requests for non-elevated

2020-11-28T18:13:42Z

Reported-by: Simon Rozman Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

conf: rework migration flows around a single Save()

2020-11-27T11:50:53Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: style

2020-11-23T09:57:35Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

global: update headers

2020-11-22T21:00:32Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: allow multiple tunnels if admin knob allows it

2020-11-22T21:00:32Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: move IPC notification to go routine per client

2020-11-22T21:00:32Z

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld

manager: allow S-1-5-32-556 users to launch a limited UI

2020-11-22T21:00:32Z

I still have serious security reservations about this, both conceptually -- should users be allowed to do this stuff? -- and pratically -- there are issues with this implementation that need some examination. TODO: - Is that registry key a secure path? Should we double check it? - Are we leaking handles to the unpriv'd process from the manager? Audit this too. - IPC notifications are blocking. Should we move this to a go routine to mitigate DoS potential? - Is GOB deserialization secure? Can an NCO user crash or RCE the manager? Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld