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author | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2020-11-13 03:10:00 +0100 |
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committer | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2020-11-22 22:00:32 +0100 |
commit | 1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89 (patch) | |
tree | 56c591b462989278a9bc89fafe927d7347122db5 /updater | |
parent | tunnel: only enable DNS blocking for 0/0 configs (diff) | |
download | wireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.tar.xz wireguard-windows-1c7606cea18e908cf76201ce1534b0afdc04cc89.zip |
manager: allow S-1-5-32-556 users to launch a limited UI
I still have serious security reservations about this, both conceptually
-- should users be allowed to do this stuff? -- and pratically -- there
are issues with this implementation that need some examination.
TODO:
- Is that registry key a secure path? Should we double check it?
- Are we leaking handles to the unpriv'd process from the manager? Audit
this too.
- IPC notifications are blocking. Should we move this to a go routine to
mitigate DoS potential?
- Is GOB deserialization secure? Can an NCO user crash or RCE the
manager?
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'updater')
-rw-r--r-- | updater/msirunner_windows.go | 1 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/updater/msirunner_windows.go b/updater/msirunner_windows.go index 2f5ce5a4..d901274c 100644 --- a/updater/msirunner_windows.go +++ b/updater/msirunner_windows.go @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ func (t *tempFile) ExclusivePath() string { return t.Name() } - func (t *tempFile) Delete() error { if t.originalHandle == 0 { name16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(t.Name()) |