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authorArchie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org>2020-04-07 12:26:27 +0800
committerMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>2020-04-07 18:32:21 +0200
commitc2aa30db744d9cbdde127d4ed8aeea18273834c6 (patch)
treee66d810d8927a0daf1515e6829664a62cfa47182
parentBluetooth: Add HCI device identifier for VIRTIO devices (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-c2aa30db744d9cbdde127d4ed8aeea18273834c6.tar.xz
linux-dev-c2aa30db744d9cbdde127d4ed8aeea18273834c6.zip
Bluetooth: debugfs option to unset MITM flag
The BT qualification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C needs us to turn off the MITM flag when pairing, and at the same time also set the io capability to something other than no input no output. Currently the MITM flag is only unset when the io capability is set to no input no output, therefore the test cannot be executed. This patch introduces a debugfs option to force MITM flag to be turned off. Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka <apusaka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
-rw-r--r--include/net/bluetooth/hci.h1
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c46
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.c15
3 files changed, 57 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
index 79de2a659dd6..f4e8e2a0b7c1 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ enum {
HCI_FORCE_STATIC_ADDR,
HCI_LL_RPA_RESOLUTION,
HCI_CMD_PENDING,
+ HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM,
__HCI_NUM_FLAGS,
};
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c
index 6b1314c738b8..5e8af2658e44 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c
@@ -1075,6 +1075,50 @@ DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(auth_payload_timeout_fops,
auth_payload_timeout_get,
auth_payload_timeout_set, "%llu\n");
+static ssize_t force_no_mitm_read(struct file *file,
+ char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM) ? 'Y' : 'N';
+ buf[1] = '\n';
+ buf[2] = '\0';
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_no_mitm_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+ char buf[32];
+ size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
+ bool enable;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+ if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM))
+ return -EALREADY;
+
+ hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM);
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations force_no_mitm_fops = {
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .read = force_no_mitm_read,
+ .write = force_no_mitm_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
DEFINE_QUIRK_ATTRIBUTE(quirk_strict_duplicate_filter,
HCI_QUIRK_STRICT_DUPLICATE_FILTER);
DEFINE_QUIRK_ATTRIBUTE(quirk_simultaneous_discovery,
@@ -1134,6 +1178,8 @@ void hci_debugfs_create_le(struct hci_dev *hdev)
&max_key_size_fops);
debugfs_create_file("auth_payload_timeout", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
&auth_payload_timeout_fops);
+ debugfs_create_file("force_no_mitm", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
+ &force_no_mitm_fops);
debugfs_create_file("quirk_strict_duplicate_filter", 0644,
hdev->debugfs, hdev,
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index d0b695ee49f6..a85e3e49cd0d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2393,12 +2393,17 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
}
- /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
- * requires it.
+ /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
+ * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
*/
- if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
- hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
- authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
+ /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
+ * requires it.
+ */
+ if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
+ hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+ }
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;