diff options
| author |   Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> | 2020-07-16 19:52:01 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> | 2020-10-13 09:17:35 -0700 |
| commit | 5294bac97e12bdabbb97e9adf44d388612a700b8 (patch) | |
| tree | e43b109a692d9a8a9367555c78b5bdf045834648 /Documentation/admin-guide/LSM | |
| parent | LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-5294bac97e12bdabbb97e9adf44d388612a700b8.tar.xz linux-dev-5294bac97e12bdabbb97e9adf44d388612a700b8.zip | |
LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/LSM')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst | 29 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst index 7bff07ce4fdd..17996c9070e2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ SafeSetID ========= SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a -system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs +system-wide allowlist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as -allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. +allowing a user to set up user namespace UID/GID mappings. Background @@ -98,10 +98,21 @@ Directions for use ================== This LSM hooks the setid syscalls to make sure transitions are allowed if an applicable restriction policy is in place. Policies are configured through -securityfs by writing to the safesetid/add_whitelist_policy and -safesetid/flush_whitelist_policies files at the location where securityfs is -mounted. The format for adding a policy is '<UID>:<UID>', using literal -numbers, such as '123:456'. To flush the policies, any write to the file is -sufficient. Again, configuring a policy for a UID will prevent that UID from -obtaining auxiliary setid privileges, such as allowing a user to set up user -namespace UID mappings. +securityfs by writing to the safesetid/uid_allowlist_policy and +safesetid/gid_allowlist_policy files at the location where securityfs is +mounted. The format for adding a policy is '<UID>:<UID>' or '<GID>:<GID>', +using literal numbers, and ending with a newline character such as '123:456\n'. +Writing an empty string "" will flush the policy. Again, configuring a policy +for a UID/GID will prevent that UID/GID from obtaining auxiliary setid +privileges, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID/GID mappings. + +Note on GID policies and setgroups() +================== +In v5.9 we are adding support for limiting CAP_SETGID privileges as was done +previously for CAP_SETUID. However, for compatibility with common sandboxing +related code conventions in userspace, we currently allow arbitrary +setgroups() calls for processes with CAP_SETGID restrictions. Until we add +support in a future release for restricting setgroups() calls, these GID +policies add no meaningful security. setgroups() restrictions will be enforced +once we have the policy checking code in place, which will rely on GID policy +configuration code added in v5.9. |