Merge tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 SGX updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add support for handling hw errors in SGX pages: poisoning,
   recovering from poison memory and error injection into SGX pages

 - A bunch of changes to the SGX selftests to simplify and allow of SGX
   features testing without the need of a whole SGX software stack

 - Add a sysfs attribute which is supposed to show the amount of SGX
   memory in a NUMA node, similar to what /proc/meminfo is to normal
   memory

 - The usual bunch of fixes and cleanups too

* tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits)
  x86/sgx: Fix NULL pointer dereference on non-SGX systems
  selftests/sgx: Fix corrupted cpuid macro invocation
  x86/sgx: Add an attribute for the amount of SGX memory in a NUMA node
  x86/sgx: Fix minor documentation issues
  selftests/sgx: Add test for multiple TCS entry
  selftests/sgx: Enable multiple thread support
  selftests/sgx: Add page permission and exception test
  selftests/sgx: Rename test properties in preparation for more enclave tests
  selftests/sgx: Provide per-op parameter structs for the test enclave
  selftests/sgx: Add a new kselftest: Unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed
  selftests/sgx: Move setup_test_encl() to each TEST_F()
  selftests/sgx: Encpsulate the test enclave creation
  selftests/sgx: Dump segments and /proc/self/maps only on failure
  selftests/sgx: Create a heap for the test enclave
  selftests/sgx: Make data measurement for an enclave segment optional
  selftests/sgx: Assign source for each segment
  selftests/sgx: Fix a benign linker warning
  x86/sgx: Add check for SGX pages to ghes_do_memory_failure()
  x86/sgx: Add hook to error injection address validation
  x86/sgx: Hook arch_memory_failure() into mainline code
  ...

3 files changed, 32 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-node b/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-node
index 484fc04bcc25..8db67aa472f1 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-node
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-node
@@ -176,3 +176,9 @@ Contact:	Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
 Description:
 		The cache write policy: 0 for write-back, 1 for write-through,
 		other or unknown.
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/node/nodeX/x86/sgx_total_bytes
+Date:		November 2021
+Contact:	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Description:
+		The total amount of SGX physical memory in bytes.
diff --git a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst
index c042176e1707..55e2331a6438 100644
--- a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst
+++ b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/apei/einj.rst
@@ -181,5 +181,24 @@ You should see something like this in dmesg::
   [22715.834759] EDAC sbridge MC3: PROCESSOR 0:306e7 TIME 1422553404 SOCKET 0 APIC 0
   [22716.616173] EDAC MC3: 1 CE memory read error on CPU_SrcID#0_Channel#0_DIMM#0 (channel:0 slot:0 page:0x12345 offset:0x0 grain:32 syndrome:0x0 -  area:DRAM err_code:0001:0090 socket:0 channel_mask:1 rank:0)
 
+Special notes for injection into SGX enclaves:
+
+There may be a separate BIOS setup option to enable SGX injection.
+
+The injection process consists of setting some special memory controller
+trigger that will inject the error on the next write to the target
+address. But the h/w prevents any software outside of an SGX enclave
+from accessing enclave pages (even BIOS SMM mode).
+
+The following sequence can be used:
+  1) Determine physical address of enclave page
+  2) Use "notrigger=1" mode to inject (this will setup
+     the injection address, but will not actually inject)
+  3) Enter the enclave
+  4) Store data to the virtual address matching physical address from step 1
+  5) Execute CLFLUSH for that virtual address
+  6) Spin delay for 250ms
+  7) Read from the virtual address. This will trigger the error
+
 For more information about EINJ, please refer to ACPI specification
 version 4.0, section 17.5 and ACPI 5.0, section 18.6.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
index a608f667fb95..265568a9292c 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Overview
 Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) hardware enables for user space applications
 to set aside private memory regions of code and data:
 
-* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the.
+* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the
   regions.
 * Unprivileged (ring-3) ENCLU functions allow an application to enter and
   execute inside the regions.
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ In addition to the traditional compiler and linker build process, SGX has a
 separate enclave “build” process.  Enclaves must be built before they can be
 executed (entered). The first step in building an enclave is opening the
 **/dev/sgx_enclave** device.  Since enclave memory is protected from direct
-access, special privileged instructions are Then used to copy data into enclave
+access, special privileged instructions are then used to copy data into enclave
 pages and establish enclave page permissions.
 
 .. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -126,13 +126,13 @@ the need to juggle signal handlers.
 ksgxd
 =====
 
-SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxwapd*.
+SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxd*.
 
 EPC sanitization
 ----------------
 
 ksgxd is started when SGX initializes.  Enclave memory is typically ready
-For use when the processor powers on or resets.  However, if SGX has been in
+for use when the processor powers on or resets.  However, if SGX has been in
 use since the reset, enclave pages may be in an inconsistent state.  This might
 occur after a crash and kexec() cycle, for instance.  At boot, ksgxd
 reinitializes all enclave pages so that they can be allocated and re-used.
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Page reclaimer
 
 Similar to the core kswapd, ksgxd, is responsible for managing the
 overcommitment of enclave memory.  If the system runs out of enclave memory,
-*ksgxwapd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory.
+*ksgxd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory.
 
 Launch Control
 ==============
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ SGX provides a launch control mechanism. After all enclave pages have been
 copied, kernel executes EINIT function, which initializes the enclave. Only after
 this the CPU can execute inside the enclave.
 
-ENIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement.  The function
+EINIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement.  The function
 checks that the measurement is correct and signature is signed with the key
 hashed to the four **IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}** MSRs representing the
 SHA256 of a public key.
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of
 MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, which
 means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated.  B, it includes
 additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory
-aliases from being Created.
+aliases from being created.
 
 DMA to enclave memory is blocked by range registers on both MEE and TME systems
 (SDM section 41.10).