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| author |   James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> | 2015-07-22 19:05:54 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> | 2015-07-27 11:08:41 +0100 |
| commit | 338d4f49d6f7114a017d294ccf7374df4f998edc (patch) | |
| tree | af0b5cedc6e042623346d4e82be24eda190626a1 /arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | |
| parent | arm64: Generalise msr_s/mrs_s operations (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-338d4f49d6f7114a017d294ccf7374df4f998edc.tar.xz linux-dev-338d4f49d6f7114a017d294ccf7374df4f998edc.zip | |
arm64: kernel: Add support for Privileged Access Never
'Privileged Access Never' is a new arm8.1 feature which prevents
privileged code from accessing any virtual address where read or write
access is also permitted at EL0.
This patch enables the PAN feature on all CPUs, and modifies {get,put}_user
helpers temporarily to permit access.
This will catch kernel bugs where user memory is accessed directly.
'Unprivileged loads and stores' using ldtrb et al are unaffected by PAN.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[will: use ALTERNATIVE in asm and tidy up pan_enable check]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/mm/fault.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 94d98cd1aad8..ce591211434e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/exception.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h> #include <asm/esr.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> #include <asm/system_misc.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> @@ -224,6 +226,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, } /* + * PAN bit set implies the fault happened in kernel space, but not + * in the arch's user access functions. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) && (regs->pstate & PSR_PAN_BIT)) + goto no_context; + + /* * As per x86, we may deadlock here. However, since the kernel only * validly references user space from well defined areas of the code, * we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't. @@ -536,3 +545,10 @@ asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr, return 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN +void cpu_enable_pan(void) +{ + config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_SPAN, 0); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */ |