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| author |   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2022-06-14 23:16:05 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 10:34:00 +0200 |
| commit | b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce (patch) | |
| tree | 52439ac589efbe3e3c881eba84cddb489e205c37 /arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | |
| parent | x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce.tar.xz linux-dev-b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce.zip | |
x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.
There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 65e3b8b7cbe5..a4ba162e52c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -264,7 +263,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popq %r15 |