diff options
| author |   Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2022-07-08 13:36:09 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-07-09 13:12:45 +0200 |
| commit | 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e (patch) | |
| tree | c0cb01cfa5e763370ef4a8a682dc7a636a8763a0 /arch/x86/include/asm | |
| parent | x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e.tar.xz linux-dev-4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e.zip | |
x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 |
2 files changed, 10 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7e8099fd5ec1..00f5227c8459 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ #define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB (11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */ -/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 7b411d9a6efb..cc615be27a54 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -141,6 +143,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* |