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authorTodd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>2018-11-06 15:55:32 -0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-11-26 20:01:47 +0100
commit7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c (patch)
tree90962d6d3e534ff0a8321118279016bcbb541f8e /drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
parentMerge tag 'fsi-updates-2018-11-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/linux-fsi char-misc-linus (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c.tar.xz
linux-dev-7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c.zip
binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer
Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free detected by KASAN with a malicious test program. This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set to 1 allowing a free to go through. Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/android/binder_alloc.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/android/binder_alloc.c16
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
index 64fd96eada31..030c98f35cca 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c
@@ -151,16 +151,12 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_prepare_to_free_locked(
else {
/*
* Guard against user threads attempting to
- * free the buffer twice
+ * free the buffer when in use by kernel or
+ * after it's already been freed.
*/
- if (buffer->free_in_progress) {
- binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_USER_ERROR,
- "%d:%d FREE_BUFFER u%016llx user freed buffer twice\n",
- alloc->pid, current->pid,
- (u64)user_ptr);
- return NULL;
- }
- buffer->free_in_progress = 1;
+ if (!buffer->allow_user_free)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ buffer->allow_user_free = 0;
return buffer;
}
}
@@ -500,7 +496,7 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked(
rb_erase(best_fit, &alloc->free_buffers);
buffer->free = 0;
- buffer->free_in_progress = 0;
+ buffer->allow_user_free = 0;
binder_insert_allocated_buffer_locked(alloc, buffer);
binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_BUFFER_ALLOC,
"%d: binder_alloc_buf size %zd got %pK\n",