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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2013-09-23 14:41:17 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2013-09-26 14:46:11 -0700
commit667b4102b3e63856ca7770521ee74b1c44629df1 (patch)
treecc69b5da8eafe69083cf6d74bb4fb0983212e744 /drivers/base
parentLinux 3.12-rc2 (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-667b4102b3e63856ca7770521ee74b1c44629df1.tar.xz
linux-dev-667b4102b3e63856ca7770521ee74b1c44629df1.zip
sysfs: Allow mounting without CONFIG_NET
In kobj_ns_current_may_mount the default should be to allow the mount. The test is only for a single kobj_ns_type at a time, and unless there is a reason to prevent it the mounting sysfs should be allowed. Subsystems that are not registered can't have are not involved so can't have a reason to prevent mounting sysfs. This is a bug-fix to: commit 7dc5dbc879bd0779924b5132a48b731a0bc04a1e Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Date: Mon Mar 25 20:07:01 2013 -0700 sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs Don't allow mounting sysfs unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights over the net namespace. The principle here is if you create or have capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live with what other people have mounted. Instead of testing this with a straight forward ns_capable call, perform this check the long and torturous way with kobject helpers, this keeps direct knowledge of namespaces out of sysfs, and preserves the existing sysfs abstractions. Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> That came in via the userns tree during the 3.12 merge window. Reported-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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