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authorLu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>2018-10-23 15:45:01 +0800
committerMika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>2018-12-05 12:01:55 +0300
commit89a6079df791aeace2044ea93be1b397195824ec (patch)
tree4a6b9484088da92e47195dd106503ab75abde5ed /drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
parentPCI / ACPI: Identify untrusted PCI devices (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-89a6079df791aeace2044ea93be1b397195824ec.tar.xz
linux-dev-89a6079df791aeace2044ea93be1b397195824ec.zip
iommu/vt-d: Force IOMMU on for platform opt in hint
Intel VT-d spec added a new DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG flag in DMAR ACPI table [1] for BIOS to report compliance about platform initiated DMA restricted to RMRR ranges when transferring control to the OS. This means that during OS boot, before it enables IOMMU none of the connected devices can bypass DMA protection for instance by overwriting the data structures used by the IOMMU. The OS also treats this as a hint that the IOMMU should be enabled to prevent DMA attacks from possible malicious devices. A use of this flag is Kernel DMA protection for Thunderbolt [2] which in practice means that IOMMU should be enabled for PCIe devices connected to the Thunderbolt ports. With IOMMU enabled for these devices, all DMA operations are limited in the range reserved for it, thus the DMA attacks are prevented. All these devices are enumerated in the PCI/PCIe module and marked with an untrusted flag. This forces IOMMU to be enabled if DMA_CTRL_PLATFORM_OPT_IN_FLAG is set in DMAR ACPI table and there are PCIe devices marked as untrusted in the system. This can be turned off by adding "intel_iommu=off" in the kernel command line, if any problems are found. [1] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/c5/15/vt-directed-io-spec.pdf [2] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c53
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index 41a4b8808802..30e8584137f5 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static int rwbf_quirk;
*/
static int force_on = 0;
int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce;
+static int no_platform_optin;
#define ROOT_ENTRY_NR (VTD_PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct root_entry))
@@ -503,6 +504,7 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str)
pr_info("IOMMU enabled\n");
} else if (!strncmp(str, "off", 3)) {
dmar_disabled = 1;
+ no_platform_optin = 1;
pr_info("IOMMU disabled\n");
} else if (!strncmp(str, "igfx_off", 8)) {
dmar_map_gfx = 0;
@@ -2895,6 +2897,13 @@ static int iommu_should_identity_map(struct device *dev, int startup)
if (device_is_rmrr_locked(dev))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * Prevent any device marked as untrusted from getting
+ * placed into the statically identity mapping domain.
+ */
+ if (pdev->untrusted)
+ return 0;
+
if ((iommu_identity_mapping & IDENTMAP_AZALIA) && IS_AZALIA(pdev))
return 1;
@@ -4728,14 +4737,54 @@ const struct attribute_group *intel_iommu_groups[] = {
NULL,
};
+static int __init platform_optin_force_iommu(void)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL;
+ bool has_untrusted_dev = false;
+
+ if (!dmar_platform_optin() || no_platform_optin)
+ return 0;
+
+ for_each_pci_dev(pdev) {
+ if (pdev->untrusted) {
+ has_untrusted_dev = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!has_untrusted_dev)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (no_iommu || dmar_disabled)
+ pr_info("Intel-IOMMU force enabled due to platform opt in\n");
+
+ /*
+ * If Intel-IOMMU is disabled by default, we will apply identity
+ * map for all devices except those marked as being untrusted.
+ */
+ if (dmar_disabled)
+ iommu_identity_mapping |= IDENTMAP_ALL;
+
+ dmar_disabled = 0;
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_SWIOTLB)
+ swiotlb = 0;
+#endif
+ no_iommu = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int __init intel_iommu_init(void)
{
int ret = -ENODEV;
struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd;
struct intel_iommu *iommu;
- /* VT-d is required for a TXT/tboot launch, so enforce that */
- force_on = tboot_force_iommu();
+ /*
+ * Intel IOMMU is required for a TXT/tboot launch or platform
+ * opt in, so enforce that.
+ */
+ force_on = tboot_force_iommu() || platform_optin_force_iommu();
if (iommu_init_mempool()) {
if (force_on)