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author | 2019-07-13 15:24:31 -0700 | |
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committer | 2019-07-13 15:24:31 -0700 | |
commit | 2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac (patch) | |
tree | 58549ab8b811b0ae728506866c7f404ac1ea27ba /drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | |
parent | Merge tag 'for-linus-5.3' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi (diff) | |
parent | dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device (diff) | |
download | linux-dev-2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac.tar.xz linux-dev-2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac.zip |
Merge tag 'for-5.3/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm
Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer:
- Add encrypted byte-offset initialization vector (eboiv) to DM crypt.
- Add optional discard features to DM snapshot which allow freeing
space from a DM device whose free space was exhausted.
- Various small improvements to use struct_size() and kzalloc().
- Fix to check if DM thin metadata is in fail_io mode before attempting
to update the superblock to set the needs_check flag. Otherwise the
DM thin-pool can hang.
- Fix DM bufio shrinker's potential for ABBA recursion deadlock with DM
thin provisioning on loop usecase.
* tag 'for-5.3/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device
dm snapshot: add optional discard support features
dm crypt: implement eboiv - encrypted byte-offset initialization vector
dm crypt: remove obsolete comment about plumb IV
dm crypt: wipe private IV struct after key invalid flag is set
dm integrity: use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() + memset()
dm: update stale comment in end_clone_bio()
dm log writes: fix incorrect comment about the logged sequence example
dm log writes: use struct_size() to calculate size of pending_block
dm crypt: use struct_size() when allocating encryption context
dm integrity: always set version on superblock update
dm thin metadata: check if in fail_io mode when setting needs_check
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-crypt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 101 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c index 1b16d34bb785..d5216bcc4649 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c @@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ struct iv_tcw_private { u8 *whitening; }; +struct iv_eboiv_private { + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; +}; + /* * Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device * and encrypts / decrypts at the same time. @@ -159,6 +163,7 @@ struct crypt_config { struct iv_benbi_private benbi; struct iv_lmk_private lmk; struct iv_tcw_private tcw; + struct iv_eboiv_private eboiv; } iv_gen_private; u64 iv_offset; unsigned int iv_size; @@ -291,8 +296,9 @@ static struct crypto_aead *any_tfm_aead(struct crypt_config *cc) * Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks * and should be used for old compatible containers access only. * - * plumb: unimplemented, see: - * http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/454 + * eboiv: Encrypted byte-offset IV (used in Bitlocker in CBC mode) + * The IV is encrypted little-endian byte-offset (with the same key + * and cipher as the volume). */ static int crypt_iv_plain_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, @@ -841,6 +847,67 @@ static int crypt_iv_random_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, return 0; } +static void crypt_iv_eboiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv; + + crypto_free_cipher(eboiv->tfm); + eboiv->tfm = NULL; +} + +static int crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, + const char *opts) +{ + struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for EBOIV"; + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + } + + if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm) != cc->iv_size) { + ti->error = "Block size of EBOIV cipher does " + "not match IV size of block cipher"; + crypto_free_cipher(tfm); + return -EINVAL; + } + + eboiv->tfm = tfm; + return 0; +} + +static int crypt_iv_eboiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv; + int err; + + err = crypto_cipher_setkey(eboiv->tfm, cc->key, cc->key_size); + if (err) + return err; + + return 0; +} + +static int crypt_iv_eboiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc) +{ + /* Called after cc->key is set to random key in crypt_wipe() */ + return crypt_iv_eboiv_init(cc); +} + +static int crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, + struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) +{ + struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv; + + memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); + *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size); + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(eboiv->tfm, iv, iv); + + return 0; +} + static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = { .generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen }; @@ -893,6 +960,14 @@ static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_random_ops = { .generator = crypt_iv_random_gen }; +static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_eboiv_ops = { + .ctr = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr, + .dtr = crypt_iv_eboiv_dtr, + .init = crypt_iv_eboiv_init, + .wipe = crypt_iv_eboiv_wipe, + .generator = crypt_iv_eboiv_gen +}; + /* * Integrity extensions */ @@ -2158,6 +2233,14 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc) clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags); get_random_bytes(&cc->key, cc->key_size); + + /* Wipe IV private keys */ + if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) { + r = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc); + if (r) + return r; + } + kzfree(cc->key_string); cc->key_string = NULL; r = crypt_setkey(cc); @@ -2288,6 +2371,8 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode) cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_benbi_ops; else if (strcmp(ivmode, "null") == 0) cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops; + else if (strcmp(ivmode, "eboiv") == 0) + cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_eboiv_ops; else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) { cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops; /* @@ -2699,7 +2784,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) return -EINVAL; } - cc = kzalloc(sizeof(*cc) + key_size * sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL); + cc = kzalloc(struct_size(cc, key, key_size), GFP_KERNEL); if (!cc) { ti->error = "Cannot allocate encryption context"; return -ENOMEM; @@ -3050,14 +3135,8 @@ static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv, memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8)); return ret; } - if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe")) { - if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) { - ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc); - if (ret) - return ret; - } + if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe")) return crypt_wipe_key(cc); - } } error: @@ -3094,7 +3173,7 @@ static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits) static struct target_type crypt_target = { .name = "crypt", - .version = {1, 18, 1}, + .version = {1, 19, 0}, .module = THIS_MODULE, .ctr = crypt_ctr, .dtr = crypt_dtr, |