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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-07-13 15:24:31 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-07-13 15:24:31 -0700
commit2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac (patch)
tree58549ab8b811b0ae728506866c7f404ac1ea27ba /drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
parentMerge tag 'for-linus-5.3' of git://github.com/cminyard/linux-ipmi (diff)
parentdm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac.tar.xz
linux-dev-2260840592fbed5be98ca03c97eb8172941f27ac.zip
Merge tag 'for-5.3/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm
Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer: - Add encrypted byte-offset initialization vector (eboiv) to DM crypt. - Add optional discard features to DM snapshot which allow freeing space from a DM device whose free space was exhausted. - Various small improvements to use struct_size() and kzalloc(). - Fix to check if DM thin metadata is in fail_io mode before attempting to update the superblock to set the needs_check flag. Otherwise the DM thin-pool can hang. - Fix DM bufio shrinker's potential for ABBA recursion deadlock with DM thin provisioning on loop usecase. * tag 'for-5.3/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: dm bufio: fix deadlock with loop device dm snapshot: add optional discard support features dm crypt: implement eboiv - encrypted byte-offset initialization vector dm crypt: remove obsolete comment about plumb IV dm crypt: wipe private IV struct after key invalid flag is set dm integrity: use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() + memset() dm: update stale comment in end_clone_bio() dm log writes: fix incorrect comment about the logged sequence example dm log writes: use struct_size() to calculate size of pending_block dm crypt: use struct_size() when allocating encryption context dm integrity: always set version on superblock update dm thin metadata: check if in fail_io mode when setting needs_check
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/dm-crypt.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/md/dm-crypt.c101
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 1b16d34bb785..d5216bcc4649 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ struct iv_tcw_private {
u8 *whitening;
};
+struct iv_eboiv_private {
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+};
+
/*
* Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device
* and encrypts / decrypts at the same time.
@@ -159,6 +163,7 @@ struct crypt_config {
struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
+ struct iv_eboiv_private eboiv;
} iv_gen_private;
u64 iv_offset;
unsigned int iv_size;
@@ -291,8 +296,9 @@ static struct crypto_aead *any_tfm_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
* Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks
* and should be used for old compatible containers access only.
*
- * plumb: unimplemented, see:
- * http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/454
+ * eboiv: Encrypted byte-offset IV (used in Bitlocker in CBC mode)
+ * The IV is encrypted little-endian byte-offset (with the same key
+ * and cipher as the volume).
*/
static int crypt_iv_plain_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
@@ -841,6 +847,67 @@ static int crypt_iv_random_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
return 0;
}
+static void crypt_iv_eboiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+ struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv;
+
+ crypto_free_cipher(eboiv->tfm);
+ eboiv->tfm = NULL;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
+ const char *opts)
+{
+ struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv;
+ struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for EBOIV";
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
+ ti->error = "Block size of EBOIV cipher does "
+ "not match IV size of block cipher";
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ eboiv->tfm = tfm;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_eboiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+ struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv;
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(eboiv->tfm, cc->key, cc->key_size);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_eboiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
+{
+ /* Called after cc->key is set to random key in crypt_wipe() */
+ return crypt_iv_eboiv_init(cc);
+}
+
+static int crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
+ struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
+{
+ struct iv_eboiv_private *eboiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.eboiv;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
+ *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size);
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(eboiv->tfm, iv, iv);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = {
.generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen
};
@@ -893,6 +960,14 @@ static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_random_ops = {
.generator = crypt_iv_random_gen
};
+static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_eboiv_ops = {
+ .ctr = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr,
+ .dtr = crypt_iv_eboiv_dtr,
+ .init = crypt_iv_eboiv_init,
+ .wipe = crypt_iv_eboiv_wipe,
+ .generator = crypt_iv_eboiv_gen
+};
+
/*
* Integrity extensions
*/
@@ -2158,6 +2233,14 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
get_random_bytes(&cc->key, cc->key_size);
+
+ /* Wipe IV private keys */
+ if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) {
+ r = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ }
+
kzfree(cc->key_string);
cc->key_string = NULL;
r = crypt_setkey(cc);
@@ -2288,6 +2371,8 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_benbi_ops;
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "null") == 0)
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops;
+ else if (strcmp(ivmode, "eboiv") == 0)
+ cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_eboiv_ops;
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) {
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops;
/*
@@ -2699,7 +2784,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
return -EINVAL;
}
- cc = kzalloc(sizeof(*cc) + key_size * sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL);
+ cc = kzalloc(struct_size(cc, key, key_size), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cc) {
ti->error = "Cannot allocate encryption context";
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -3050,14 +3135,8 @@ static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv,
memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
return ret;
}
- if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe")) {
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) {
- ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- }
+ if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe"))
return crypt_wipe_key(cc);
- }
}
error:
@@ -3094,7 +3173,7 @@ static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
static struct target_type crypt_target = {
.name = "crypt",
- .version = {1, 18, 1},
+ .version = {1, 19, 0},
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.ctr = crypt_ctr,
.dtr = crypt_dtr,