diff options
author | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-07-30 10:46:03 +0200 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-07-30 10:46:38 +0200 |
commit | c7346797f5fb7be8e139fbeb1324669e7cb2ef9a (patch) | |
tree | d6577fbbb1d6f4547509ae933170a5a8f29edbf0 /drivers/staging/rtl8188eu | |
parent | Merge 4.18-rc7 into staging-next (diff) | |
download | linux-dev-c7346797f5fb7be8e139fbeb1324669e7cb2ef9a.tar.xz linux-dev-c7346797f5fb7be8e139fbeb1324669e7cb2ef9a.zip |
Revert "staging:r8188eu: Use lib80211 to encrypt (TKIP) tx frames"
This reverts commit 0d4876f4e977798238db594321db9184704fcf5d as it
breaks the build once 4.18-rc7 was merged into the staging-next tree.
Cc: Ivan Safonov <insafonov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/staging/rtl8188eu')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c | 425 |
1 files changed, 345 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c index add033114863..da5f308f9e30 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_security.c @@ -12,6 +12,121 @@ #include <osdep_intf.h> #include <net/lib80211.h> +/* WEP related ===== */ + +#define CRC32_POLY 0x04c11db7 + +struct arc4context { + u32 x; + u32 y; + u8 state[256]; +}; + +static void arcfour_init(struct arc4context *parc4ctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) +{ + u32 t, u; + u32 keyindex; + u32 stateindex; + u8 *state; + u32 counter; + + state = parc4ctx->state; + parc4ctx->x = 0; + parc4ctx->y = 0; + for (counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++) + state[counter] = (u8)counter; + keyindex = 0; + stateindex = 0; + for (counter = 0; counter < 256; counter++) { + t = state[counter]; + stateindex = (stateindex + key[keyindex] + t) & 0xff; + u = state[stateindex]; + state[stateindex] = (u8)t; + state[counter] = (u8)u; + if (++keyindex >= key_len) + keyindex = 0; + } +} + +static u32 arcfour_byte(struct arc4context *parc4ctx) +{ + u32 x; + u32 y; + u32 sx, sy; + u8 *state; + + state = parc4ctx->state; + x = (parc4ctx->x + 1) & 0xff; + sx = state[x]; + y = (sx + parc4ctx->y) & 0xff; + sy = state[y]; + parc4ctx->x = x; + parc4ctx->y = y; + state[y] = (u8)sx; + state[x] = (u8)sy; + return state[(sx + sy) & 0xff]; +} + +static void arcfour_encrypt(struct arc4context *parc4ctx, u8 *dest, u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + u32 i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + dest[i] = src[i] ^ (unsigned char)arcfour_byte(parc4ctx); +} + +static int bcrc32initialized; +static u32 crc32_table[256]; + +static u8 crc32_reverseBit(u8 data) +{ + return (u8)((data<<7)&0x80) | ((data<<5)&0x40) | ((data<<3)&0x20) | + ((data<<1)&0x10) | ((data>>1)&0x08) | ((data>>3)&0x04) | + ((data>>5)&0x02) | ((data>>7)&0x01); +} + +static void crc32_init(void) +{ + if (bcrc32initialized == 1) { + return; + } else { + int i, j; + u32 c; + u8 *p = (u8 *)&c, *p1; + u8 k; + + c = 0x12340000; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { + k = crc32_reverseBit((u8)i); + for (c = ((u32)k) << 24, j = 8; j > 0; --j) + c = c & 0x80000000 ? (c << 1) ^ CRC32_POLY : (c << 1); + p1 = (u8 *)&crc32_table[i]; + + p1[0] = crc32_reverseBit(p[3]); + p1[1] = crc32_reverseBit(p[2]); + p1[2] = crc32_reverseBit(p[1]); + p1[3] = crc32_reverseBit(p[0]); + } + bcrc32initialized = 1; + } +} + +static __le32 getcrc32(u8 *buf, int len) +{ + u8 *p; + u32 crc; + + if (bcrc32initialized == 0) + crc32_init(); + + crc = 0xffffffff; /* preload shift register, per CRC-32 spec */ + + for (p = buf; len > 0; ++p, --len) + crc = crc32_table[(crc ^ *p) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8); + return cpu_to_le32(~crc); /* transmit complement, per CRC-32 spec */ +} + /* Need to consider the fragment situation */ @@ -280,24 +395,202 @@ void rtw_seccalctkipmic(u8 *key, u8 *header, u8 *data, u32 data_len, u8 *mic_cod #define P1K_SIZE 10 /* 80-bit Phase1 key */ #define RC4_KEY_SIZE 16 /* 128-bit RC4KEY (104 bits unknown) */ +/* 2-unsigned char by 2-unsigned char subset of the full AES S-box table */ +static const unsigned short Sbox1[2][256] = { /* Sbox for hash (can be in ROM) */ +{ + 0xC6A5, 0xF884, 0xEE99, 0xF68D, 0xFF0D, 0xD6BD, 0xDEB1, 0x9154, + 0x6050, 0x0203, 0xCEA9, 0x567D, 0xE719, 0xB562, 0x4DE6, 0xEC9A, + 0x8F45, 0x1F9D, 0x8940, 0xFA87, 0xEF15, 0xB2EB, 0x8EC9, 0xFB0B, + 0x41EC, 0xB367, 0x5FFD, 0x45EA, 0x23BF, 0x53F7, 0xE496, 0x9B5B, + 0x75C2, 0xE11C, 0x3DAE, 0x4C6A, 0x6C5A, 0x7E41, 0xF502, 0x834F, + 0x685C, 0x51F4, 0xD134, 0xF908, 0xE293, 0xAB73, 0x6253, 0x2A3F, + 0x080C, 0x9552, 0x4665, 0x9D5E, 0x3028, 0x37A1, 0x0A0F, 0x2FB5, + 0x0E09, 0x2436, 0x1B9B, 0xDF3D, 0xCD26, 0x4E69, 0x7FCD, 0xEA9F, + 0x121B, 0x1D9E, 0x5874, 0x342E, 0x362D, 0xDCB2, 0xB4EE, 0x5BFB, + 0xA4F6, 0x764D, 0xB761, 0x7DCE, 0x527B, 0xDD3E, 0x5E71, 0x1397, + 0xA6F5, 0xB968, 0x0000, 0xC12C, 0x4060, 0xE31F, 0x79C8, 0xB6ED, + 0xD4BE, 0x8D46, 0x67D9, 0x724B, 0x94DE, 0x98D4, 0xB0E8, 0x854A, + 0xBB6B, 0xC52A, 0x4FE5, 0xED16, 0x86C5, 0x9AD7, 0x6655, 0x1194, + 0x8ACF, 0xE910, 0x0406, 0xFE81, 0xA0F0, 0x7844, 0x25BA, 0x4BE3, + 0xA2F3, 0x5DFE, 0x80C0, 0x058A, 0x3FAD, 0x21BC, 0x7048, 0xF104, + 0x63DF, 0x77C1, 0xAF75, 0x4263, 0x2030, 0xE51A, 0xFD0E, 0xBF6D, + 0x814C, 0x1814, 0x2635, 0xC32F, 0xBEE1, 0x35A2, 0x88CC, 0x2E39, + 0x9357, 0x55F2, 0xFC82, 0x7A47, 0xC8AC, 0xBAE7, 0x322B, 0xE695, + 0xC0A0, 0x1998, 0x9ED1, 0xA37F, 0x4466, 0x547E, 0x3BAB, 0x0B83, + 0x8CCA, 0xC729, 0x6BD3, 0x283C, 0xA779, 0xBCE2, 0x161D, 0xAD76, + 0xDB3B, 0x6456, 0x744E, 0x141E, 0x92DB, 0x0C0A, 0x486C, 0xB8E4, + 0x9F5D, 0xBD6E, 0x43EF, 0xC4A6, 0x39A8, 0x31A4, 0xD337, 0xF28B, + 0xD532, 0x8B43, 0x6E59, 0xDAB7, 0x018C, 0xB164, 0x9CD2, 0x49E0, + 0xD8B4, 0xACFA, 0xF307, 0xCF25, 0xCAAF, 0xF48E, 0x47E9, 0x1018, + 0x6FD5, 0xF088, 0x4A6F, 0x5C72, 0x3824, 0x57F1, 0x73C7, 0x9751, + 0xCB23, 0xA17C, 0xE89C, 0x3E21, 0x96DD, 0x61DC, 0x0D86, 0x0F85, + 0xE090, 0x7C42, 0x71C4, 0xCCAA, 0x90D8, 0x0605, 0xF701, 0x1C12, + 0xC2A3, 0x6A5F, 0xAEF9, 0x69D0, 0x1791, 0x9958, 0x3A27, 0x27B9, + 0xD938, 0xEB13, 0x2BB3, 0x2233, 0xD2BB, 0xA970, 0x0789, 0x33A7, + 0x2DB6, 0x3C22, 0x1592, 0xC920, 0x8749, 0xAAFF, 0x5078, 0xA57A, + 0x038F, 0x59F8, 0x0980, 0x1A17, 0x65DA, 0xD731, 0x84C6, 0xD0B8, + 0x82C3, 0x29B0, 0x5A77, 0x1E11, 0x7BCB, 0xA8FC, 0x6DD6, 0x2C3A, + }, + + { /* second half of table is unsigned char-reversed version of first! */ + 0xA5C6, 0x84F8, 0x99EE, 0x8DF6, 0x0DFF, 0xBDD6, 0xB1DE, 0x5491, + 0x5060, 0x0302, 0xA9CE, 0x7D56, 0x19E7, 0x62B5, 0xE64D, 0x9AEC, + 0x458F, 0x9D1F, 0x4089, 0x87FA, 0x15EF, 0xEBB2, 0xC98E, 0x0BFB, + 0xEC41, 0x67B3, 0xFD5F, 0xEA45, 0xBF23, 0xF753, 0x96E4, 0x5B9B, + 0xC275, 0x1CE1, 0xAE3D, 0x6A4C, 0x5A6C, 0x417E, 0x02F5, 0x4F83, + 0x5C68, 0xF451, 0x34D1, 0x08F9, 0x93E2, 0x73AB, 0x5362, 0x3F2A, + 0x0C08, 0x5295, 0x6546, 0x5E9D, 0x2830, 0xA137, 0x0F0A, 0xB52F, + 0x090E, 0x3624, 0x9B1B, 0x3DDF, 0x26CD, 0x694E, 0xCD7F, 0x9FEA, + 0x1B12, 0x9E1D, 0x7458, 0x2E34, 0x2D36, 0xB2DC, 0xEEB4, 0xFB5B, + 0xF6A4, 0x4D76, 0x61B7, 0xCE7D, 0x7B52, 0x3EDD, 0x715E, 0x9713, + 0xF5A6, 0x68B9, 0x0000, 0x2CC1, 0x6040, 0x1FE3, 0xC879, 0xEDB6, + 0xBED4, 0x468D, 0xD967, 0x4B72, 0xDE94, 0xD498, 0xE8B0, 0x4A85, + 0x6BBB, 0x2AC5, 0xE54F, 0x16ED, 0xC586, 0xD79A, 0x5566, 0x9411, + 0xCF8A, 0x10E9, 0x0604, 0x81FE, 0xF0A0, 0x4478, 0xBA25, 0xE34B, + 0xF3A2, 0xFE5D, 0xC080, 0x8A05, 0xAD3F, 0xBC21, 0x4870, 0x04F1, + 0xDF63, 0xC177, 0x75AF, 0x6342, 0x3020, 0x1AE5, 0x0EFD, 0x6DBF, + 0x4C81, 0x1418, 0x3526, 0x2FC3, 0xE1BE, 0xA235, 0xCC88, 0x392E, + 0x5793, 0xF255, 0x82FC, 0x477A, 0xACC8, 0xE7BA, 0x2B32, 0x95E6, + 0xA0C0, 0x9819, 0xD19E, 0x7FA3, 0x6644, 0x7E54, 0xAB3B, 0x830B, + 0xCA8C, 0x29C7, 0xD36B, 0x3C28, 0x79A7, 0xE2BC, 0x1D16, 0x76AD, + 0x3BDB, 0x5664, 0x4E74, 0x1E14, 0xDB92, 0x0A0C, 0x6C48, 0xE4B8, + 0x5D9F, 0x6EBD, 0xEF43, 0xA6C4, 0xA839, 0xA431, 0x37D3, 0x8BF2, + 0x32D5, 0x438B, 0x596E, 0xB7DA, 0x8C01, 0x64B1, 0xD29C, 0xE049, + 0xB4D8, 0xFAAC, 0x07F3, 0x25CF, 0xAFCA, 0x8EF4, 0xE947, 0x1810, + 0xD56F, 0x88F0, 0x6F4A, 0x725C, 0x2438, 0xF157, 0xC773, 0x5197, + 0x23CB, 0x7CA1, 0x9CE8, 0x213E, 0xDD96, 0xDC61, 0x860D, 0x850F, + 0x90E0, 0x427C, 0xC471, 0xAACC, 0xD890, 0x0506, 0x01F7, 0x121C, + 0xA3C2, 0x5F6A, 0xF9AE, 0xD069, 0x9117, 0x5899, 0x273A, 0xB927, + 0x38D9, 0x13EB, 0xB32B, 0x3322, 0xBBD2, 0x70A9, 0x8907, 0xA733, + 0xB62D, 0x223C, 0x9215, 0x20C9, 0x4987, 0xFFAA, 0x7850, 0x7AA5, + 0x8F03, 0xF859, 0x8009, 0x171A, 0xDA65, 0x31D7, 0xC684, 0xB8D0, + 0xC382, 0xB029, 0x775A, 0x111E, 0xCB7B, 0xFCA8, 0xD66D, 0x3A2C, + } +}; + + /* +********************************************************************** +* Routine: Phase 1 -- generate P1K, given TA, TK, IV32 +* +* Inputs: +* tk[] = temporal key [128 bits] +* ta[] = transmitter's MAC address [ 48 bits] +* iv32 = upper 32 bits of IV [ 32 bits] +* Output: +* p1k[] = Phase 1 key [ 80 bits] +* +* Note: +* This function only needs to be called every 2**16 packets, +* although in theory it could be called every packet. +* +********************************************************************** +*/ +static void phase1(u16 *p1k, const u8 *tk, const u8 *ta, u32 iv32) +{ + int i; + /* Initialize the 80 bits of P1K[] from IV32 and TA[0..5] */ + p1k[0] = Lo16(iv32); + p1k[1] = Hi16(iv32); + p1k[2] = Mk16(ta[1], ta[0]); /* use TA[] as little-endian */ + p1k[3] = Mk16(ta[3], ta[2]); + p1k[4] = Mk16(ta[5], ta[4]); + + /* Now compute an unbalanced Feistel cipher with 80-bit block */ + /* size on the 80-bit block P1K[], using the 128-bit key TK[] */ + for (i = 0; i < PHASE1_LOOP_CNT; i++) { /* Each add operation here is mod 2**16 */ + p1k[0] += _S_(p1k[4] ^ TK16((i&1)+0)); + p1k[1] += _S_(p1k[0] ^ TK16((i&1)+2)); + p1k[2] += _S_(p1k[1] ^ TK16((i&1)+4)); + p1k[3] += _S_(p1k[2] ^ TK16((i&1)+6)); + p1k[4] += _S_(p1k[3] ^ TK16((i&1)+0)); + p1k[4] += (unsigned short)i; /* avoid "slide attacks" */ + } +} + +/* +********************************************************************** +* Routine: Phase 2 -- generate RC4KEY, given TK, P1K, IV16 +* +* Inputs: +* tk[] = Temporal key [128 bits] +* p1k[] = Phase 1 output key [ 80 bits] +* iv16 = low 16 bits of IV counter [ 16 bits] +* Output: +* rc4key[] = the key used to encrypt the packet [128 bits] +* +* Note: +* The value {TA, IV32, IV16} for Phase1/Phase2 must be unique +* across all packets using the same key TK value. Then, for a +* given value of TK[], this TKIP48 construction guarantees that +* the final RC4KEY value is unique across all packets. +* +* Suggested implementation optimization: if PPK[] is "overlaid" +* appropriately on RC4KEY[], there is no need for the final +* for loop below that copies the PPK[] result into RC4KEY[]. +* +********************************************************************** +*/ +static void phase2(u8 *rc4key, const u8 *tk, const u16 *p1k, u16 iv16) +{ + int i; + u16 PPK[6]; /* temporary key for mixing */ + /* Note: all adds in the PPK[] equations below are mod 2**16 */ + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) + PPK[i] = p1k[i]; /* first, copy P1K to PPK */ + PPK[5] = p1k[4] + iv16; /* next, add in IV16 */ + + /* Bijective non-linear mixing of the 96 bits of PPK[0..5] */ + PPK[0] += _S_(PPK[5] ^ TK16(0)); /* Mix key in each "round" */ + PPK[1] += _S_(PPK[0] ^ TK16(1)); + PPK[2] += _S_(PPK[1] ^ TK16(2)); + PPK[3] += _S_(PPK[2] ^ TK16(3)); + PPK[4] += _S_(PPK[3] ^ TK16(4)); + PPK[5] += _S_(PPK[4] ^ TK16(5)); /* Total # S-box lookups == 6 */ + + /* Final sweep: bijective, "linear". Rotates kill LSB correlations */ + PPK[0] += RotR1(PPK[5] ^ TK16(6)); + PPK[1] += RotR1(PPK[0] ^ TK16(7)); /* Use all of TK[] in Phase2 */ + PPK[2] += RotR1(PPK[1]); + PPK[3] += RotR1(PPK[2]); + PPK[4] += RotR1(PPK[3]); + PPK[5] += RotR1(PPK[4]); + /* Note: At this point, for a given key TK[0..15], the 96-bit output */ + /* value PPK[0..5] is guaranteed to be unique, as a function */ + /* of the 96-bit "input" value {TA, IV32, IV16}. That is, P1K */ + /* is now a keyed permutation of {TA, IV32, IV16}. */ + + /* Set RC4KEY[0..3], which includes "cleartext" portion of RC4 key */ + rc4key[0] = Hi8(iv16); /* RC4KEY[0..2] is the WEP IV */ + rc4key[1] = (Hi8(iv16) | 0x20) & 0x7F; /* Help avoid weak (FMS) keys */ + rc4key[2] = Lo8(iv16); + rc4key[3] = Lo8((PPK[5] ^ TK16(0)) >> 1); + + /* Copy 96 bits of PPK[0..5] to RC4KEY[4..15] (little-endian) */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + rc4key[4+2*i] = Lo8(PPK[i]); + rc4key[5+2*i] = Hi8(PPK[i]); + } +} + /* The hlen isn't include the IV */ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe) -{ +{ /* exclude ICV */ + u16 pnl; + u32 pnh; + u8 rc4key[16]; + u8 ttkey[16]; + u8 crc[4]; u8 hw_hdr_offset = 0; + struct arc4context mycontext; int curfragnum, length; - u8 *pframe; + u8 *pframe, *payload, *iv, *prwskey; + union pn48 dot11txpn; struct sta_info *stainfo; struct pkt_attrib *pattrib = &((struct xmit_frame *)pxmitframe)->attrib; struct security_priv *psecuritypriv = &padapter->securitypriv; struct xmit_priv *pxmitpriv = &padapter->xmitpriv; u32 res = _SUCCESS; - void *crypto_private; - struct sk_buff *skb; - u8 key[32]; - int key_idx; - const int key_length = 32; - struct lib80211_crypto_ops *crypto_ops; if (((struct xmit_frame *)pxmitframe)->buf_addr == NULL) return _FAIL; @@ -306,85 +599,57 @@ u32 rtw_tkip_encrypt(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pxmitframe) (((struct xmit_frame *)pxmitframe)->pkt_offset * PACKET_OFFSET_SZ); pframe = ((struct xmit_frame *)pxmitframe)->buf_addr + hw_hdr_offset; /* 4 start to encrypt each fragment */ - if (pattrib->encrypt != _TKIP_) - return res; - - if (pattrib->psta) - stainfo = pattrib->psta; - else - stainfo = rtw_get_stainfo(&padapter->stapriv, &pattrib->ra[0]); - - if (!stainfo) { - RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n", __func__)); - return _FAIL; - } - - crypto_ops = try_then_request_module(lib80211_get_crypto_ops("TKIP"), "lib80211_crypt_tkip"); - - if (IS_MCAST(pattrib->ra)) { - key_idx = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKeyid; - memcpy(key, psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[key_idx].skey, 16); - memcpy(key + 16, psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrptxmickey[key_idx].skey, 16); - } else { - key_idx = 0; - memcpy(key, stainfo->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey, 16); - memcpy(key + 16, stainfo->dot11tkiptxmickey.skey, 16); - } - - if (!crypto_ops) { - res = _FAIL; - goto exit; - } - - crypto_private = crypto_ops->init(key_idx); - if (!crypto_private) { - res = _FAIL; - goto exit; - } - - if (crypto_ops->set_key(key, key_length, NULL, crypto_private) < 0) { - res = _FAIL; - goto exit_crypto_ops_deinit; - } - - RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo!= NULL!!!\n", __func__)); - - for (curfragnum = 0; curfragnum < pattrib->nr_frags; curfragnum++) { - if ((curfragnum+1) == pattrib->nr_frags) - length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz; + if (pattrib->encrypt == _TKIP_) { + if (pattrib->psta) + stainfo = pattrib->psta; else - length = pxmitpriv->frag_len; + stainfo = rtw_get_stainfo(&padapter->stapriv, &pattrib->ra[0]); - skb = dev_alloc_skb(length); - if (!skb) { - res = _FAIL; - goto exit_crypto_ops_deinit; - } - - skb_put_data(skb, pframe, length); + if (stainfo != NULL) { + RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo!= NULL!!!\n", __func__)); - memmove(skb->data + pattrib->iv_len, skb->data, pattrib->hdrlen); - skb_pull(skb, pattrib->iv_len); - skb_trim(skb, skb->len - pattrib->icv_len); + if (IS_MCAST(pattrib->ra)) + prwskey = psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKey[psecuritypriv->dot118021XGrpKeyid].skey; + else + prwskey = &stainfo->dot118021x_UncstKey.skey[0]; - if (crypto_ops->encrypt_mpdu(skb, pattrib->hdrlen, crypto_private)) { - kfree_skb(skb); + for (curfragnum = 0; curfragnum < pattrib->nr_frags; curfragnum++) { + iv = pframe+pattrib->hdrlen; + payload = pframe+pattrib->iv_len+pattrib->hdrlen; + + GET_TKIP_PN(iv, dot11txpn); + + pnl = (u16)(dot11txpn.val); + pnh = (u32)(dot11txpn.val>>16); + phase1((u16 *)&ttkey[0], prwskey, &pattrib->ta[0], pnh); + phase2(&rc4key[0], prwskey, (u16 *)&ttkey[0], pnl); + + if ((curfragnum+1) == pattrib->nr_frags) { /* 4 the last fragment */ + length = pattrib->last_txcmdsz-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len; + RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_info_, + ("pattrib->iv_len=%x, pattrib->icv_len=%x\n", + pattrib->iv_len, pattrib->icv_len)); + *((__le32 *)crc) = getcrc32(payload, length);/* modified by Amy*/ + + arcfour_init(&mycontext, rc4key, 16); + arcfour_encrypt(&mycontext, payload, payload, length); + arcfour_encrypt(&mycontext, payload+length, crc, 4); + } else { + length = pxmitpriv->frag_len-pattrib->hdrlen-pattrib->iv_len-pattrib->icv_len; + *((__le32 *)crc) = getcrc32(payload, length);/* modified by Amy*/ + arcfour_init(&mycontext, rc4key, 16); + arcfour_encrypt(&mycontext, payload, payload, length); + arcfour_encrypt(&mycontext, payload+length, crc, 4); + + pframe += pxmitpriv->frag_len; + pframe = (u8 *)round_up((size_t)(pframe), 4); + } + } + } else { + RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("%s: stainfo==NULL!!!\n", __func__)); res = _FAIL; - goto exit_crypto_ops_deinit; } - - memcpy(pframe, skb->data, skb->len); - - pframe += skb->len; - pframe = (u8 *)round_up((size_t)(pframe), 4); - - kfree_skb(skb); } - -exit_crypto_ops_deinit: - crypto_ops->deinit(crypto_private); - -exit: return res; } |