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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2019-01-06 08:36:21 -0500
committerTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>2019-01-06 08:36:21 -0500
commit8094c3ceb21ad93896fd4d238e8ba41911932eaf (patch)
tree8dcc0b7473ad0996841ce20dc84febfe45b7e591 /fs/crypto
parentf2fs: clean up f2fs_sb_has_##feature_name (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-8094c3ceb21ad93896fd4d238e8ba41911932eaf.tar.xz
linux-dev-8094c3ceb21ad93896fd4d238e8ba41911932eaf.zip
fscrypt: add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/crypto.c28
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/fname.c22
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h67
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyinfo.c351
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/policy.c5
5 files changed, 363 insertions, 110 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 0f46cf550907..4dc788e3bc96 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -133,15 +133,25 @@ struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_ctx);
+void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
+ const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+{
+ memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
+ iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
+
+ if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
+ memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+ if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
+}
+
int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
u64 lblk_num, struct page *src_page,
struct page *dest_page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
- struct {
- __le64 index;
- u8 padding[FS_IV_SIZE - sizeof(__le64)];
- } iv;
+ union fscrypt_iv iv;
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist dst, src;
@@ -151,15 +161,7 @@ int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
BUG_ON(len == 0);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(iv) != FS_IV_SIZE);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(AES_BLOCK_SIZE != FS_IV_SIZE);
- iv.index = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
- memset(iv.padding, 0, sizeof(iv.padding));
-
- if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL) {
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, (u8 *)&iv,
- (u8 *)&iv);
- }
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci);
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, gfp_flags);
if (!req)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index d7a0f682ca12..7ff40a73dbec 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm;
- int res = 0;
- char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
+ union fscrypt_iv iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
+ int res;
/*
* Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and
@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
memset(out + iname->len, 0, olen - iname->len);
/* Initialize the IV */
- memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, ci);
/* Set up the encryption request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
sg_init_one(&sg, out, olen);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, iv);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, &iv);
/* Do the encryption */
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
@@ -94,9 +95,10 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm;
- int res = 0;
- char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
+ union fscrypt_iv iv;
+ int res;
/* Allocate request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -107,12 +109,12 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
/* Initialize IV */
- memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ fscrypt_generate_iv(&iv, 0, ci);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, &iv);
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 79debfc9cef9..7424f851eb5c 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
/* Encryption parameters */
-#define FS_IV_SIZE 16
#define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16
/**
@@ -52,16 +51,42 @@ struct fscrypt_symlink_data {
} __packed;
/*
- * A pointer to this structure is stored in the file system's in-core
- * representation of an inode.
+ * fscrypt_info - the "encryption key" for an inode
+ *
+ * When an encrypted file's key is made available, an instance of this struct is
+ * allocated and stored in ->i_crypt_info. Once created, it remains until the
+ * inode is evicted.
*/
struct fscrypt_info {
+
+ /* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
+ struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
+
+ /*
+ * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation. Only set for CBC contents
+ * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
+ */
+ struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
+
+ /*
+ * Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either
+ * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
+ */
+ struct fscrypt_mode *ci_mode;
+
+ /*
+ * If non-NULL, then this inode uses a master key directly rather than a
+ * derived key, and ci_ctfm will equal ci_master_key->mk_ctfm.
+ * Otherwise, this inode uses a derived key.
+ */
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *ci_master_key;
+
+ /* fields from the fscrypt_context */
u8 ci_data_mode;
u8 ci_filename_mode;
u8 ci_flags;
- struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
- struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
- u8 ci_master_key[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ u8 ci_master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ u8 ci_nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
};
typedef enum {
@@ -83,6 +108,10 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode,
filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
return true;
+ if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM &&
+ filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM)
+ return true;
+
return false;
}
@@ -107,6 +136,22 @@ fscrypt_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
#define fscrypt_err(sb, fmt, ...) \
fscrypt_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE 32
+
+union fscrypt_iv {
+ struct {
+ /* logical block number within the file */
+ __le64 lblk_num;
+
+ /* per-file nonce; only set in DIRECT_KEY mode */
+ u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
+ };
+ u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE];
+};
+
+void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
+ const struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+
/* fname.c */
extern int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,
u8 *out, unsigned int olen);
@@ -115,6 +160,16 @@ extern bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode,
u32 *encrypted_len_ret);
/* keyinfo.c */
+
+struct fscrypt_mode {
+ const char *friendly_name;
+ const char *cipher_str;
+ int keysize;
+ int ivsize;
+ bool logged_impl_name;
+ bool needs_essiv;
+};
+
extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
#endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 7874c9bb2fc5..1e11a683f63d 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -10,15 +10,21 @@
*/
#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
+/* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
+
/*
* Key derivation function. This generates the derived key by encrypting the
* master key with AES-128-ECB using the inode's nonce as the AES key.
@@ -123,56 +129,37 @@ invalid:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
}
-/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */
-static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode,
- const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
- u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize)
-{
- struct key *key;
- const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
- int err;
-
- key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
- ctx->master_key_descriptor,
- derived_keysize, &payload);
- if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
- key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
- ctx->master_key_descriptor,
- derived_keysize, &payload);
- }
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
- err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key, derived_keysize);
- up_read(&key->sem);
- key_put(key);
- return err;
-}
-
-static struct fscrypt_mode {
- const char *friendly_name;
- const char *cipher_str;
- int keysize;
- bool logged_impl_name;
-} available_modes[] = {
+static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
.keysize = 64,
+ .ivsize = 16,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-256-CTS-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 32,
+ .ivsize = 16,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
.keysize = 16,
+ .ivsize = 16,
+ .needs_essiv = true,
},
[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
.cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.keysize = 16,
+ .ivsize = 16,
+ },
+ [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM] = {
+ .friendly_name = "Adiantum",
+ .cipher_str = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
+ .keysize = 32,
+ .ivsize = 32,
},
};
@@ -198,14 +185,196 @@ select_encryption_mode(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct inode *inode)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
-static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */
+static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode,
+ const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
+ u8 *derived_key, const struct fscrypt_mode *mode)
{
- if (!ci)
+ struct key *key;
+ const struct fscrypt_key *payload;
+ int err;
+
+ key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
+ ctx->master_key_descriptor,
+ mode->keysize, &payload);
+ if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
+ key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
+ ctx->master_key_descriptor,
+ mode->keysize, &payload);
+ }
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+ if (ctx->flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
+ if (mode->ivsize < offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce)) {
+ fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
+ "direct key mode not allowed with %s",
+ mode->friendly_name);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (ctx->contents_encryption_mode !=
+ ctx->filenames_encryption_mode) {
+ fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
+ "direct key mode not allowed with different contents and filenames modes");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(derived_key, payload->raw, mode->keysize);
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key,
+ mode->keysize);
+ }
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ key_put(key);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and key a symmetric cipher object for the given encryption mode */
+static struct crypto_skcipher *
+allocate_skcipher_for_mode(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, const u8 *raw_key,
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+ int err;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
+ "error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %ld",
+ mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return tfm;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) {
+ /*
+ * fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which
+ * crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug
+ * performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the
+ * first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can
+ * race here, but it doesn't really matter.
+ */
+ mode->logged_impl_name = true;
+ pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
+ mode->friendly_name,
+ crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
+ }
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
+ err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_free_tfm;
+
+ return tfm;
+
+err_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/* Master key referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policy */
+struct fscrypt_master_key {
+ struct hlist_node mk_node;
+ refcount_t mk_refcount;
+ const struct fscrypt_mode *mk_mode;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *mk_ctfm;
+ u8 mk_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ u8 mk_raw[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+{
+ if (mk) {
+ crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_ctfm);
+ kzfree(mk);
+ }
+}
+
+static void put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+{
+ if (!refcount_dec_and_lock(&mk->mk_refcount, &fscrypt_master_keys_lock))
return;
+ hash_del(&mk->mk_node);
+ spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
- crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
- crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
- kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
+ free_master_key(mk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find/insert the given master key into the fscrypt_master_keys table. If
+ * found, it is returned with elevated refcount, and 'to_insert' is freed if
+ * non-NULL. If not found, 'to_insert' is inserted and returned if it's
+ * non-NULL; otherwise NULL is returned.
+ */
+static struct fscrypt_master_key *
+find_or_insert_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *to_insert,
+ const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
+ const struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+{
+ unsigned long hash_key;
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+
+ /*
+ * Careful: to avoid potentially leaking secret key bytes via timing
+ * information, we must key the hash table by descriptor rather than by
+ * raw key, and use crypto_memneq() when comparing raw keys.
+ */
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hash_key) > FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&hash_key, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, sizeof(hash_key));
+
+ spin_lock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
+ hash_for_each_possible(fscrypt_master_keys, mk, mk_node, hash_key) {
+ if (memcmp(ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, mk->mk_descriptor,
+ FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (mode != mk->mk_mode)
+ continue;
+ if (crypto_memneq(raw_key, mk->mk_raw, mode->keysize))
+ continue;
+ /* using existing tfm with same (descriptor, mode, raw_key) */
+ refcount_inc(&mk->mk_refcount);
+ spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
+ free_master_key(to_insert);
+ return mk;
+ }
+ if (to_insert)
+ hash_add(fscrypt_master_keys, &to_insert->mk_node, hash_key);
+ spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
+ return to_insert;
+}
+
+/* Prepare to encrypt directly using the master key in the given mode */
+static struct fscrypt_master_key *
+fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
+ const u8 *raw_key, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Is there already a tfm for this key? */
+ mk = find_or_insert_master_key(NULL, raw_key, mode, ci);
+ if (mk)
+ return mk;
+
+ /* Nope, allocate one. */
+ mk = kzalloc(sizeof(*mk), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!mk)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ refcount_set(&mk->mk_refcount, 1);
+ mk->mk_mode = mode;
+ mk->mk_ctfm = allocate_skcipher_for_mode(mode, raw_key, inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(mk->mk_ctfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(mk->mk_ctfm);
+ mk->mk_ctfm = NULL;
+ goto err_free_mk;
+ }
+ memcpy(mk->mk_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+ FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ memcpy(mk->mk_raw, raw_key, mode->keysize);
+
+ return find_or_insert_master_key(mk, raw_key, mode, ci);
+
+err_free_mk:
+ free_master_key(mk);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
@@ -275,11 +444,67 @@ void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
}
+/*
+ * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
+ * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
+ * symmetric cipher transform object(s).
+ */
+static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+ struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
+ const u8 *raw_key, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
+ int err;
+
+ if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
+ mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(mk))
+ return PTR_ERR(mk);
+ ctfm = mk->mk_ctfm;
+ } else {
+ mk = NULL;
+ ctfm = allocate_skcipher_for_mode(mode, raw_key, inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(ctfm);
+ }
+ ci->ci_master_key = mk;
+ ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
+
+ if (mode->needs_essiv) {
+ /* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
+ WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
+
+ err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
+ if (err) {
+ fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
+ "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
+ inode->i_ino, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+{
+ if (!ci)
+ return;
+
+ if (ci->ci_master_key) {
+ put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
+ } else {
+ crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
+ crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
+ }
+ kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
+}
+
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info;
struct fscrypt_context ctx;
- struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
u8 *raw_key = NULL;
int res;
@@ -312,74 +537,42 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
return -EINVAL;
- crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
+ crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!crypt_info)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
- crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
- crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = NULL;
- memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
- sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
+ memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+ FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
mode = select_encryption_mode(crypt_info, inode);
if (IS_ERR(mode)) {
res = PTR_ERR(mode);
goto out;
}
+ WARN_ON(mode->ivsize > FSCRYPT_MAX_IV_SIZE);
+ crypt_info->ci_mode = mode;
/*
- * This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist
- * crypto API as part of key derivation.
+ * This cannot be a stack buffer because it may be passed to the
+ * scatterlist crypto API as part of key derivation.
*/
res = -ENOMEM;
raw_key = kmalloc(mode->keysize, GFP_NOFS);
if (!raw_key)
goto out;
- res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode->keysize);
+ res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode);
if (res)
goto out;
- ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(ctfm)) {
- res = PTR_ERR(ctfm);
- fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
- "error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %d",
- mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, res);
- goto out;
- }
- if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) {
- /*
- * fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which
- * crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug
- * performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the
- * first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can
- * race here, but it doesn't really matter.
- */
- mode->logged_impl_name = true;
- pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
- mode->friendly_name,
- crypto_skcipher_alg(ctfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
- }
- crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
- crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
- res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
+ res = setup_crypto_transform(crypt_info, mode, raw_key, inode);
if (res)
goto out;
- if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
- crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) {
- res = init_essiv_generator(crypt_info, raw_key, mode->keysize);
- if (res) {
- fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
- "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
- inode->i_ino, res);
- goto out;
- }
- }
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
crypt_info = NULL;
out:
diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
index c6d431a5cce9..f490de921ce8 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
child_ci = child->i_crypt_info;
if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
- return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key,
+ return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+ child_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
@@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
- memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key,
+ memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);