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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2006-06-26 00:25:45 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-06-26 09:58:24 -0700
commit68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751 (patch)
treefdd1db5b08755bf2c353364b56a778f62e5009f4 /fs/proc
parent[PATCH] proc: Replace proc_inode.type with proc_inode.fd (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751.tar.xz
linux-dev-68602066c3327fa340899609d715781eda423751.zip
[PATCH] proc: Remove bogus proc_task_permission
First we can access every /proc/<tgid>/task/<pid> directory as /proc/<pid> so proc_task_permission is not usefully limiting visibility. Second having related filesystems information should have nothing to do with process visibility. kill does not implement any checks like that. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c63
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 63 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 9562df760901..6080672276d5 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -361,54 +361,6 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vf
return result;
}
-
-/* Same as proc_root_link, but this addionally tries to get fs from other
- * threads in the group */
-static int proc_task_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry,
- struct vfsmount **mnt)
-{
- struct fs_struct *fs;
- int result = -ENOENT;
- struct task_struct *leader = proc_task(inode);
-
- task_lock(leader);
- fs = leader->fs;
- if (fs) {
- atomic_inc(&fs->count);
- task_unlock(leader);
- } else {
- /* Try to get fs from other threads */
- task_unlock(leader);
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- if (pid_alive(leader)) {
- struct task_struct *task = leader;
-
- while ((task = next_thread(task)) != leader) {
- task_lock(task);
- fs = task->fs;
- if (fs) {
- atomic_inc(&fs->count);
- task_unlock(task);
- break;
- }
- task_unlock(task);
- }
- }
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- }
-
- if (fs) {
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- *mnt = mntget(fs->rootmnt);
- *dentry = dget(fs->root);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- result = 0;
- put_fs_struct(fs);
- }
- return result;
-}
-
-
#define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
(task == current || \
(task->parent == current && \
@@ -600,20 +552,6 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
return proc_check_root(inode);
}
-static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
-{
- struct dentry *root;
- struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
-
- if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
- return -EACCES;
-
- if (proc_task_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt);
-}
-
extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op;
static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
@@ -1583,7 +1521,6 @@ static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
static struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_task_lookup,
- .permission = proc_task_permission,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY