diff options
| author |   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-06-21 09:53:06 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2017-06-29 20:08:32 -0400 |
| commit | cc658db47d6897a8571fb6227f59d1d18151b0b2 (patch) | |
| tree | 67d1bd8c5c8f3f7c90a6f24c39832fc0218de07a /fs | |
| parent | fs: warn in case userspace lied about modprobe return (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-cc658db47d6897a8571fb6227f59d1d18151b0b2.tar.xz linux-dev-cc658db47d6897a8571fb6227f59d1d18151b0b2.zip | |
fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless
Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing
access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required
for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation).
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/inode.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index db5914783a71..7092debe90cc 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode) return true; ns = current_user_ns(); - if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid)) + if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER)) return true; return false; } diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 6571a5f5112e..efe53a5d0737 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, * otherwise, it must be a safe source. */ - if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) || safe_hardlink_source(inode)) + if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return 0; audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link); |