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authorMikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>2018-06-27 16:33:42 +0300
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2018-07-18 07:27:22 -0400
commit6eb864c1d9dd1ef32b88e03c3f49d8be0dab7dcf (patch)
tree3484d390ade78e5dcdffdb67cb11b00ecefa10b9 /include/linux/integrity.h
parentevm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-6eb864c1d9dd1ef32b88e03c3f49d8be0dab7dcf.tar.xz
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integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
This patch aimed to prevent deadlock during digsig verification.The point of issue - user space utility modprobe and/or it's dependencies (ld-*.so, libz.so.*, libc-*.so and /lib/modules/ files) that could be used for kernel modules load during digsig verification and could be signed by digsig in the same time. First at all, look at crypto_alloc_tfm() work algorithm: crypto_alloc_tfm() will first attempt to locate an already loaded algorithm. If that fails and the kernel supports dynamically loadable modules, it will then attempt to load a module of the same name or alias. If that fails it will send a query to any loaded crypto manager to construct an algorithm on the fly. We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. 1) we can't do anything with crypto module work, since it designed to work exactly in this way; 2) we can't globally filter module requests for modprobe, since it designed to work with any requests. In this patch, I propose add an exception for "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" module requests only in case of enabled integrity asymmetric keys support. Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules for sure, we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies also signed with digsig. Requested "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel module name formed by: 1) "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)" in public_key_verify_signature(); 2) "crypto-%s" / "crypto-%s-all" in crypto_larval_lookup(). "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa," part of request is a constant and unique and could be used as filter. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/integrity.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/integrity.h13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 858d3f4a2241..54c853ec2fd1 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -44,4 +44,17 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */