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authorAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>2018-06-13 15:48:26 -0700
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2018-06-20 19:10:00 +0200
commit17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 (patch)
treeed81f3bf900f83cdae9739415d0382b1fd303306 /include/linux/swapfile.h
parentx86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved (diff)
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x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits. - Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not vulnerable to L1TF - Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits - If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore, because an inverted physical address will also point to valid memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is vulnerable. Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks. [ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/swapfile.h')
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