Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
   using IMA.

 - A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
   mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
   patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
   flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.

 - Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
   credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
   attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
   is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
   patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
   change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.

 - Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
   list for two SELinux object classes.

* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
  smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
  selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
  lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
  nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
  nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
  lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
  selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
  selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			   logged upon error */
 			if (f->lsm_rule) {
 				if (need_sid) {
-					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;