Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix regression in multi-SKB responses to RTM_GETADDR, from Arthur
    Gautier.

 2) Fix ipv6 frag parsing in openvswitch, from Yi-Hung Wei.

 3) Unbounded recursion in ipv4 and ipv6 GUE tunnels, from Stefano
    Brivio.

 4) Use after free in hns driver, from Yonglong Liu.

 5) icmp6_send() needs to handle the case of NULL skb, from Eric
    Dumazet.

 6) Missing rcu read lock in __inet6_bind() when operating on mapped
    addresses, from David Ahern.

 7) Memory leak in tipc-nl_compat_publ_dump(), from Gustavo A. R. Silva.

 8) Fix PHY vs r8169 module loading ordering issues, from Heiner
    Kallweit.

 9) Fix bridge vlan memory leak, from Ido Schimmel.

10) Dev refcount leak in AF_PACKET, from Jason Gunthorpe.

11) Infoleak in ipv6_local_error(), flow label isn't completely
    initialized. From Eric Dumazet.

12) Handle mv88e6390 errata, from Andrew Lunn.

13) Making vhost/vsock CID hashing consistent, from Zha Bin.

14) Fix lack of UMH cleanup when it unexpectedly exits, from Taehee Yoo.

15) Bridge forwarding must clear skb->tstamp, from Paolo Abeni.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (87 commits)
  bnxt_en: Fix context memory allocation.
  bnxt_en: Fix ring checking logic on 57500 chips.
  mISDN: hfcsusb: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
  net: clear skb->tstamp in bridge forwarding path
  net: bpfilter: disallow to remove bpfilter module while being used
  net: bpfilter: restart bpfilter_umh when error occurred
  net: bpfilter: use cleanup callback to release umh_info
  umh: add exit routine for UMH process
  isdn: i4l: isdn_tty: Fix some concurrency double-free bugs
  vhost/vsock: fix vhost vsock cid hashing inconsistent
  net: stmmac: Prevent RX starvation in stmmac_napi_poll()
  net: stmmac: Fix the logic of checking if RX Watchdog must be enabled
  net: stmmac: Check if CBS is supported before configuring
  net: stmmac: dwxgmac2: Only clear interrupts that are active
  net: stmmac: Fix PCI module removal leak
  tools/bpf: fix bpftool map dump with bitfields
  tools/bpf: test btf bitfield with >=256 struct member offset
  bpf: fix bpffs bitfield pretty print
  net: ethernet: mediatek: fix warning in phy_start_aneg
  tcp: change txhash on SYN-data timeout
  ...

1 files changed, 48 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f6bc62a9ee8e..56674a7c3778 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3103,6 +3103,40 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 	}
 }
 
+static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				    const struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+	return env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K;
+}
+
+static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
+				       u32 alu_state, u32 alu_limit)
+{
+	/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
+	 * state or limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
+	 */
+	if (aux->alu_state &&
+	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
+	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
+	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
+	aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			    struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
+
+	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
+		return 0;
+
+	return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
+}
+
 static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@@ -3117,7 +3151,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
 	bool ret;
 
-	if (env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
+	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
@@ -3133,19 +3167,8 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
 		return 0;
-
-	/* If we arrived here from different branches with different
-	 * limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
-	 */
-	if (aux->alu_state &&
-	    (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
-	     aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+	if (update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit))
 		return -EACCES;
-
-	/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
-	aux->alu_state = alu_state;
-	aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
-
 do_sim:
 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
@@ -3418,6 +3441,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
 	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
+	u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (insn_bitness == 32) {
 		/* Relevant for 32-bit RSH: Information can propagate towards
@@ -3452,6 +3477,11 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	switch (opcode) {
 	case BPF_ADD:
+		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
+			return ret;
+		}
 		if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
 		    signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
 			dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
@@ -3471,6 +3501,11 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
 		break;
 	case BPF_SUB:
+		ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
+			return ret;
+		}
 		if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
 		    signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
 			/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */