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authorDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>2021-04-23 10:29:59 +0200
committerDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>2021-09-03 18:42:01 +0200
commitfe69d560b5bd9ec77b5d5749bd7027344daef47e (patch)
treed326cdd1de311c30c88008ffd2f1f3a9ac34e227 /kernel/fork.c
parentkernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-fe69d560b5bd9ec77b5d5749bd7027344daef47e.tar.xz
linux-dev-fe69d560b5bd9ec77b5d5749bd7027344daef47e.zip
kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
We want to remove VM_DENYWRITE only currently only used when mapping the executable during exec. During exec, we already deny_write_access() the executable, however, after exec completes the VMAs mapped with VM_DENYWRITE effectively keeps write access denied via deny_write_access(). Let's deny write access when setting or replacing the MM exe_file. With this change, we can remove VM_DENYWRITE for mapping executables. Make set_mm_exe_file() return an error in case deny_write_access() fails; note that this should never happen, because exec code does a deny_write_access() early and keeps write access denied when calling set_mm_exe_file. However, it makes the code easier to read and makes set_mm_exe_file() and replace_mm_exe_file() look more similar. This represents a minor user space visible change: sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) can now fail if the file is already opened writable. Also, after sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) the file cannot be opened writable. Note that we can already fail with -EACCES if the file doesn't have execute permissions. Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/fork.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c50
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index f4ac883c4a1e..7677f897ecb6 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -470,6 +470,20 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
+static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
+{
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, exe_file);
+ /*
+ * We depend on the oldmm having properly denied write access to the
+ * exe_file already.
+ */
+ if (exe_file && deny_write_access(exe_file))
+ pr_warn_once("deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct mm_struct *oldmm)
@@ -493,7 +507,7 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
mmap_write_lock_nested(mm, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* No ordering required: file already has been exposed. */
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
+ dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm);
mm->total_vm = oldmm->total_vm;
mm->data_vm = oldmm->data_vm;
@@ -639,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void mm_free_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
{
mmap_write_lock(oldmm);
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
+ dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm);
mmap_write_unlock(oldmm);
return 0;
}
@@ -1149,8 +1163,10 @@ void mmput_async(struct mm_struct *mm)
* Main users are mmput() and sys_execve(). Callers prevent concurrent
* invocations: in mmput() nobody alive left, in execve task is single
* threaded.
+ *
+ * Can only fail if new_exe_file != NULL.
*/
-void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
{
struct file *old_exe_file;
@@ -1161,11 +1177,21 @@ void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
*/
old_exe_file = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->exe_file);
- if (new_exe_file)
+ if (new_exe_file) {
+ /*
+ * We expect the caller (i.e., sys_execve) to already denied
+ * write access, so this is unlikely to fail.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(deny_write_access(new_exe_file)))
+ return -EACCES;
get_file(new_exe_file);
+ }
rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file);
- if (old_exe_file)
+ if (old_exe_file) {
+ allow_write_access(old_exe_file);
fput(old_exe_file);
+ }
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -1201,10 +1227,22 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
}
/* set the new file, lockless */
+ ret = deny_write_access(new_exe_file);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EACCES;
get_file(new_exe_file);
+
old_exe_file = xchg(&mm->exe_file, new_exe_file);
- if (old_exe_file)
+ if (old_exe_file) {
+ /*
+ * Don't race with dup_mmap() getting the file and disallowing
+ * write access while someone might open the file writable.
+ */
+ mmap_read_lock(mm);
+ allow_write_access(old_exe_file);
fput(old_exe_file);
+ mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+ }
return 0;
}