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author | 2020-06-08 11:11:38 -0700 | |
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committer | 2020-06-08 11:11:38 -0700 | |
commit | 20b0d06722169e6e66049c8fe6f1a48adffb79c6 (patch) | |
tree | 1b88278ca547c07f58297325aea1ab3c447e844d /kernel | |
parent | vfs: clean up posix_acl_permission() logic aroudn MAY_NOT_BLOCK (diff) | |
parent | doc: cgroup: update note about conditions when oom killer is invoked (diff) | |
download | linux-dev-20b0d06722169e6e66049c8fe6f1a48adffb79c6.tar.xz linux-dev-20b0d06722169e6e66049c8fe6f1a48adffb79c6.zip |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge still more updates from Andrew Morton:
"Various trees. Mainly those parts of MM whose linux-next dependents
are now merged. I'm still sitting on ~160 patches which await merges
from -next.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm/proc, ipc, dynamic-debug,
panic, lib, sysctl, mm/gup, mm/pagemap"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (52 commits)
doc: cgroup: update note about conditions when oom killer is invoked
module: move the set_fs hack for flush_icache_range to m68k
nommu: use flush_icache_user_range in brk and mmap
binfmt_flat: use flush_icache_user_range
exec: use flush_icache_user_range in read_code
exec: only build read_code when needed
m68k: implement flush_icache_user_range
arm: rename flush_cache_user_range to flush_icache_user_range
xtensa: implement flush_icache_user_range
sh: implement flush_icache_user_range
asm-generic: add a flush_icache_user_range stub
mm: rename flush_icache_user_range to flush_icache_user_page
arm,sparc,unicore32: remove flush_icache_user_range
riscv: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
powerpc: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
openrisc: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
m68knommu: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
microblaze: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
ia64: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
hexagon: use asm-generic/cacheflush.h
...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/uprobes.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/hung_task.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/module.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/watchdog.c | 37 |
7 files changed, 109 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index fcfadecd3a08..63d66bbebbd5 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -6934,12 +6934,12 @@ static u64 perf_virt_to_phys(u64 virt) * Walking the pages tables for user address. * Interrupts are disabled, so it prevents any tear down * of the page tables. - * Try IRQ-safe __get_user_pages_fast first. + * Try IRQ-safe get_user_page_fast_only first. * If failed, leave phys_addr as 0. */ if (current->mm != NULL) { pagefault_disable(); - if (__get_user_pages_fast(virt, 1, 0, &p) == 1) + if (get_user_page_fast_only(virt, 0, &p)) phys_addr = page_to_phys(p) + virt % PAGE_SIZE; pagefault_enable(); } diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c index eddc8db96027..e51ec844c87c 100644 --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c @@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ void __weak arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr, copy_to_page(page, vaddr, src, len); /* - * We probably need flush_icache_user_range() but it needs vma. + * We probably need flush_icache_user_page() but it needs vma. * This should work on most of architectures by default. If * architecture needs to do something different it can define * its own version of the function. diff --git a/kernel/hung_task.c b/kernel/hung_task.c index 14a625c16cb3..ce76f490126c 100644 --- a/kernel/hung_task.c +++ b/kernel/hung_task.c @@ -53,9 +53,18 @@ int __read_mostly sysctl_hung_task_warnings = 10; static int __read_mostly did_panic; static bool hung_task_show_lock; static bool hung_task_call_panic; +static bool hung_task_show_all_bt; static struct task_struct *watchdog_task; +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +/* + * Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in a hung task event? + * Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl. + */ +unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace; +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + /* * Should we panic (and reboot, if panic_timeout= is set) when a * hung task is detected: @@ -63,16 +72,6 @@ static struct task_struct *watchdog_task; unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_hung_task_panic = CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC_VALUE; -static int __init hung_task_panic_setup(char *str) -{ - int rc = kstrtouint(str, 0, &sysctl_hung_task_panic); - - if (rc) - return rc; - return 1; -} -__setup("hung_task_panic=", hung_task_panic_setup); - static int hung_task_panic(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { @@ -137,6 +136,9 @@ static void check_hung_task(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long timeout) " disables this message.\n"); sched_show_task(t); hung_task_show_lock = true; + + if (sysctl_hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace) + hung_task_show_all_bt = true; } touch_nmi_watchdog(); @@ -201,10 +203,14 @@ static void check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks(unsigned long timeout) rcu_read_unlock(); if (hung_task_show_lock) debug_show_all_locks(); - if (hung_task_call_panic) { + + if (hung_task_show_all_bt) { + hung_task_show_all_bt = false; trigger_all_cpu_backtrace(); - panic("hung_task: blocked tasks"); } + + if (hung_task_call_panic) + panic("hung_task: blocked tasks"); } static long hung_timeout_jiffies(unsigned long last_checked, diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index ef400c389f49..e8a198588f26 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -3344,12 +3344,6 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod) static void flush_module_icache(const struct module *mod) { - mm_segment_t old_fs; - - /* flush the icache in correct context */ - old_fs = get_fs(); - set_fs(KERNEL_DS); - /* * Flush the instruction cache, since we've played with text. * Do it before processing of module parameters, so the module @@ -3361,8 +3355,6 @@ static void flush_module_icache(const struct module *mod) + mod->init_layout.size); flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->core_layout.base, (unsigned long)mod->core_layout.base + mod->core_layout.size); - - set_fs(old_fs); } int __weak module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr, diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index b69ee9e76cb2..85568bbfb12b 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100 #define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18 +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +/* + * Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event? + * Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl. + */ +unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace; +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE; static unsigned long tainted_mask = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0; @@ -44,6 +52,8 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers; int panic_on_warn __read_mostly; +unsigned long panic_on_taint; +bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false; int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout); @@ -434,6 +444,11 @@ void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); + + if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) { + panic_on_taint = 0; + panic("panic_on_taint set ..."); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); @@ -515,6 +530,9 @@ void oops_enter(void) /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */ debug_locks_off(); do_oops_enter_exit(); + + if (sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace) + trigger_all_cpu_backtrace(); } /* @@ -686,3 +704,30 @@ static int __init oops_setup(char *s) return 0; } early_param("oops", oops_setup); + +static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s) +{ + char *taint_str; + + if (!s) + return -EINVAL; + + taint_str = strsep(&s, ","); + if (kstrtoul(taint_str, 16, &panic_on_taint)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* make sure panic_on_taint doesn't hold out-of-range TAINT flags */ + panic_on_taint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX; + + if (!panic_on_taint) + return -EINVAL; + + if (s && !strcmp(s, "nousertaint")) + panic_on_taint_nousertaint = true; + + pr_info("panic_on_taint: bitmask=0x%lx nousertaint_mode=%sabled\n", + panic_on_taint, panic_on_taint_nousertaint ? "en" : "dis"); + + return 0; +} +early_param("panic_on_taint", panic_on_taint_setup); diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 715774d8c55f..db1ce7af2563 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -866,15 +866,23 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return err; if (write) { + int i; + + /* + * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing + * false positives due to userspace input, bail out + * before setting the requested taint flags. + */ + if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint)) + return -EINVAL; + /* * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive * to everyone's atomic.h for this */ - int i; - for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) { - if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1) + for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) + if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint) add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); - } } return err; @@ -2141,6 +2149,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + { + .procname = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace", + .data = &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ { .procname = "pid_max", .data = &pid_max, @@ -2428,6 +2447,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { }, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + { + .procname = "hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace", + .data = &sysctl_hung_task_all_cpu_backtrace, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ { .procname = "hung_task_panic", .data = &sysctl_hung_task_panic, diff --git a/kernel/watchdog.c b/kernel/watchdog.c index 53ff2c81b084..5abb5b22ad13 100644 --- a/kernel/watchdog.c +++ b/kernel/watchdog.c @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct cpumask watchdog_cpumask __read_mostly; unsigned long *watchdog_cpumask_bits = cpumask_bits(&watchdog_cpumask); #ifdef CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR + +# ifdef CONFIG_SMP +int __read_mostly sysctl_hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace; +# endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + /* * Should we panic when a soft-lockup or hard-lockup occurs: */ @@ -82,16 +87,6 @@ static int __init hardlockup_panic_setup(char *str) } __setup("nmi_watchdog=", hardlockup_panic_setup); -# ifdef CONFIG_SMP -int __read_mostly sysctl_hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace; - -static int __init hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace_setup(char *str) -{ - sysctl_hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); - return 1; -} -__setup("hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace=", hardlockup_all_cpu_backtrace_setup); -# endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ #endif /* CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR */ /* @@ -163,6 +158,10 @@ static void lockup_detector_update_enable(void) #define SOFTLOCKUP_RESET ULONG_MAX +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +int __read_mostly sysctl_softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace; +#endif + /* Global variables, exported for sysctl */ unsigned int __read_mostly softlockup_panic = CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC_VALUE; @@ -178,13 +177,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, hrtimer_interrupts); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, hrtimer_interrupts_saved); static unsigned long soft_lockup_nmi_warn; -static int __init softlockup_panic_setup(char *str) -{ - softlockup_panic = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0); - return 1; -} -__setup("softlockup_panic=", softlockup_panic_setup); - static int __init nowatchdog_setup(char *str) { watchdog_user_enabled = 0; @@ -206,17 +198,6 @@ static int __init watchdog_thresh_setup(char *str) } __setup("watchdog_thresh=", watchdog_thresh_setup); -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -int __read_mostly sysctl_softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace; - -static int __init softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace_setup(char *str) -{ - sysctl_softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace = !!simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0); - return 1; -} -__setup("softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace=", softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace_setup); -#endif - static void __lockup_detector_cleanup(void); /* |