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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-10-16 15:27:07 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-10-16 15:27:07 -0700
commitf1947d7c8a61db1cb0ef909a6512ede0b1f2115b (patch)
treebbe7f785243bb692f243d08de8bc5ef4a82454d6 /kernel
parentMerge tag 'perf-tools-for-v6.1-2-2022-10-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux (diff)
parentprandom: remove unused functions (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-f1947d7c8a61db1cb0ef909a6512ede0b1f2115b.tar.xz
linux-dev-f1947d7c8a61db1cb0ef909a6512ede0b1f2115b.zip
Merge tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull more random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: "This time with some large scale treewide cleanups. The intent of this pull is to clean up the way callers fetch random integers. The current rules for doing this right are: - If you want a secure or an insecure random u64, use get_random_u64() - If you want a secure or an insecure random u32, use get_random_u32() The old function prandom_u32() has been deprecated for a while now and is just a wrapper around get_random_u32(). Same for get_random_int(). - If you want a secure or an insecure random u16, use get_random_u16() - If you want a secure or an insecure random u8, use get_random_u8() - If you want secure or insecure random bytes, use get_random_bytes(). The old function prandom_bytes() has been deprecated for a while now and has long been a wrapper around get_random_bytes() - If you want a non-uniform random u32, u16, or u8 bounded by a certain open interval maximum, use prandom_u32_max() I say "non-uniform", because it doesn't do any rejection sampling or divisions. Hence, it stays within the prandom_*() namespace, not the get_random_*() namespace. I'm currently investigating a "uniform" function for 6.2. We'll see what comes of that. By applying these rules uniformly, we get several benefits: - By using prandom_u32_max() with an upper-bound that the compiler can prove at compile-time is ≤65536 or ≤256, internally get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() is used, which wastes fewer batched random bytes, and hence has higher throughput. - By using prandom_u32_max() instead of %, when the upper-bound is not a constant, division is still avoided, because prandom_u32_max() uses a faster multiplication-based trick instead. - By using get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() in cases where the return value is intended to indeed be a u16 or a u8, we waste fewer batched random bytes, and hence have higher throughput. This series was originally done by hand while I was on an airplane without Internet. Later, Kees and I worked on retroactively figuring out what could be done with Coccinelle and what had to be done manually, and then we split things up based on that. So while this touches a lot of files, the actual amount of code that's hand fiddled is comfortably small" * tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: prandom: remove unused functions treewide: use get_random_bytes() when possible treewide: use get_random_u32() when possible treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 2 treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 1 treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 2 treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/core.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/hashtab.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/kcsan/selftest.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/locking/test-ww_mutex.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/time/clocksource.c2
7 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c b/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
index b9ea539a5561..48ee750849f2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *bloom_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
attr->value_size / sizeof(u32);
if (!(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_ZERO_SEED))
- bloom->hash_seed = get_random_int();
+ bloom->hash_seed = get_random_u32();
return &bloom->map;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 59cf4dc728a5..25a54e04560e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@ bpf_jit_binary_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
hdr->size = size;
hole = min_t(unsigned int, size - (proglen + sizeof(*hdr)),
PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*hdr));
- start = (get_random_int() % hole) & ~(alignment - 1);
+ start = prandom_u32_max(hole) & ~(alignment - 1);
/* Leave a random number of instructions before BPF code. */
*image_ptr = &hdr->image[start];
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr,
hole = min_t(unsigned int, size - (proglen + sizeof(*ro_header)),
BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE - sizeof(*ro_header));
- start = (get_random_int() % hole) & ~(alignment - 1);
+ start = prandom_u32_max(hole) & ~(alignment - 1);
*image_ptr = &ro_header->image[start];
*rw_image = &(*rw_header)->image[start];
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
bool emit_zext)
{
struct bpf_insn *to = to_buff;
- u32 imm_rnd = get_random_int();
+ u32 imm_rnd = get_random_u32();
s16 off;
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_AX + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index ed3f8a53603b..f39ee3e05589 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (htab->map.map_flags & BPF_F_ZERO_SEED)
htab->hashrnd = 0;
else
- htab->hashrnd = get_random_int();
+ htab->hashrnd = get_random_u32();
htab_init_buckets(htab);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6f6d2d511c06..014ee0953dbd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13350,7 +13350,7 @@ static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
aux[adj_idx].ptr_type == PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
- imm_rnd = get_random_int();
+ imm_rnd = get_random_u32();
rnd_hi32_patch[0] = insn;
rnd_hi32_patch[1].imm = imm_rnd;
rnd_hi32_patch[3].dst_reg = load_reg;
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/selftest.c b/kernel/kcsan/selftest.c
index 75712959c84e..00cdf8fa5693 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/selftest.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/selftest.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
static bool __init test_requires(void)
{
/* random should be initialized for the below tests */
- return prandom_u32() + prandom_u32() != 0;
+ return get_random_u32() + get_random_u32() != 0;
}
/*
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static bool __init test_encode_decode(void)
unsigned long addr;
size_t verif_size;
- prandom_bytes(&addr, sizeof(addr));
+ get_random_bytes(&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (addr < PAGE_SIZE)
addr = PAGE_SIZE;
diff --git a/kernel/locking/test-ww_mutex.c b/kernel/locking/test-ww_mutex.c
index 353004155d65..43efb2a04160 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/test-ww_mutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/test-ww_mutex.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int *get_random_order(int count)
order[n] = n;
for (n = count - 1; n > 1; n--) {
- r = get_random_int() % (n + 1);
+ r = prandom_u32_max(n + 1);
if (r != n) {
tmp = order[n];
order[n] = order[r];
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static void stress_one_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct stress *stress = container_of(work, typeof(*stress), work);
const int nlocks = stress->nlocks;
- struct ww_mutex *lock = stress->locks + (get_random_int() % nlocks);
+ struct ww_mutex *lock = stress->locks + prandom_u32_max(nlocks);
int err;
do {
diff --git a/kernel/time/clocksource.c b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
index cee5da1e54c4..8058bec87ace 100644
--- a/kernel/time/clocksource.c
+++ b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static void clocksource_verify_choose_cpus(void)
* CPUs that are currently online.
*/
for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
- cpu = prandom_u32() % nr_cpu_ids;
+ cpu = prandom_u32_max(nr_cpu_ids);
cpu = cpumask_next(cpu - 1, cpu_online_mask);
if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);