diff options
| author |   Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2012-10-21 19:57:11 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2012-10-22 14:29:06 -0400 |
| commit | 354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 (patch) | |
| tree | 26a9eab79c239f1e0f27b469a5ed06c9a111a1d2 /net/ipv4/tcp.c | |
| parent | pkt_sched: use ns_to_ktime() helper (diff) | |
| download | linux-dev-354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25.tar.xz linux-dev-354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25.zip | |
tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation
RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
declaration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions