tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once

Changed key initialization of tcp_fastopen cookies to net_get_random_once.

If the user sets a custom key net_get_random_once must be called at
least once to ensure we don't overwrite the user provided key when the
first cookie is generated later on.

Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 16 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index ab7bd35bb312..766032b4a6c3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);
 
+void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
+{
+	static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+	/* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
+	 * atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
+	 *
+	 * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
+	 * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
+	 */
+	if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
+		tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
+}
+
 static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
@@ -70,6 +84,8 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
 	__be32 path[4] = { src, dst, 0, 0 };
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
 
+	tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(true);
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
 	if (ctx) {
@@ -78,14 +94,3 @@ void tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
-
-static int __init tcp_fastopen_init(void)
-{
-	__u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-	get_random_bytes(key, sizeof(key));
-	tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
-	return 0;
-}
-
-late_initcall(tcp_fastopen_init);