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authorJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2022-04-07 20:38:16 -0700
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2022-04-08 11:49:08 +0100
commitc3f6bb74137c68b515b7e2ff123a80611e801013 (patch)
treecdef4b7bf334b0e5c3c99d49a65fcf88682b832f /net/tls
parenttls: rx: drop pointless else after goto (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-c3f6bb74137c68b515b7e2ff123a80611e801013.tar.xz
linux-dev-c3f6bb74137c68b515b7e2ff123a80611e801013.zip
tls: rx: don't store the record type in socket context
Original TLS implementation was handling one record at a time. It stashed the type of the record inside tls context (per socket structure) for convenience. When async crypto support was added [1] the author had to use skb->cb to store the type per-message. The use of skb->cb overlaps with strparser, however, so a hybrid approach was taken where type is stored in context while parsing (since we parse a message at a time) but once parsed its copied to skb->cb. Recently a workaround for sockmaps [2] exposed the previously private struct _strp_msg and started a trend of adding user fields directly in strparser's header. This is cleaner than storing information about an skb in the context. This change is not strictly necessary, but IMHO the ownership of the context field is confusing. Information naturally belongs to the skb. [1] commit 94524d8fc965 ("net/tls: Add support for async decryption of tls records") [2] commit b2c4618162ec ("bpf, sockmap: sk_skb data_end access incorrect when src_reg = dst_reg") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/tls')
-rw-r--r--net/tls/tls_sw.c38
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index e2b9c55980e2..1494e7edcf51 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
}
-static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
- struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int padding_length(struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
int sub = 0;
/* Determine zero-padding length */
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
sub++;
back++;
}
- ctx->control = content_type;
+ tlm->control = content_type;
}
return sub;
}
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int pad;
- pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
+ pad = padding_length(prot, skb);
if (pad < 0) {
ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
@@ -1421,6 +1421,7 @@ static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
struct aead_request *aead_req;
struct sk_buff *unused;
@@ -1505,7 +1506,7 @@ static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* Prepare AAD */
tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
prot->tail_size,
- tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, ctx->control, prot);
+ tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tlm->control, prot);
/* Prepare sgin */
sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
@@ -1590,7 +1591,7 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
*zc = false;
}
- pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
+ pad = padding_length(prot, skb);
if (pad < 0)
return pad;
@@ -1822,26 +1823,21 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
}
}
goto recv_end;
- } else {
- tlm = tls_msg(skb);
- if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
- tlm->control = 0;
- else
- tlm->control = ctx->control;
}
rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
- ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
+ tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
!bpf_strp_enabled)
zc = true;
/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
- if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
+ if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
else
async_capable = false;
@@ -1856,8 +1852,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
async = true;
num_async++;
- } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
- tlm->control = ctx->control;
}
/* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
@@ -2005,6 +1999,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct tls_msg *tlm;
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t copied = 0;
bool from_queue;
@@ -2033,14 +2028,15 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
}
}
+ rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+
/* splice does not support reading control messages */
- if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+ if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto splice_read_end;
}
- rxm = strp_msg(skb);
-
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
if (copied < 0)
@@ -2084,10 +2080,10 @@ bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk)
static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb);
size_t cipher_overhead;
size_t data_len = 0;
int ret;
@@ -2108,7 +2104,7 @@ static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (ret < 0)
goto read_failure;
- ctx->control = header[0];
+ tlm->control = header[0];
data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));