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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700
commit7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch)
tree65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /scripts/mod
parentMerge tag 'trace-v5.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace (diff)
parentkvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.tar.xz
linux-dev-7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8.zip
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra: "Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen), which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP. Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1]. CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as described above, speculation limits itself" [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html * tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits) kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0 x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0 kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions objtool: Validate IBT assumptions objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation x86: Annotate idtentry_df() x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h x86: Annotate call_on_stack() objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto ...
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/mod')
-rw-r--r--scripts/mod/modpost.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 8a7937452991..d10f93aac1c8 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1996,9 +1996,9 @@ static char *remove_dot(char *s)
if (m && (s[n + m] == '.' || s[n + m] == 0))
s[n] = 0;
- /* strip trailing .lto */
- if (strends(s, ".lto"))
- s[strlen(s) - 4] = '\0';
+ /* strip trailing .prelink */
+ if (strends(s, ".prelink"))
+ s[strlen(s) - 8] = '\0';
}
return s;
}
@@ -2022,9 +2022,9 @@ static void read_symbols(const char *modname)
/* strip trailing .o */
tmp = NOFAIL(strdup(modname));
tmp[strlen(tmp) - 2] = '\0';
- /* strip trailing .lto */
- if (strends(tmp, ".lto"))
- tmp[strlen(tmp) - 4] = '\0';
+ /* strip trailing .prelink */
+ if (strends(tmp, ".prelink"))
+ tmp[strlen(tmp) - 8] = '\0';
mod = new_module(tmp);
free(tmp);
}