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authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2017-01-16 00:43:02 -0800
committerJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2017-01-16 01:18:47 -0800
commitef88a7ac55fdd3bf6ac3942b83aa29311b45339b (patch)
tree54c6b15e2101650dd169caf745bdb17521db899c /security/apparmor/file.c
parentapparmor: change op from int to const char * (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-ef88a7ac55fdd3bf6ac3942b83aa29311b45339b.tar.xz
linux-dev-ef88a7ac55fdd3bf6ac3942b83aa29311b45339b.zip
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/file.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c69
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index e04f044340ba..750564c3ab71 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -67,24 +67,24 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.request);
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
- audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
+ audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.denied);
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid));
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid));
}
- if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
+ if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
}
}
@@ -104,54 +104,53 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
* Returns: %0 or error on failure
*/
int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
- gfp_t gfp, const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
+ const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
{
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, op);
+
+ sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request = request;
+ aad(&sa)->name = name;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.target = target;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid;
+ aad(&sa)->info = info;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
sa.u.tsk = NULL;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = op,
- aad.fs.request = request;
- aad.name = name;
- aad.fs.target = target;
- aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
- aad.info = info;
- aad.error = error;
-
- if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+
+ if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
u32 mask = perms->audit;
if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
mask = 0xffff;
/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
- sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request &= mask;
- if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
+ if (likely(!aad(&sa)->fs.request))
return 0;
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
} else {
/* only report permissions that were denied */
- sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->fs.request);
- if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
+ if (aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->kill)
type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
- if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+ if ((aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
- sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+ aad(&sa)->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
- if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
- return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+ if (!aad(&sa)->fs.request)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
}
- sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
- return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+ aad(&sa)->fs.denied = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -302,8 +301,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
if (request & ~perms.allow)
error = -EACCES;
}
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
- NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, name, NULL,
+ cond->uid, info, error);
kfree(buffer);
return error;
@@ -430,7 +429,7 @@ done_tests:
error = 0;
audit:
- error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request,
lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
kfree(buffer);
kfree(buffer2);