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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2012-02-07 16:45:47 -0800
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2012-05-03 03:28:40 -0700
commit18815a18085364d8514c0d0c4c986776cb74272c (patch)
treea931fb2eee31aee6f8d83ef4493071b9827b1b9f /security/commoncap.c
parentuserns: Convert sched_set_affinity and sched_set_scheduler's permission checks (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-18815a18085364d8514c0d0c4c986776cb74272c.tar.xz
linux-dev-18815a18085364d8514c0d0c4c986776cb74272c.zip
userns: Convert capabilities related permsion checks
- Use uid_eq when comparing kuids Use gid_eq when comparing kgids - Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c41
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index dbd465a59286..ff9b113bb07c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -472,19 +472,22 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
+
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+ if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
@@ -495,12 +498,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
- if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
- if (new->euid == 0)
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
effective = true;
}
skip:
@@ -508,8 +511,8 @@ skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/
- if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
- new->egid != old->gid ||
+ if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ skip:
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
- new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
+ !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -569,16 +572,17 @@ skip:
int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0);
- if (cred->uid != 0) {
+ if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) {
if (bprm->cap_effective)
return 1;
if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted))
return 1;
}
- return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
- cred->egid != cred->gid);
+ return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid));
}
/**
@@ -668,15 +672,21 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
- (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+
+ if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
+ (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
- if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
+ if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
- if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
+ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
@@ -709,11 +719,12 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
*/
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
- if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
+ if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);