Merge tag 'kernel-hardening-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook:

 - usercopy hardening expanded to check other allocation types (Matthew
   Wilcox, Yuanzheng Song)

 - arm64 stackleak behavioral improvements (Mark Rutland)

 - arm64 CFI code gen improvement (Sami Tolvanen)

 - LoadPin LSM block dev API adjustment (Christoph Hellwig)

 - Clang randstruct support (Bill Wendling, Kees Cook)

* tag 'kernel-hardening-v5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (34 commits)
  loadpin: stop using bdevname
  mm: usercopy: move the virt_addr_valid() below the is_vmalloc_addr()
  gcc-plugins: randstruct: Remove cast exception handling
  af_unix: Silence randstruct GCC plugin warning
  niu: Silence randstruct warnings
  big_keys: Use struct for internal payload
  gcc-plugins: Change all version strings match kernel
  randomize_kstack: Improve docs on requirements/rationale
  lkdtm/stackleak: fix CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n
  arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack()
  stackleak: add on/off stack variants
  lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries
  lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage
  lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management
  lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure
  stackleak: rework poison scanning
  stackleak: rework stack high bound handling
  stackleak: clarify variable names
  stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
  stackleak: remove redundant check
  ...

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index aaf6566deb9f..08420c6ff52d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -367,13 +367,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 
 int __init early_security_init(void)
 {
-	int i;
-	struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads;
 	struct lsm_info *lsm;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
-	     i++)
-		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
+#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME);
+#include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h"
+#undef LSM_HOOK
 
 	for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
 		if (!lsm->enabled)