Merge tag 'blob-stacking-security-next' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux into next-general

LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

The combined series of LSM refactoring and addition of blob-sharing for
SARA and Landlock.

From Casey:

v5: Include Kees Cook's rework of the lsm command
    line interface.
v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other
    cleanups suggested by Kees Cook.
    Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux
    credential blob poisoning.
v3: Add ipc blob for SARA and task blob for Landlock.
    Removing the SELinux cred blob pointer poisoning
    results selinux_is_enabled() being unused, so it and
    all it's overhead has been removed.
    Broke up the cred infrastructure patch.
v2: Reduce the patchset to what is required to support
    the proposed SARA and LandLock security modules

The SARA security module is intended to be used
in conjunction with other security modules. It requires
state to be maintained for the credential, which
in turn requires a mechanism for sharing the credential
security blob. It also uses the ipc security blob. The
module also requires mechanism for user space manipulation
of the credential information, hence an additional
subdirectory in /proc/.../attr.

The LandLock security module provides user configurable
policy in the secmark mechanism. It requires data in
the credential, file, inode and task security blobs. For
this to be used along side the existing "major" security
modules mechanism for sharing these blobs are provided.

A side effect of providing sharing of the crendential
security blob is that the TOMOYO module can be used at
the same time as the other "major" modules.

The mechanism for configuring which security modules are
enabled has to change when stacking in enabled. Any
module that uses just the security blobs that are shared
can be selected. Additionally, one other "major" module
can be selected.

The security module stacking issues around networking and
IPC are not addressed here as they are beyond what is
required for TOMOYO, SARA and LandLock.

1 files changed, 576 insertions, 59 deletions

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f1b8d2587639..953fc3ea18a9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,20 +30,32 @@
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
-/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
-#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10
+/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
+#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
 
 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
 static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
 
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
+
 char *lsm_names;
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
-	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
+
+static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
+
+/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
+static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
+static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
 
 static __initdata bool debug;
 #define init_debug(...)						\
@@ -52,18 +64,260 @@ static __initdata bool debug;
 			pr_info(__VA_ARGS__);			\
 	} while (0)
 
-static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
+static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 {
-	struct lsm_info *lsm;
-	int ret;
+	if (!lsm->enabled)
+		return false;
+
+	return *lsm->enabled;
+}
+
+/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
+static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
+static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
+static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
+	 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
+	 */
+	if (!lsm->enabled) {
+		if (enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+		else
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+	} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
+		if (!enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+	} else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+		if (enabled)
+			lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+	} else {
+		*lsm->enabled = enabled;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
+static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	struct lsm_info **check;
+
+	for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
+		if (*check == lsm)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
+static int last_lsm __initdata;
+static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
+{
+	/* Ignore duplicate selections. */
+	if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
+		return;
+
+	/* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
+	if (!lsm->enabled)
+		lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+	ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
+
+	init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
+		   is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
+static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	/* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
+	if (!is_enabled(lsm))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
+	if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
+		init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
+{
+	int offset;
+
+	if (*need > 0) {
+		offset = *lbs;
+		*lbs += *need;
+		*need = offset;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
+{
+	if (!needed)
+		return;
+
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+	/*
+	 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
+	 * what the modules might need.
+	 */
+	if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
+		blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+}
+
+/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
+static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
+
+	/* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
+	set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
+
+	/* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
+	if (enabled) {
+		if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
+			exclusive = lsm;
+			init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
+		}
+
+		lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
+static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+	if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
+		int ret;
 
-	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
 		init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
 		ret = lsm->init();
 		WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
 	}
 }
 
+/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
+static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
+{
+	struct lsm_info *lsm;
+	char *sep, *name, *next;
+
+	/* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
+	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+		if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
+			append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first");
+	}
+
+	/* Process "security=", if given. */
+	if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+		struct lsm_info *major;
+
+		/*
+		 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this
+		 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
+		 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
+		 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
+		 */
+		for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
+		     major++) {
+			if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
+			    strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
+				set_enabled(major, false);
+				init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n",
+					   chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
+	next = sep;
+	/* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
+	while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
+		bool found = false;
+
+		for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+			if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
+			    strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+				append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
+				found = true;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!found)
+			init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
+	}
+
+	/* Process "security=", if given. */
+	if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+		for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+			if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+				continue;
+			if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
+				append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
+	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+		if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+			continue;
+		set_enabled(lsm, false);
+		init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
+	}
+
+	kfree(sep);
+}
+
+static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
+{
+	struct lsm_info **lsm;
+
+	ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
+				GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (chosen_lsm_order)
+		ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
+	else
+		ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
+
+	for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+		prepare_lsm(*lsm);
+
+	init_debug("cred blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+	init_debug("file blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+	init_debug("inode blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+	init_debug("ipc blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+	init_debug("msg_msg blob size  = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	init_debug("task blob size     = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
+	 */
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
+		lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
+						   blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
+						   SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
+		lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
+						    blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
+						    SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+
+	for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+		initialize_lsm(*lsm);
+
+	kfree(ordered_lsms);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_init - initializes the security framework
  *
@@ -80,28 +334,27 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	     i++)
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
 
-	/*
-	 * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
-	 */
-	capability_add_hooks();
-	yama_add_hooks();
-	loadpin_add_hooks();
-
-	/*
-	 * Load all the remaining security modules.
-	 */
-	major_lsm_init();
+	/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
+	ordered_lsm_init();
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Save user chosen LSM */
-static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
+static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
 {
-	strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+	chosen_major_lsm = str;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
+
+/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
+static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
+{
+	chosen_lsm_order = str;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
 
 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */
 static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
@@ -148,29 +401,6 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
 }
 
 /**
- * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
- * @module: the name of the module
- *
- * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
- * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
- * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
- *
- * Returns:
- *
- * true if:
- *
- * - The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- * - or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- *   choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
- *
- * Otherwise, return false.
- */
-int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
-{
-	return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
-}
-
-/**
  * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
  * @hooks: the hooks to add
  * @count: the number of hooks to add
@@ -209,6 +439,171 @@ int unregister_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
 
+/**
+ * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
+		cred->security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
+	if (cred->security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (cred == NULL)
+		panic("%s: NULL cred.\n", __func__);
+	if (cred->security != NULL)
+		return;
+	rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
+ * @file: the file that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (!lsm_file_cache) {
+		file->f_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (file->f_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
+		inode->i_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
+		task->security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (task->security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
+ * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
+		kip->security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (kip->security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
+ * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
+		mp->security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (mp->security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules if it's not already there
+ */
+void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (task == NULL)
+		panic("%s: task cred.\n", __func__);
+	if (task->security != NULL)
+		return;
+	rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+	if (rc)
+		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
 /*
  * Hook list operation macros.
  *
@@ -468,14 +863,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_add_mnt_opt);
 
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+	int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_inode_free(inode);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
+	 */
+	kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
 }
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	integrity_inode_free(inode);
 	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+	/*
+	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+	 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
+	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_security)
+		call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
+				inode_free_by_rcu);
 }
 
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
@@ -905,12 +1326,27 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+	int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_file_free(file);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
+	void *blob;
+
 	call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+	blob = file->f_security;
+	if (blob) {
+		file->f_security = NULL;
+		kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
+	}
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1012,27 +1448,56 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
 
 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+	int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_task_free(task);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	call_void_hook(task_free, task);
+
+	kfree(task->security);
+	task->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+	int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_cred_free(cred);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+	kfree(cred->security);
+	cred->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+	int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_cred_free(new);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
@@ -1213,22 +1678,40 @@ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+	int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_msg_msg_free(msg);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+	kfree(msg->security);
+	msg->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_msg_queue_free(msq);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 {
 	call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+	kfree(msq->security);
+	msq->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -1255,12 +1738,21 @@ int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 
 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_shm_free(shp);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 {
 	call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+	kfree(shp->security);
+	shp->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -1280,12 +1772,21 @@ int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmf
 
 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+	int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sem_free(sma);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 {
 	call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+	kfree(sma->security);
+	sma->security = NULL;
 }
 
 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
@@ -1312,14 +1813,30 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
 
-int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+				char **value)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+			continue;
+		return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+			 size_t size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
+		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+			continue;
+		return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)