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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2016-05-23 10:54:11 -0400
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2016-05-31 12:01:59 -0400
commit7ea59202db8d20806d9ae552acd1875c3a978bcc (patch)
treede9c1ac30dda9cc2ac5c89434bff2087277f449c /security/selinux/ss/services.c
parentLSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG (diff)
downloadlinux-dev-7ea59202db8d20806d9ae552acd1875c3a978bcc.tar.xz
linux-dev-7ea59202db8d20806d9ae552acd1875c3a978bcc.zip
selinux: Only apply bounds checking to source types
The current bounds checking of both source and target types requires allowing any domain that has access to the child domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which is undesirable. Drop the target bounds checking. KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in commit 7d52a155e38d ("selinux: remove dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in commit 2ae3ba39389b ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions to the child that the child is allowed to itself. This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding permissions to the parent of the target. Further, this change reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve a bounds violation. Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the target type. Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic: 1. If we have: typebounds A B; then: allow B self:process <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A self:process <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed: allow A B:process <permissions>; or allow B A:process <permissions>; or allow A self:process <permissions>; However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only need to perform one compute_av call). 2. If we have: typebounds A B; typebounds A_exec B_exec; then: allow B B_exec:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A A_exec:file <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having: allow A B_exec:file <permissions>; in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types. 3. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded type T, then: allow B T:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A T:file <permissions>; is allowed in policy. The old logic would have been identical for this example. 4. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded domain D, then: allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having to allow it to do the same to its parent. The old logic would have required: allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; to also be allowed in policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/ss/services.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c70
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 89df64672b89..082b20c78363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct context lo_scontext;
- struct context lo_tcontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
struct av_decision lo_avd;
struct type_datum *source;
struct type_datum *target;
@@ -553,67 +553,41 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!source);
+ if (!source->bounds)
+ return;
+
target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
tcontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!target);
- if (source->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
- memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
- lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
- context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
- tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- }
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
if (target->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
-
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
- &lo_tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
}
- if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
- /*
- * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
- * set up.
- */
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ tcontextp,
+ tclass,
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
- context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
- &lo_tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- }
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- if (masked) {
- /* mask violated permissions */
- avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+ if (likely(!masked))
+ return; /* no masked permission */
- /* audit masked permissions */
- security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
- tclass, masked, "bounds");
- }
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
}
/*