path: root/security/selinux
diff options
authorPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>2014-05-15 11:16:06 -0400
committerPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>2014-05-15 11:16:06 -0400
commit4f189988a0a5890db597ec48fc0e8b09922f290a (patch)
treeb3160fdb38bc7ab16a603ed69d737be2b1b7d5d2 /security/selinux
parentselinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages. (diff)
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid case. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 889cf4c3c3fa..b03b0776955a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2123,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
- * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
- * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+ * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+ * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
return -EPERM;
+ if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ return -EACCES;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,