Merge branch 'master' into next

14 files changed, 154 insertions, 61 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 4c865345caa0..fb363cd81cf6 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -113,6 +113,36 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config INTEL_TXT
+	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
+	help
+	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+	  will have no effect.
+
+	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
+	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
+	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
+	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
+	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
+	  of the kernel itself.
+
+	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
+	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
+	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
+	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
+
+	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+	  about Intel(R) TXT.
+	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
+	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index b8186bac8b7e..6cf8fd2b79e8 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
 struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys;
 
 static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
-		struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task)
+		struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task,
+		bool threadgroup)
 {
 	if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 6bfc7eaebfda..8e9777b76405 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
+static const struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
 	.start = ima_measurements_start,
 	.next = ima_measurements_next,
 	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
+static const struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
 	.start = ima_measurements_start,
 	.next = ima_measurements_next,
 	.stop = ima_measurements_stop,
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 1e616aef55fd..4770be375ffe 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *);
 static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0);
 static DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
 static key_serial_t key_gc_cursor; /* the last key the gc considered */
+static bool key_gc_again;
 static unsigned long key_gc_executing;
 static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+static time_t key_gc_new_timer;
 
 /*
  * Schedule a garbage collection run
@@ -40,9 +42,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
 
 	kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
 
-	gc_at += key_gc_delay;
-
-	if (now >= gc_at) {
+	if (gc_at <= now) {
 		schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
 	} else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
 		expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
@@ -112,16 +112,18 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct rb_node *rb;
 	key_serial_t cursor;
 	struct key *key, *xkey;
-	time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit;
+	time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit, now;
 
-	kenter("");
+	now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+	kenter("[%x,%ld]", key_gc_cursor, key_gc_new_timer - now);
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(0, &key_gc_executing)) {
-		key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec);
+		key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec + 1);
+		kleave(" [busy; deferring]");
 		return;
 	}
 
-	limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+	limit = now;
 	if (limit > key_gc_delay)
 		limit -= key_gc_delay;
 	else
@@ -129,12 +131,19 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-	if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))
-		goto reached_the_end;
+	if (unlikely(RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))) {
+		spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+		clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	cursor = key_gc_cursor;
 	if (cursor < 0)
 		cursor = 0;
+	if (cursor > 0)
+		new_timer = key_gc_new_timer;
+	else
+		key_gc_again = false;
 
 	/* find the first key above the cursor */
 	key = NULL;
@@ -160,35 +169,50 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	/* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
 	for (;;) {
-		if (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry < new_timer)
+		if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) {
+			kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
+			       key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
 			new_timer = key->expiry;
+		}
 
 		if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
-		    key_gc_keyring(key, limit)) {
-			/* the gc ate our lock */
-			schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
-			goto no_unlock;
-		}
+		    key_gc_keyring(key, limit))
+			/* the gc had to release our lock so that the keyring
+			 * could be modified, so we have to get it again */
+			goto gc_released_our_lock;
 
 		rb = rb_next(&key->serial_node);
-		if (!rb) {
-			key_gc_cursor = 0;
-			break;
-		}
+		if (!rb)
+			goto reached_the_end;
 		key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
 	}
 
-out:
-	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
-no_unlock:
+gc_released_our_lock:
+	kdebug("gc_released_our_lock");
+	key_gc_new_timer = new_timer;
+	key_gc_again = true;
 	clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
-	if (new_timer < LONG_MAX)
-		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
-
-	kleave("");
+	schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+	kleave(" [continue]");
 	return;
 
+	/* when we reach the end of the run, we set the timer for the next one */
 reached_the_end:
+	kdebug("reached_the_end");
+	spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+	key_gc_new_timer = new_timer;
 	key_gc_cursor = 0;
-	goto out;
+	clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+
+	if (key_gc_again) {
+		/* there may have been a key that expired whilst we were
+		 * scanning, so if we discarded any links we should do another
+		 * scan */
+		new_timer = now + 1;
+		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+	} else if (new_timer < LONG_MAX) {
+		new_timer += key_gc_delay;
+		key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+	}
+	kleave(" [end]");
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 08531ad0f252..e50d264c9ad1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
-		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
+		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
 
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
 			awaken = 1;
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 	time = now.tv_sec;
 	if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
 		key->revoked_at = time;
-		key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at);
+		key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
 	}
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 74c968524592..2fb28efc5326 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	}
 
 	key->expiry = expiry;
-	key_schedule_gc(key->expiry);
+	key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 	key_put(key);
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 already_same:
 	ret = 0;
 not_permitted:
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 	put_cred(cred);
 	return ret;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index ac977f661a79..8ec02746ca99 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1019,18 +1019,18 @@ void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 	struct key *key;
 	int loop, keep, max;
 
-	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+	kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description);
 
 	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 
 	klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
 	if (!klist)
-		goto just_return;
+		goto no_klist;
 
 	/* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
 	keep = 0;
 	for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
-		if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit));
+		if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit))
 			keep++;
 
 	if (keep == klist->nkeys)
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 	new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
 		      GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new)
-		goto just_return;
+		goto nomem;
 	new->maxkeys = max;
 	new->nkeys = 0;
 	new->delkey = 0;
@@ -1081,7 +1081,21 @@ void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 discard_new:
 	new->nkeys = keep;
 	keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [discard]");
+	return;
+
 just_return:
 	up_write(&keyring->sem);
-	kleave(" [no]");
+	kleave(" [no dead]");
+	return;
+
+no_klist:
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [no_klist]");
+	return;
+
+nomem:
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" [oom]");
 }
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 500aad0ebd6a..3bb90b6f1dd3 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static inline void print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 				   char *name1, char *name2)
 {
 	if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
-		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6c", name1, addr);
 	if (port)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
 }
diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c
index 14cc7b3b8d03..c844eed7915d 100644
--- a/security/min_addr.c
+++ b/security/min_addr.c
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ static void update_mmap_min_addr(void)
  * sysctl handler which just sets dac_mmap_min_addr = the new value and then
  * calls update_mmap_min_addr() so non MAP_FIXED hints get rounded properly
  */
-int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
+int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 			  void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
 	update_mmap_min_addr();
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index e3d19014259b..b4b5da1c0a42 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -709,18 +709,16 @@ out:
 }
 
 /**
- * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
- * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
  */
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+static void avc_flush(void)
 {
-	struct avc_callback_node *c;
-	int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
-	unsigned long flag;
-	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	struct hlist_node *next;
+	struct avc_node *node;
 	spinlock_t *lock;
+	unsigned long flag;
+	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
 		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
@@ -737,6 +735,18 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+	struct avc_callback_node *c;
+	int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+	avc_flush();
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
@@ -858,6 +868,19 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 
 void avc_disable(void)
 {
-	if (avc_node_cachep)
-		kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+	/*
+	 * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
+	 * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
+	 * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know.  It's
+	 * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
+	 * it still pointed to selinux operations.  If that is the case it's
+	 * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
+	 * avc_node_cachep.  I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
+	 * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it.  Instead I just flush
+	 * the cache and get that memory back.
+	 */
+	if (avc_node_cachep) {
+		avc_flush();
+		/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
+	}
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index c73aeaa008e8..c0a454aee1e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -63,3 +63,9 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 	atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
+bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
+{
+	return selinux_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 417f7c994522..bb230d5d7085 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2411,7 +2411,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
 	 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-	wake_up_interruptible(&current->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+	__wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
 	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index acae7ef4092d..c33b6bb9b6dd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -30,17 +30,11 @@
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
 
-/*
- * I hope these are the hokeyist lines of code in the module. Casey.
- */
-#define DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC	0x1cd1
-#define SOCKFS_MAGIC		0x534F434B
-#define TMPFS_MAGIC		0x01021994
-
 /**
  * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
  * @ip: a pointer to the inode
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f83a80980726..aeead7585093 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	/* No-op */
 }
 
-static struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
 	.start = load_seq_start,
 	.next  = load_seq_next,
 	.show  = load_seq_show,
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static void cipso_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	/* No-op */
 }
 
-static struct seq_operations cipso_seq_ops = {
+static const struct seq_operations cipso_seq_ops = {
 	.start = cipso_seq_start,
 	.stop  = cipso_seq_stop,
 	.next  = cipso_seq_next,
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ static void netlbladdr_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	/* No-op */
 }
 
-static struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
+static const struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
 	.start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
 	.stop  = netlbladdr_seq_stop,
 	.next  = netlbladdr_seq_next,