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Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/virt/kvm/s390')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst | 119 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst | 84 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst | 64 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst | 116 |
5 files changed, 396 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..44ec9ab14b59 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==================== +KVM for s390 systems +==================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 2 + + s390-diag + s390-pv + s390-pv-boot + s390-pv-dump diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ca85f030eb0b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-diag.rst @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============================= +The s390 DIAGNOSE call on KVM +============================= + +KVM on s390 supports the DIAGNOSE call for making hypercalls, both for +native hypercalls and for selected hypercalls found on other s390 +hypervisors. + +Note that bits are numbered as by the usual s390 convention (most significant +bit on the left). + + +General remarks +--------------- + +DIAGNOSE calls by the guest cause a mandatory intercept. This implies +all supported DIAGNOSE calls need to be handled by either KVM or its +userspace. + +All DIAGNOSE calls supported by KVM use the RS-a format:: + + -------------------------------------- + | '83' | R1 | R3 | B2 | D2 | + -------------------------------------- + 0 8 12 16 20 31 + +The second-operand address (obtained by the base/displacement calculation) +is not used to address data. Instead, bits 48-63 of this address specify +the function code, and bits 0-47 are ignored. + +The supported DIAGNOSE function codes vary by the userspace used. For +DIAGNOSE function codes not specific to KVM, please refer to the +documentation for the s390 hypervisors defining them. + + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'500' - KVM virtio functions +----------------------------------------------------- + +If the function code specifies 0x500, various virtio-related functions +are performed. + +General register 1 contains the virtio subfunction code. Supported +virtio subfunctions depend on KVM's userspace. Generally, userspace +provides either s390-virtio (subcodes 0-2) or virtio-ccw (subcode 3). + +Upon completion of the DIAGNOSE instruction, general register 2 contains +the function's return code, which is either a return code or a subcode +specific value. + +Subcode 0 - s390-virtio notification and early console printk + Handled by userspace. + +Subcode 1 - s390-virtio reset + Handled by userspace. + +Subcode 2 - s390-virtio set status + Handled by userspace. + +Subcode 3 - virtio-ccw notification + Handled by either userspace or KVM (ioeventfd case). + + General register 2 contains a subchannel-identification word denoting + the subchannel of the virtio-ccw proxy device to be notified. + + General register 3 contains the number of the virtqueue to be notified. + + General register 4 contains a 64bit identifier for KVM usage (the + kvm_io_bus cookie). If general register 4 does not contain a valid + identifier, it is ignored. + + After completion of the DIAGNOSE call, general register 2 may contain + a 64bit identifier (in the kvm_io_bus cookie case), or a negative + error value, if an internal error occurred. + + See also the virtio standard for a discussion of this hypercall. + + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'501 - KVM breakpoint +---------------------------------------------- + +If the function code specifies 0x501, breakpoint functions may be performed. +This function code is handled by userspace. + +This diagnose function code has no subfunctions and uses no parameters. + + +DIAGNOSE function code 'X'9C - Voluntary Time Slice Yield +--------------------------------------------------------- + +General register 1 contains the target CPU address. + +In a guest of a hypervisor like LPAR, KVM or z/VM using shared host CPUs, +DIAGNOSE with function code 0x9c may improve system performance by +yielding the host CPU on which the guest CPU is running to be assigned +to another guest CPU, preferably the logical CPU containing the specified +target CPU. + + +DIAG 'X'9C forwarding ++++++++++++++++++++++ + +The guest may send a DIAGNOSE 0x9c in order to yield to a certain +other vcpu. An example is a Linux guest that tries to yield to the vcpu +that is currently holding a spinlock, but not running. + +However, on the host the real cpu backing the vcpu may itself not be +running. +Forwarding the DIAGNOSE 0x9c initially sent by the guest to yield to +the backing cpu will hopefully cause that cpu, and thus subsequently +the guest's vcpu, to be scheduled. + + +diag9c_forwarding_hz + KVM kernel parameter allowing to specify the maximum number of DIAGNOSE + 0x9c forwarding per second in the purpose of avoiding a DIAGNOSE 0x9c + forwarding storm. + A value of 0 turns the forwarding off. diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..96c48480a360 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-boot.rst @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +====================================== +s390 (IBM Z) Boot/IPL of Protected VMs +====================================== + +Summary +------- +The memory of Protected Virtual Machines (PVMs) is not accessible to +I/O or the hypervisor. In those cases where the hypervisor needs to +access the memory of a PVM, that memory must be made accessible. +Memory made accessible to the hypervisor will be encrypted. See +Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst for details." + +On IPL (boot) a small plaintext bootloader is started, which provides +information about the encrypted components and necessary metadata to +KVM to decrypt the protected virtual machine. + +Based on this data, KVM will make the protected virtual machine known +to the Ultravisor (UV) and instruct it to secure the memory of the +PVM, decrypt the components and verify the data and address list +hashes, to ensure integrity. Afterwards KVM can run the PVM via the +SIE instruction which the UV will intercept and execute on KVM's +behalf. + +As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the +switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest +executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi, +direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process. + + +Diag308 +------- +This diagnose instruction is the basic mechanism to handle IPL and +related operations for virtual machines. The VM can set and retrieve +IPL information blocks, that specify the IPL method/devices and +request VM memory and subsystem resets, as well as IPLs. + +For PVMs this concept has been extended with new subcodes: + +Subcode 8: Set an IPL Information Block of type 5 (information block +for PVMs) +Subcode 9: Store the saved block in guest memory +Subcode 10: Move into Protected Virtualization mode + +The new PV load-device-specific-parameters field specifies all data +that is necessary to move into PV mode. + +* PV Header origin +* PV Header length +* List of Components composed of + * AES-XTS Tweak prefix + * Origin + * Size + +The PV header contains the keys and hashes, which the UV will use to +decrypt and verify the PV, as well as control flags and a start PSW. + +The components are for instance an encrypted kernel, kernel parameters +and initrd. The components are decrypted by the UV. + +After the initial import of the encrypted data, all defined pages will +contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as +zero pages on first access. + + +When running in protected virtualization mode, some subcodes will result in +exceptions or return error codes. + +Subcodes 4 and 7, which specify operations that do not clear the guest +memory, will result in specification exceptions. This is because the +UV will clear all memory when a secure VM is removed, and therefore +non-clearing IPL subcodes are not allowed. + +Subcodes 8, 9, 10 will result in specification exceptions. +Re-IPL into a protected mode is only possible via a detour into non +protected mode. + +Keys +---- +Every CEC will have a unique public key to enable tooling to build +encrypted images. +See `s390-tools <https://github.com/ibm-s390-linux/s390-tools/>`_ +for the tooling. diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e542f06048f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv-dump.rst @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=========================================== +s390 (IBM Z) Protected Virtualization dumps +=========================================== + +Summary +------- + +Dumping a VM is an essential tool for debugging problems inside +it. This is especially true when a protected VM runs into trouble as +there's no way to access its memory and registers from the outside +while it's running. + +However when dumping a protected VM we need to maintain its +confidentiality until the dump is in the hands of the VM owner who +should be the only one capable of analysing it. + +The confidentiality of the VM dump is ensured by the Ultravisor who +provides an interface to KVM over which encrypted CPU and memory data +can be requested. The encryption is based on the Customer +Communication Key which is the key that's used to encrypt VM data in a +way that the customer is able to decrypt. + + +Dump process +------------ + +A dump is done in 3 steps: + +**Initiation** + +This step initializes the dump process, generates cryptographic seeds +and extracts dump keys with which the VM dump data will be encrypted. + +**Data gathering** + +Currently there are two types of data that can be gathered from a VM: +the memory and the vcpu state. + +The vcpu state contains all the important registers, general, floating +point, vector, control and tod/timers of a vcpu. The vcpu dump can +contain incomplete data if a vcpu is dumped while an instruction is +emulated with help of the hypervisor. This is indicated by a flag bit +in the dump data. For the same reason it is very important to not only +write out the encrypted vcpu state, but also the unencrypted state +from the hypervisor. + +The memory state is further divided into the encrypted memory and its +metadata comprised of the encryption tweaks and status flags. The +encrypted memory can simply be read once it has been exported. The +time of the export does not matter as no re-encryption is +needed. Memory that has been swapped out and hence was exported can be +read from the swap and written to the dump target without need for any +special actions. + +The tweaks / status flags for the exported pages need to be requested +from the Ultravisor. + +**Finalization** + +The finalization step will provide the data needed to be able to +decrypt the vcpu and memory data and end the dump process. When this +step completes successfully a new dump initiation can be started. diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8e41a3b63fa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390/s390-pv.rst @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========================================= +s390 (IBM Z) Ultravisor and Protected VMs +========================================= + +Summary +------- +Protected virtual machines (PVM) are KVM VMs that do not allow KVM to +access VM state like guest memory or guest registers. Instead, the +PVMs are mostly managed by a new entity called Ultravisor (UV). The UV +provides an API that can be used by PVMs and KVM to request management +actions. + +Each guest starts in non-protected mode and then may make a request to +transition into protected mode. On transition, KVM registers the guest +and its VCPUs with the Ultravisor and prepares everything for running +it. + +The Ultravisor will secure and decrypt the guest's boot memory +(i.e. kernel/initrd). It will safeguard state changes like VCPU +starts/stops and injected interrupts while the guest is running. + +As access to the guest's state, such as the SIE state description, is +normally needed to be able to run a VM, some changes have been made in +the behavior of the SIE instruction. A new format 4 state description +has been introduced, where some fields have different meanings for a +PVM. SIE exits are minimized as much as possible to improve speed and +reduce exposed guest state. + + +Interrupt injection +------------------- +Interrupt injection is safeguarded by the Ultravisor. As KVM doesn't +have access to the VCPUs' lowcores, injection is handled via the +format 4 state description. + +Machine check, external, IO and restart interruptions each can be +injected on SIE entry via a bit in the interrupt injection control +field (offset 0x54). If the guest cpu is not enabled for the interrupt +at the time of injection, a validity interception is recognized. The +format 4 state description contains fields in the interception data +block where data associated with the interrupt can be transported. + +Program and Service Call exceptions have another layer of +safeguarding; they can only be injected for instructions that have +been intercepted into KVM. The exceptions need to be a valid outcome +of an instruction emulation by KVM, e.g. we can never inject a +addressing exception as they are reported by SIE since KVM has no +access to the guest memory. + + +Mask notification interceptions +------------------------------- +KVM cannot intercept lctl(g) and lpsw(e) anymore in order to be +notified when a PVM enables a certain class of interrupt. As a +replacement, two new interception codes have been introduced: One +indicating that the contents of CRs 0, 6, or 14 have been changed, +indicating different interruption subclasses; and one indicating that +PSW bit 13 has been changed, indicating that a machine check +intervention was requested and those are now enabled. + +Instruction emulation +--------------------- +With the format 4 state description for PVMs, the SIE instruction already +interprets more instructions than it does with format 2. It is not able +to interpret every instruction, but needs to hand some tasks to KVM; +therefore, the SIE and the ultravisor safeguard emulation inputs and outputs. + +The control structures associated with SIE provide the Secure +Instruction Data Area (SIDA), the Interception Parameters (IP) and the +Secure Interception General Register Save Area. Guest GRs and most of +the instruction data, such as I/O data structures, are filtered. +Instruction data is copied to and from the SIDA when needed. Guest +GRs are put into / retrieved from the Secure Interception General +Register Save Area. + +Only GR values needed to emulate an instruction will be copied into this +save area and the real register numbers will be hidden. + +The Interception Parameters state description field still contains +the bytes of the instruction text, but with pre-set register values +instead of the actual ones. I.e. each instruction always uses the same +instruction text, in order not to leak guest instruction text. +This also implies that the register content that a guest had in r<n> +may be in r<m> from the hypervisor's point of view. + +The Secure Instruction Data Area contains instruction storage +data. Instruction data, i.e. data being referenced by an instruction +like the SCCB for sclp, is moved via the SIDA. When an instruction is +intercepted, the SIE will only allow data and program interrupts for +this instruction to be moved to the guest via the two data areas +discussed before. Other data is either ignored or results in validity +interceptions. + + +Instruction emulation interceptions +----------------------------------- +There are two types of SIE secure instruction intercepts: the normal +and the notification type. Normal secure instruction intercepts will +make the guest pending for instruction completion of the intercepted +instruction type, i.e. on SIE entry it is attempted to complete +emulation of the instruction with the data provided by KVM. That might +be a program exception or instruction completion. + +The notification type intercepts inform KVM about guest environment +changes due to guest instruction interpretation. Such an interception +is recognized, for example, for the store prefix instruction to provide +the new lowcore location. On SIE reentry, any KVM data in the data areas +is ignored and execution continues as if the guest instruction had +completed. For that reason KVM is not allowed to inject a program +interrupt. + +Links +----- +`KVM Forum 2019 presentation <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/kvmforum2019/3b/ibm_protected_vms_s390x.pdf>`_ |