11 files changed, 314 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/PCI/index.rst b/Documentation/PCI/index.rst
index f4c6121868c3..6768305e4c26 100644
--- a/Documentation/PCI/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/PCI/index.rst
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Linux PCI Bus Subsystem
    :numbered:
 
    pci
-   picebus-howto
+   pciebus-howto
    pci-iov-howto
    msi-howto
    acpi-info
diff --git a/Documentation/PCI/picebus-howto.rst b/Documentation/PCI/pciebus-howto.rst
index f882ff62c51f..f882ff62c51f 100644
--- a/Documentation/PCI/picebus-howto.rst
+++ b/Documentation/PCI/pciebus-howto.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 47d981a86e2f..4c1971960afa 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4090,6 +4090,13 @@
 			Run specified binary instead of /init from the ramdisk,
 			used for early userspace startup. See initrd.
 
+	rdrand=		[X86]
+			force - Override the decision by the kernel to hide the
+				advertisement of RDRAND support (this affects
+				certain AMD processors because of buggy BIOS
+				support, specifically around the suspend/resume
+				path).
+
 	rdt=		[HW,X86,RDT]
 			Turn on/off individual RDT features. List is:
 			cmt, mbmtotal, mbmlocal, l3cat, l3cdp, l2cat, l2cdp,
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
index a7d44e71019d..287b98708a40 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ Table : Subdirectories in /proc/sys/net
  802       E802 protocol         ax25       AX25
  ethernet  Ethernet protocol     rose       X.25 PLP layer
  ipv4      IP version 4          x25        X.25 protocol
- ipx       IPX                   token-ring IBM token ring
  bridge    Bridging              decnet     DEC net
  ipv6      IP version 6          tipc       TIPC
  ========= =================== = ========== ==================
@@ -401,33 +400,7 @@ interface.
 (network) that the route leads to, the router (may be directly connected), the
 route flags, and the device the route is using.
 
-
-5. IPX
-------
-
-The IPX protocol has no tunable values in proc/sys/net.
-
-The IPX  protocol  does,  however,  provide  proc/net/ipx. This lists each IPX
-socket giving  the  local  and  remote  addresses  in  Novell  format (that is
-network:node:port). In  accordance  with  the  strange  Novell  tradition,
-everything but the port is in hex. Not_Connected is displayed for sockets that
-are not  tied to a specific remote address. The Tx and Rx queue sizes indicate
-the number  of  bytes  pending  for  transmission  and  reception.  The  state
-indicates the  state  the  socket  is  in and the uid is the owning uid of the
-socket.
-
-The /proc/net/ipx_interface  file lists all IPX interfaces. For each interface
-it gives  the network number, the node number, and indicates if the network is
-the primary  network.  It  also  indicates  which  device  it  is bound to (or
-Internal for  internal  networks)  and  the  Frame  Type if appropriate. Linux
-supports 802.3,  802.2,  802.2  SNAP  and DIX (Blue Book) ethernet framing for
-IPX.
-
-The /proc/net/ipx_route  table  holds  a list of IPX routes. For each route it
-gives the  destination  network, the router node (or Directly) and the network
-address of the router (or Connected) for internal networks.
-
-6. TIPC
+5. TIPC
 -------
 
 tipc_rmem
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/interrupt-controller/snps,archs-idu-intc.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/interrupt-controller/snps,archs-idu-intc.txt
index 09fc02b99845..a5c1db95b3ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/interrupt-controller/snps,archs-idu-intc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/interrupt-controller/snps,archs-idu-intc.txt
@@ -1,20 +1,30 @@
 * ARC-HS Interrupt Distribution Unit
 
-  This optional 2nd level interrupt controller can be used in SMP configurations for
-  dynamic IRQ routing, load balancing of common/external IRQs towards core intc.
+  This optional 2nd level interrupt controller can be used in SMP configurations
+  for dynamic IRQ routing, load balancing of common/external IRQs towards core
+  intc.
 
 Properties:
 
 - compatible: "snps,archs-idu-intc"
 - interrupt-controller: This is an interrupt controller.
-- #interrupt-cells: Must be <1>.
-
-  Value of the cell specifies the "common" IRQ from peripheral to IDU. Number N
-  of the particular interrupt line of IDU corresponds to the line N+24 of the
-  core interrupt controller.
-
-  intc accessed via the special ARC AUX register interface, hence "reg" property
-  is not specified.
+- #interrupt-cells: Must be <1> or <2>.
+
+  Value of the first cell specifies the "common" IRQ from peripheral to IDU.
+  Number N of the particular interrupt line of IDU corresponds to the line N+24
+  of the core interrupt controller.
+
+  The (optional) second cell specifies any of the following flags:
+    - bits[3:0] trigger type and level flags
+        1 = low-to-high edge triggered
+        2 = NOT SUPPORTED (high-to-low edge triggered)
+        4 = active high level-sensitive <<< DEFAULT
+        8 = NOT SUPPORTED (active low level-sensitive)
+  When no second cell is specified, the interrupt is assumed to be level
+  sensitive.
+
+  The interrupt controller is accessed via the special ARC AUX register
+  interface, hence "reg" property is not specified.
 
 Example:
 	core_intc: core-interrupt-controller {
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/ksz.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/ksz.txt
index 4ac21cef370e..113e7ac79aad 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/ksz.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/dsa/ksz.txt
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Required properties:
   - "microchip,ksz8565"
   - "microchip,ksz9893"
   - "microchip,ksz9563"
+  - "microchip,ksz8563"
 
 Optional properties:
 
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/macb.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/macb.txt
index 63c73fafe26d..0b61a90f1592 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/macb.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/macb.txt
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ Required properties:
   Use "atmel,sama5d4-gem" for the GEM IP (10/100) available on Atmel sama5d4 SoCs.
   Use "cdns,zynq-gem" Xilinx Zynq-7xxx SoC.
   Use "cdns,zynqmp-gem" for Zynq Ultrascale+ MPSoC.
-  Use "sifive,fu540-macb" for SiFive FU540-C000 SoC.
+  Use "sifive,fu540-c000-gem" for SiFive FU540-C000 SoC.
   Or the generic form: "cdns,emac".
 - reg: Address and length of the register set for the device
-	For "sifive,fu540-macb", second range is required to specify the
+	For "sifive,fu540-c000-gem", second range is required to specify the
 	address and length of the registers for GEMGXL Management block.
 - interrupts: Should contain macb interrupt
 - phy-mode: See ethernet.txt file in the same directory.
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst b/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
index b70b70dc4524..0dd3f748239f 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
@@ -506,21 +506,3 @@ Drivers should ignore the changes to TLS the device feature flags.
 These flags will be acted upon accordingly by the core ``ktls`` code.
 TLS device feature flags only control adding of new TLS connection
 offloads, old connections will remain active after flags are cleared.
-
-Known bugs
-==========
-
-skb_orphan() leaks clear text
------------------------------
-
-Currently drivers depend on the :c:member:`sk` member of
-:c:type:`struct sk_buff <sk_buff>` to identify segments requiring
-encryption. Any operation which removes or does not preserve the socket
-association such as :c:func:`skb_orphan` or :c:func:`skb_clone`
-will cause the driver to miss the packets and lead to clear text leaks.
-
-Redirects leak clear text
--------------------------
-
-In the RX direction, if segment has already been decrypted by the device
-and it gets redirected or mirrored - clear text will be transmitted out.
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt b/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt
index 949d5dcdd9a3..0104830d5075 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt
@@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ Ethernet device, which instead of receiving packets from a physical
 media, receives them from user space program and instead of sending 
 packets via physical media sends them to the user space program. 
 
-Let's say that you configured IPX on the tap0, then whenever 
-the kernel sends an IPX packet to tap0, it is passed to the application
+Let's say that you configured IPv6 on the tap0, then whenever
+the kernel sends an IPv6 packet to tap0, it is passed to the application
 (VTun for example). The application encrypts, compresses and sends it to 
 the other side over TCP or UDP. The application on the other side decompresses
 and decrypts the data received and writes the packet to the TAP device, 
diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..402636356fbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+Embargoed hardware issues
+=========================
+
+Scope
+-----
+
+Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category
+of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux
+kernel.
+
+Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated
+differently because they usually affect all Operating Systems ("OS") and
+therefore need coordination across different OS vendors, distributions,
+hardware vendors and other parties. For some of the issues, software
+mitigations can depend on microcode or firmware updates, which need further
+coordination.
+
+.. _Contact:
+
+Contact
+-------
+
+The Linux kernel hardware security team is separate from the regular Linux
+kernel security team.
+
+The team only handles the coordination of embargoed hardware security
+issues.  Reports of pure software security bugs in the Linux kernel are not
+handled by this team and the reporter will be guided to contact the regular
+Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/
+<securitybugs>`) instead.
+
+The team can be contacted by email at <hardware-security@kernel.org>. This
+is a private list of security officers who will help you to coordinate an
+issue according to our documented process.
+
+The list is encrypted and email to the list can be sent by either PGP or
+S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the reporter's PGP key or S/MIME
+certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME certificate are available from
+https://www.kernel.org/....
+
+While hardware security issues are often handled by the affected hardware
+vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or individuals who have
+identified a potential hardware flaw.
+
+Hardware security officers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The current team of hardware security officers:
+
+  - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow)
+  - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fellow)
+  - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow)
+
+Operation of mailing-lists
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in our process are hosted on
+Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By providing this service Linux
+Foundation's director of IT Infrastructure security technically has the
+ability to access the embargoed information, but is obliged to
+confidentiality by his employment contract. Linux Foundation's director of
+IT Infrastructure security is also responsible for the kernel.org
+infrastructure.
+
+The Linux Foundation's current director of IT Infrastructure security is
+Konstantin Ryabitsev.
+
+
+Non-disclosure agreements
+-------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel hardware security team is not a formal body and therefore
+unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreements.  The kernel community
+is aware of the sensitive nature of such issues and offers a Memorandum of
+Understanding instead.
+
+
+Memorandum of Understanding
+---------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel community has a deep understanding of the requirement to
+keep hardware security issues under embargo for coordination between
+different OS vendors, distributors, hardware vendors and other parties.
+
+The Linux kernel community has successfully handled hardware security
+issues in the past and has the necessary mechanisms in place to allow
+community compliant development under embargo restrictions.
+
+The Linux kernel community has a dedicated hardware security team for
+initial contact, which oversees the process of handling such issues under
+embargo rules.
+
+The hardware security team identifies the developers (domain experts) who
+will form the initial response team for a particular issue. The initial
+response team can bring in further developers (domain experts) to address
+the issue in the best technical way.
+
+All involved developers pledge to adhere to the embargo rules and to keep
+the received information confidential. Violation of the pledge will lead to
+immediate exclusion from the current issue and removal from all related
+mailing-lists. In addition, the hardware security team will also exclude
+the offender from future issues. The impact of this consequence is a highly
+effective deterrent in our community. In case a violation happens the
+hardware security team will inform the involved parties immediately. If you
+or anyone becomes aware of a potential violation, please report it
+immediately to the Hardware security officers.
+
+
+Process
+^^^^^^^
+
+Due to the globally distributed nature of Linux kernel development,
+face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to address hardware security
+issues.  Phone conferences are hard to coordinate due to time zones and
+other factors and should be only used when absolutely necessary. Encrypted
+email has been proven to be the most effective and secure communication
+method for these types of issues.
+
+Start of Disclosure
+"""""""""""""""""""
+
+Disclosure starts by contacting the Linux kernel hardware security team by
+email. This initial contact should contain a description of the problem and
+a list of any known affected hardware. If your organization builds or
+distributes the affected hardware, we encourage you to also consider what
+other hardware could be affected.
+
+The hardware security team will provide an incident-specific encrypted
+mailing-list which will be used for initial discussion with the reporter,
+further disclosure and coordination.
+
+The hardware security team will provide the disclosing party a list of
+developers (domain experts) who should be informed initially about the
+issue after confirming with the developers  that they will adhere to this
+Memorandum of Understanding and the documented process. These developers
+form the initial response team and will be responsible for handling the
+issue after initial contact. The hardware security team is supporting the
+response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation
+development process.
+
+While individual developers might be covered by a non-disclosure agreement
+via their employer, they cannot enter individual non-disclosure agreements
+in their role as Linux kernel developers. They will, however, agree to
+adhere to this documented process and the Memorandum of Understanding.
+
+
+Disclosure
+""""""""""
+
+The disclosing party provides detailed information to the initial response
+team via the specific encrypted mailing-list.
+
+From our experience the technical documentation of these issues is usually
+a sufficient starting point and further technical clarification is best
+done via email.
+
+Mitigation development
+""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes
+an existing one if appropriate. The disclosing party should provide a list
+of contacts for all other parties who have already been, or should be,
+informed about the issue. The response team contacts these parties so they
+can name experts who should be subscribed to the mailing-list.
+
+Using a mailing-list is close to the normal Linux development process and
+has been successfully used in developing mitigations for various hardware
+security issues in the past.
+
+The mailing-list operates in the same way as normal Linux development.
+Patches are posted, discussed and reviewed and if agreed on applied to a
+non-public git repository which is only accessible to the participating
+developers via a secure connection. The repository contains the main
+development branch against the mainline kernel and backport branches for
+stable kernel versions as necessary.
+
+The initial response team will identify further experts from the Linux
+kernel developer community as needed and inform the disclosing party about
+their participation. Bringing in experts can happen at any time of the
+development process and often needs to be handled in a timely manner.
+
+Coordinated release
+"""""""""""""""""""
+
+The involved parties will negotiate the date and time where the embargo
+ends. At that point the prepared mitigations are integrated into the
+relevant kernel trees and published.
+
+While we understand that hardware security issues need coordinated embargo
+time, the embargo time should be constrained to the minimum time which is
+required for all involved parties to develop, test and prepare the
+mitigations. Extending embargo time artificially to meet conference talk
+dates or other non-technical reasons is creating more work and burden for
+the involved developers and response teams as the patches need to be kept
+up to date in order to follow the ongoing upstream kernel development,
+which might create conflicting changes.
+
+CVE assignment
+""""""""""""""
+
+Neither the hardware security team nor the initial response team assign
+CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the development process. If CVEs are
+provided by the disclosing party they can be used for documentation
+purposes.
+
+Process ambassadors
+-------------------
+
+For assistance with this process we have established ambassadors in various
+organizations, who can answer questions about or provide guidance on the
+reporting process and further handling. Ambassadors are not involved in the
+disclosure of a particular issue, unless requested by a response team or by
+an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:
+
+  ============= ========================================================
+  ARM
+  AMD
+  IBM
+  Intel
+  Qualcomm	Trilok Soni <tsoni@codeaurora.org>
+
+  Microsoft	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+  VMware
+  Xen		Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+  Canonical	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
+  Debian	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+  Oracle	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+  Red Hat	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+  SUSE		Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+
+  Amazon
+  Google	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+  ============= ========================================================
+
+If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please
+contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to
+understand and support our process fully and is ideally well connected in
+the Linux kernel community.
+
+Encrypted mailing-lists
+-----------------------
+
+We use encrypted mailing-lists for communication. The operating principle
+of these lists is that email sent to the list is encrypted either with the
+list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certificate. The mailing-list
+software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it individually for each
+subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME certificate. Details
+about the mailing-list software and the setup which is used to ensure the
+security of the lists and protection of the data can be found here:
+https://www.kernel.org/....
+
+List keys
+^^^^^^^^^
+
+For initial contact see :ref:`Contact`. For incident specific mailing-lists
+the key and S/MIME certificate are conveyed to the subscribers by email
+sent from the specific list.
+
+Subscription to incident specific lists
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Subscription is handled by the response teams. Disclosed parties who want
+to participate in the communication send a list of potential subscribers to
+the response team so the response team can validate subscription requests.
+
+Each subscriber needs to send a subscription request to the response team
+by email. The email must be signed with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME
+certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be available from a public key
+server and is ideally connected to the Linux kernel's PGP web of trust. See
+also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html.
+
+The response team verifies that the subscriber request is valid and adds
+the subscriber to the list. After subscription the subscriber will receive
+email from the mailing-list which is signed either with the list's PGP key
+or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscriber's email client can extract
+the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the signature so the subscriber
+can send encrypted email to the list.
+
diff --git a/Documentation/process/index.rst b/Documentation/process/index.rst
index 878ebfda7eef..e2c9ffc682c5 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/index.rst
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Other guides to the community that are of interest to most developers are:
    submit-checklist
    kernel-docs
    deprecated
+   embargoed-hardware-issues
 
 These are some overall technical guides that have been put here for now for
 lack of a better place.